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Much of what has been written on thinkers oscillates between two 
different approaches. On the one hand, thinkers are studied and 
compared with regard to specific topics. One could write a book (or 
three books), for example, on what Nietzsche, Foucault, and Luhmann 
wrote about the concept of power. On the other hand, depending on the 
scope of the work in question, a biographical reading still seems to offer 
the only access to the unity and entirety of the creativity of a thinker.
In this essay, I try to present a somewhat different route to the 
unity of the work: what I will call the intrinsic geometry of a mode of 
questioning and observing refers to the design of the linkage between 
observation and self-observation. The design chosen at this level 
accounts for many peculiarities of the resulting work. For example, the 
extent to which a full account of the work has to draw on biographical 
circumstances largely depends on how observation and self-observation 
were coupled in the work in question. In other words, the level of the 
intrinsic geometry seems anterior to the level of biography.
In the following, I will examine (i) how in the writings of Nietzsche, 
of Foucault, and of Luhmann highly recursive designs were employed 
at the level of their intrinsic geometries, (ii) what consequences these 
designs had for the continuation and reception of the respective 
projects, and (iii) what the status of such recursive designs is in current 
philosophy and sociology.
I am very much indebted to Arpad Scakolczai, who accompanied 
this work with his advice and encouragement. Arpad is much more an 
expert on Foucault than I am, and he generously shared his in-depth 
knowledge of Foucault’s work with me. He pointed me to crucial texts 
and commented on earlier drafts of parts of this book. Without his help, 
I easily could have gone lost in Foucault’s labyrinth. Still, and needless 




























































































Very special thanks also to Ruth Purchase and Steven Hicklin.
While I was working my way into the labyrinths of Nietzsche, 
Foucault, and Luhmann, I always felt as if I were engaged in some kind 
of parrhesiastic game (see sections 78.-79.), which forced me to take 
care of myself -  by writing this essay, by adding a fourth reference to 
its title!





























































































The three thinkers mentioned in the subtitle of this essay -- 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, Niklas Luhmann -- all have 
provoked (or are about to provoke) a tremendous amount of what is 
called "secondary literature": discussions, commentary, applications, 
criticism, summaries, reviews, assessments, evaluations, 
categorizations, judgements. The case of Nietzsche, for example, is 
almost frightening -  not only because of the scope and diversity of the 
responses to his writings but also because he himself, as is well-known, 
predicted his ambiguous fame (including its ambiguity) in spite of his 
being ignored throughout much of his conscious life. Many of the 
responses to these thinkers seem to imply that we have to be either for 
or against them, that they were right or wrong, better or worse than 
other thinkers, or right on that issue and wrong on this issue. And they 
were wright or wrong, so we are told, because the world is or is not 
what they thought it is. I wonder whether there is a way of thinking with 
and about thinkers which does not end with this kind of binary choice: 
for or against. In fact, I wonder whether it would not be necessary to 
find such a way since it became one of the most frequently referred to 
(yet rarely remembered) features of our time to think that solid grounds 
upon which such choices can be made do not exist. Moreover, I 
wonder whether especially in the cases of Nietzsche, Foucault, 
Luhmann we would not have to look for new, more sophisticated ways 
of approaching their works precisely because these works question, 
each in its way, the grounds of a normality upon which we (de)value 
utterances, writings and, ultimately, being.
2 .
The point of this opening is not, of course, to disregard or to 




























































































thinkers. The point is rather to question the automaticity of many of the 
procedures which we are used to in academic work. We are used to 
situate thinkers in an history of (only) thought; we engage them in a 
discussion which is imposed on them; and we thereby presuppose a 
continuity and unity which functions like an invisible black board upon 
which names and ideas are being schematized: evaluation and 
categorization as the easiest ways to establish superiority over the texts 
of others. And what remains, then, on this magic black board, which 
somehow fills the space in between what thinkers thought at different 
times and different places, is nothing but pure thought which is 
somehow distinct from being, nothing but "fixed" ideas, fixed points, like 
stars at the sky which move, if at all, in predictable orbits and order, like 
things we own, like things we consider under control. Again, all this has 
been fruitful and perhaps, depending on the purpose of the inquiries, 
even necessary. But, again, I wonder what is hidden behind the 
darkness of that black board; I wonder what we would find if we started 
to question its taken-for-grantedness: perhaps more than thought? 
Thought and the struggle behind it? Being? Experience? The dynamics 
behind evolutions of thought? Thought and its reflection upon itself? 
Pieces of work which, in fact, do not refer to other pieces on the board 
but to ... themselves?
3.
Although this essay, unless it will be ignored, will undoubtedly run 
into the fate of being simply added to that immense and complex body 
of evaluating commentaries on Nietzsche, Foucault, and Luhmann, it 
does at least try to establish a difference to that body. Its purpose is not 
to be located at the level of critique, commentary or exegesis. It tries 
to inaugurate a new way of thinking about and with thinkers. It suggests 
a new way of comparing and relating thinkers without squeezing them 
into hierarchies; and it thereby tries to open new ways of using and 
continuing their works. The novelty this essay introduces lies in its 
attempt to trace the specific epistemological designs employed by 
certain streams of observations or modes of inquiries. Not each inquiry, 
of course, will arrive at its own epistemological design; instead, it is 




























































































mode of observing, is embedded in "disciplines": sociology, political 
science, history, and so on. The great bulk of academic work is being 
done in this disciplined way and thus takes for granted epistemological 
foundations sanctioned by the mere existence of the discipline. In these 
cases, tracing epistemological designs amounts to just another chapter 
in a sociology of science. But there are other, rare and exceptional 
cases of modes of observing which, for their own specific reasons, felt 
it necessary to establish their own designs. Often this happens in an 
uneasy, troubled and uncertain disengagement from earlier allegiances 
to disciplines or, more general, to assumptions which had been hitherto 
taken for granted and eventually became unacceptable. In these 
designs, self-reference substitutes the reference to a discipline. These 
designs are, then, specific forms of linkages between observation and 
self-observation, between self- and hetero-reference.
4.
An observation is the unity of a distinction and a denotation.1 It 
is, in other words, the execution of a distinction by denoting one of the 
two distinct sides. I observe, just now, the cursor of my computer 
screen as it is moving while I am typing these words. I observe it by 
treating it as distinct from everything else which is currently within the 
range of my vision. A denotation is necessary to accentuate the cursor 
against the background of everything else, which is in fact just 
"everything else": unspecified, unspecific, indefinite. Yet, while 
observing, I cannot but take for granted this distinction; I can only 
employ it, not observe it. As long as I observe the cursor I cannot 
observe something else for that would require another, different 
distinction between what is (then) being observed and everything else.
I could turn my head (say, to the left), and I could observe (through the 
window of my room with a view): the cupola of the Duomo in Florence, 
Italy, as being distinct from everything else in the range of my vision. 
And I would learn that the distinction I employed while observing the 
cursor was already based on a selection, i.e. a distinction: namely the 
distinction between the distinction I employed in order to see the cursor 
and between all other distinctions I could have employed. Thus, one 




























































































observation uses and creates a "blind spot"; each observation creates 
unobservabilities. But precisely this can be observed. Another observer 
could see me typing and could (then) see all the things I cannot see as 
I am following the cursor. He could see what I cannot see (he could 
see the Duomo) and he could see that I cannot see what I cannot see 
(he could see that I cannot see the Duomo). And even I could see all 
this, but it would require time: it would require the time necessary to 
switch from the distinction between the cursor and everything else to 
another distinction. To render unobservabilities observable requires 
either time or another observer, i.e. in either case distance -  temporal 
or, if you will, spatial distance.
5.
There are at least two possible ways in which a concern with 
distance can surface as a problem in an ongoing stream of 
observations. First, an observation may simply become too ambitious; 
it may continuously try to arrive and to transgress the limits of visibility 
and precisely thereby reveal its own secret: it may reveal that its own 
possibility sponged on a necessary restriction of visibility which is 
continuously reproduced by continuing the observation. Second, an 
observation may be directed, from the outset, towards its own 
unobservabilities; it may be directed towards independence and 
autonomy and thus may try to look at what it took for granted after 
having taken it for granted. In both cases, a first encounter with its blind 
spot may pose severe problems for the observation: its possibility 
evaporates with its secret; the momentum is lost. It is at this point 
where the continuation of observation becomes a problem and distance 
a solution. For distance makes the observation of unobservabilities 
possible. The blind spot cannot be removed but the observation can 
take its inevitability into account by following routes which are 
compatible with the necessity of distance. The question is then how the 
observation can return, time after time, to its earlier observations in 
order to see what it could not see at that time. In some sense, the 
observation must become systematic in that it somehow combines 




























































































observations where the previously used and thus unobserved 
distinctions continuously re-enter the string of observations.
6.
In this picture, there is, then, one point, one singularity where the 
momentum of observation is lost. I shall refer to this singularity as the 
re-entry of the observation into itself. The observation uses a distinction 
and later returns to it so that the earlier distinction becomes one of the 
two sides of the (now) actual distinction. In other words, the very 
distinction between what is being denoted and everything else later 
reappears in its entirety in a distinction of the same kind on the side of 
what is being denoted. For the observation, this moment of re-entry 
functions like a switch point. On the one hand, the re-entry marks the 
perhaps first encounter of the observation with itself; it may realize on 
this occasion that it has been based, all the time, on a certain degree 
of blindness. On the other hand, once the re-entry took place, the 
blindness itself has become visible so that some distance to what was 
previously taken for granted must have been installed already. The 
question is only how the observation connects to that distance and how 
it ensures, if it does, that this distance will be continuously reproduced 
in the future. To ensure this continuous creation of distance requires a 
systematic link between observation and self-observation. Somehow the 
observation must create space for itself in what it observes. But, as the 
different designs of Nietzsche, Foucault and Luhmann show, this can 
be done in various ways. The re-entry only enforces a choice and does 
not prescribe the outcome of that choice. The deeper reason for this 
logical incompleteness is the logical independence between a "self" and 
what it sees when it observes itself.2 Due to the self-reference involved 
in the very procedure of self-observation, due to the lack of distance 
precisely at the singularity of the re-entry, self-observation is always an 
act of creation. This does not mean that there is no relationship 
between the choice made at the point of re-entry and everything that 
took place before; rather, the choice consists precisely in a creation of 
such a relationship. Since it enforces a creation (rather than an 
inference), the re-entry marks, in a sense, a lack of justification within 




























































































the choice of design, once made, largely determines how the project, 
the stream of observations unfolds after the re-entry. In the following, 
I will refer to the level of that choice, i.e. to the specific design of the 
coupling between observation and self-observation as the intrinsic 
geometry of a research project, a stream of observations, a mode of 
questioning, or an evolution of thought.
7.
Once observation and self-observation have been explicitly linked, 
the observation from then on will be more than what is usually 
described as "reflexive". Academic work is always reflexive: one writes 
a paper at point A, then refers back to it later at point B, possibly 
corrects it, puts it into a larger context, or even rejects it. But, typically, 
academic reflexiveness is only occasional, mostly oriented towards 
specific temporary projects and never towards the very activity of 
pursuing these projects, never towards the unity which connects all 
these activities into what counts as "knowledge". Science delegates 
systematic reflexion to a subfield, to epistemology, in order to be able 
to continue what it does, hoping that epistemology will take care of 
whatever doubts there may remain. Yet even epistemology or the 
sociology of science rarely arrives at an inclusion of the exclusion of 
self-reflexion, subjectivity and self-reference into its considerations. To 
be part of an academic "discipline" does not mean, then, to take up a 
burden, to suffer from punishment, control, or to be subjugated to 
discipline; it means quite the contrary: it means to be relieved from the 
burden of self-reflexion, it means to take for granted one’s purpose, to 
rely on the discipline sanctioning one’s doing. I could say (if it were 
true): "I am a political scientist", and everyone (thinks s(he)) 
understands! Academic discipline is a safeguard against re-entries. Still, 
re-entries do occur. The re-entry forces an observation to take care of 
itself, to sanction itself, to re-establish "self-evidence. And precisely 
this can be done by relating observation and self-observation, by seeing 
the activity of seeing in what is being seen, by embedding the 
observation in what is being observed. The recursiveness of such a 
procedure invites feed back-effects: the observation learns something 




























































































observes. It must be prepared, then, to move, change focus, 
perspective, mode or position in accordance with what is being 
observed. In this way, the observation cannot but try to live up to its 
own results since these results now always refer also to the observation 
itself. Projects which employ such a design not only develop but 
simultaneously exemplify their own epistemologies; and precisely 
thereby they give evidence of the very possibility of their results. The 
project itself, in its entirety, becomes an example of what it generates; 
it becomes (one of) its own output(s). This procedure is highly dynamic 
and non-linear. At first, nothing guarantees that its initiation leads to a 
stable setting. Stability must be achieved and cannot be inferred in 
advance.
8 .
What does one have to see in order to be able (to continue) to 
see what one sees? -  this, in some sense, is the question which a 
thinker has to respond to at the moment of re-entry. After this 
encounter with himself, with what made him possible in the past, he 
now has to create the future conditions of his thinking and observing. 
He may return to or enter a discipline or he may instead develop his 
own personal line of inquiry, his own problematic, sanctioned only by 
its exemplification. In the latter case, when the re-entry is followed by 
an explicit linkage between observation and self-observation, 
subsequent work is likely to be situated outside of scientific traditions. 
For in that this type of work simultaneously generates and exemplifies 
its epistemology, it forms a science of its own, a Gay Science!, and, to 
some extent, closes itself off from scientific disciplines. Attempts to 
evaluate the self-referential work according to standards external to it 
usually follow the usual procedures and lead to predictable results: it is 
as if someone looks at a potato, then takes a knife, cuts and forms the 
potato until it looks like a pear, tastes it and then passionately and 
publicly complains that the thing doesn’t taste like a pear, not at all! 
And those who nevertheless try to work their way into those projects, 
who try to arrive at an internal reading of those works, often struggle 
with their recursive, labyrinthine architectures. The unfortunate result is 




























































































against-alternative -  only that now, due to the peculiar autonomy of 
self-referential work, the alternative remains unsettled, leading to a 
delicate stalemate between mainstream thinking and some loyal 
followers. The thinkers who performed or perform this type of work 
remain unstable entries, trouble-makers, on that black board of the 
history of thought; they function like touchstones forcing everyone who 
touches them to reveal his position, his personal truth.
9.
This essay tries to read the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel 
Foucault, and Niklas Luhmann as examples of such touchstones: as 
works which implement specific linkages between observation and self­
observation. Again, the point of this essay is not to either defend or 
challenge these authors; the point is instead to lay open the intrinsic 
geometry of their observations, to reveal how concretely each of them 
linked self- and hetero-reference. This requires an internal reading of 
their works, a reconstruction of their intellectual trajectories with a 
special emphasis on how they looked upon their own undertakings at 
their various stages. The evolution of the self-descriptions of their works 
is an important key to an understanding of their intrinsic geometries. I 
will therefore make use also of sources which are not always 
considered part of the main works: for example, in the case of 
Nietzsche, I will heavily draw on his letters, and in the case of Foucault, 
on his interviews. Although tracing the self-observation in the 
observation inevitably exposes, as far as available, biographical details 
of the lives of those thinkers, the following three chapters on Nietzsche, 
Foucault and Luhmann are not meant to be exercises in writing 
biographies. In other words, my question is not how the life of a thinker, 
his very personal situation, his state of mind generates his writings 
simply because this biographical question already presupposes a 
specific link between observation and self-observation: it links them in 
an asymmetrical way as if self-observation always guided the 
observation. Instead, my interest refers to a level prior to this level of 






























































































Moreover, my presentation of first Nietzsche’s, then Foucault’s 
and then Luhmann’s undertaking is more or something else than mere 
exegesis. My aim is not to trace all the hiding places and corners in 
their labyrinths, but to do analytical work: to specify and conceptualize 
the principles upon which those labyrinths were built. The aim is 
precisely to understand how their works came to be labyrinthine rather 
than straightforward, easily accessible and linear. What is it in those 
works that accounts for their complexity? The final chapter picks up this 
question again by means of a comparison. Again, the aim of comparing 
is not to hierarchize or categorize, but instead to render both my 
question and first tentative answers more precise. The presentation of 
three different designs at once and their comparison will also help to 
avoid thinking of one of these designs as the only possible or as the 
ultimate mapping of the world as it is. And if, in this way, the specific 
designs are being revealed as contingent, as selections made in 
response to certain requirements, then the question cannot be whether 
these selections were right or wrong. The question is instead what 
there is in our present that has made and makes these selections 
possible or likely. What is this specificity of our present of which these 
selections are concrete evidence? And what could be, then, the future 































































































In late 1874, early 75, Nietzsche projected altogether 13 
Unzeitqemal3e Betrachtungen [Untimely Meditations], three of which 
were already finished and a fourth existed "in his mind".3 He estimated 
that he would need five more years for the remaining ten and 
contemplated that 50 of those pamphlets "should have some effect".4 
Seven years later, and now, in his own words, "at the height of his life 
and his task", Nietzsche was forced again and again to reflect upon his 
future and his work. This time, however, for more prosaic reasons: his 
pension granted in 1879 for six years would expire after four more 
years. In August 1881, Nietzsche asked his friend Overbeck, who 
managed his financial affairs in Switzerland, when precisely the last 
payment was to be expected. Nietzsche did not want to devote these 
four years to anything but to his task and its fulfilment -  if possible 
without any distraction whatsoever.5 Absolute solitude was now the 
condition of his work and life.6
12 .
Nietzsche’s earlier projection, of course, proved to be as wrong 
as it could be. He did not publish anything in 75 and had great 
difficulties in finishing only the fourth UnzeitqemaBe Betrachtung on 
Wagner. In fact, in September of that year, he was "increasingly 
disgusted" by the very idea of publishing in general.7 Apart from his 
piece on Wagner and its translation into French, Nietzsche’s next 
publication would be Menschliches. Allzumenschliches [Human. All-Too 
Human] in 1878.® In the early 80s, in contrast, he seemed to be back 




























































































Zarathustra] was finished in February 1885; shortly before his pension 
expired.9 In between, I shall argue, there was Nietzsche’s crisis: a 
moment where he seemed to have lost all orientation. As his life plans 
of late 75 show, the loss of momentum occurred precisely at a moment 
when he came close to a complete picture of what he was doing and 
of what he was going to do. At some point, Nietzsche might have 
regarded the completeness of these outlooks on his life and his work 
as an achievement, but it was exactly their completeness that would 
allow him to problematize his work in its entirety.
13.
Nietzsche’s crisis had many faces. There are several schemes of 
interpretation of why and how he lost direction that all fit the redundant 
evidence. In the following I will not provide a narrative account of this 
period from 1875 to 1881, but will highlight in a few words the schemes 
usually considered -- also by Nietzsche himself -- to be most important: 
Nietzsche’s failure as a philologist, the increasing distance to 
Schopenhauer and in particular to Wagner, Nietzsche’s deteriorating 
health, and the now recurring theme of loneliness. Of course, a 
separate treatment of these themes should not obscure that they were 
interrelated and mutually amplified their effects. Throughout my 
discussion, Nietzsche’s reflection upon his work, his perspective, and 
his life will be crucial. I shall therefore make extensive use of the 
advantage that all his writings, unpublished fragments and most of his 
letters are available. 14
14 .
Nietzsche was 24 years old when he became professor of 
classical philology at Bâle university. He had been promoted by his 
teacher in Leipzig, Ritschl, to this position without having written a 
proper dissertation.10 Apparently, at this time Nietzsche already had 
some doubts about the role philology should play in his future life.11 
However, his success soon dissolved whatever doubts there might 




























































































considered this strike of the "devil ‘destiny’" only as a confirmation of 
what he had already enjoyed for some time: the status of the genius.12 
And yet Nietzsche’s first book, Die Geburt der Traaodie [The Birth of 
Tragedy], ended his career as a scientist as rapidly as it began. While 
he was working on this book, from about late 69 to its publication in 
January 72, Nietzsche must have felt more and more that he was 
leaving his academic discipline. In January 1871, he applied for the 
then vacant chair in philosophy at Bâle and suggested his friend Rohde 
as his successor in philology. The ideas of the book -- the birth of 
tragedy out of the spirit of dionysian music, tragedy’s death in the spirit 
of socratism, and the possible renaissance of tragedy in German 
philosophy and Richard Wagner’s music -- do not add up to what would 
count as a scientific treatise but to a philosophical and political essay 
on art, culture and education. Accordingly, the philologists at first 
reacted with total silence. Nietzsche, anxious for reactions, for 
applause, let himself carried away and demanded in writing a response 
from his mentor and one of the biggest German names in philology, 
Ritschl, claiming that his book was a manifest and deserved if not 
agreement then at least opposition.13 Ritschl’s answer was diplomatic 
in its form, but highly ironical in its contents. Obviously, Nietzsche did 
not understand this irony. In particular, he did not notice that the 
devastating part of Ritschl’s letter was an omittance: there was no 
comment whatsoever on the scientific part of Nietzsche’s book, i.e. on 
his theses concerning the Greeks.14 Comments of this kind would 
follow, soon enough, in Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf’s famous 
pamphlet published in May 1872.15 I will not go into the historical 
details of the exchange between Rohde, Wagner (defending Nietzsche), 
and again Wilamowitz-Moellendorf that followed this challenge. Two 
points, however, are important. First, Moellendorf criticized Die Geburt 
der Traaodie not only for its philosophical framework, but in particular 
measured it according to the standards of philology as a scientific 
discipline: there were no quotations from Greek texts in the book, 
historical dates were neglected and texts were assigned to the wrong 
periods etc. Moellendorf’s critique quite accurately represented the 
discipline’s viewpoint. The German philologist Hermann Usenertold his 
students in Bonn that "someone who wrote something like that is dead 
as a scientist".16 From one day to the other, Nietzsche lost his 




























































































one studying German, the other law -  who would follow his course on 
Greek and Roman Rhetoric. Although students would return later, 
Nietzsche never regained his reputation as a scientist. The second 
point: Nietzsche was not at all impressed by this. It is true, the episode 
would later have repercussions even in the Zarathustra,15 *7 but it was 
only in retrospective that Nietzsche acknowledged his defeat (and 
interpreted it as a liberation). At first, he did not lose momentum; his 
self-confidence did not decrease. The opposite was the case. He had 
always wanted to have enemies; now he found one in Wiiamowitz, and 
this "poor little boy, certainly befooled and seduced by others, had to 
be punished publicly".18 This, however, had to be done by Rohde for 
it would have been against Nietzsche’s honour as a professor to 
respond to the attack of a younger student who had just written his 
dissertation. Nietzsche did not even reconsider his profession. In 
September 72, he did not see himself as a philosopher -  only "a little 
bit".19 It is not difficult to speculate on why Nietzsche was not at all 
shaken by this for the first time encountered silence of an audience. In 
some sense, he felt reconfirmed without seeing the necessity to change 
perspective. Of course, what helped him was that his book made him 
the first intellectual spokesman of the circle around Richard Wagner. It 
was here where his book did have an impact.
15.
Nietzsche’s failure as a philologist did not lead him into an 
intellectual crisis. In fact, in 1873, he would again publish an article on 
Homer and Hesiod in Ritschl’s philological journal "Rheinisches 
Museum". Nietzsche’s interest in philology might in fact have increased 
in that period -  for reasons, of course, which had nothing to do with the 
success or failure of his book. For he discovered, in the summer of
1872, the pre-platonic philosophers, especially Heraclitus, who would 
have an important influence not only on Nietzsche’s thinking but also 
on his relation towards his own work.20 Also in the context of
Nietzsche’s increasing distance to Schopenhauer and Wagner, one 
should not underestimate the influential inspiration Nietzsche found in
his philological studies. The various ways of thinking and living




























































































which his masters were continuously measured so that, at the time 
when Nietzsche wrote his UnzeitqemaBe Betrachtungen about them, 
he had already gained intellectual distance to them. He encountered 
Schopenhauer’s writings in late 1865, shortly after his arrival in Leipzig. 
During his military service, Nietzsche had a picture of the very popular 
thinker on his desk.21 It was not just Schopenhauer’s thinking that 
attracted Nietzsche, but also the philosopher’s attitude, i.e. the close 
relation between Schopenhauer’s life and his philosophy. Throughout 
his career as an author, Schopenhauer remained unconnected with 
universities or the philosophical establishment. He was the self-made 
man, the creator of his own world whose success would come only very 
late in his life. And before, Schopenhauer took great pleasure in this 
lack of recognition; he sacrificed his life for his philosophy. 
Schopenhauer’s thinking started from the Kantian scepticism about 
human ability to apprehend reality and concluded that, although the will 
was the root of the intellect, an "objective" and deep apprehension of 
the world required the latter to be decoupled from the former. "The 
world can appear in its true colour and shape, in its full and correct 
meaning only if the intellect, rid of the will, soars freely over the 
subjects, energetic and active even without being driven by the will."22 
For Schopenhauer, the ethical implication of Kant’s scepticism was the 
renunciation of the "interested" will, the furthering of the separation of 
intellect and will, which for the genius reached its ultimate form. The 
works of a genius are characterized, then, as immediate, necessary, 
purified, instinctive, as the opposite of purposeful calculations, as the 
clear mirrors of the world. The genius was not part of the world to the 
extent that he had no interests in it; since he was detached from the 
world, the world could not but appear strange to him. The consequence 
was misery: a genius was lonely because of his exceptionality, he 
suffered from feelings of alienation, lacked practical skill and was close 
to insanity. A genius must be prepared to accept that only future 
generations might be able to understand and honour his ingenuity. 
Clearly, at the time when Nietzsche began to read Schopenhauer, he 
read him as a thinker who could make sense out of his, Nietzsche’s!, 
misery in Bonn and of the early days in Leipzig. The reading of 
Schopenhauer was such a great emotional experience for Nietzsche 
simply because it seemed to give meaning to his uneasiness and 




























































































against the will on the route towards objective perception, was not only 
the point that brought Nietzsche to Schopenhauer; it was also the point 
that would soon lead Nietzsche away from him. The fact that he later 
would frame his central concepts in terms of wills (to knowledge, to 
truth, to power) was an explicit move against Schopenhauer. Later in 
Zur Genealoaie der Moral [On the Genealogy of Morals], Nietzsche 
would in some sense generalize and dismiss (or at least: problematize) 
what he interpreted retrospectively into his way of reading 
Schopenhauer: the necessity to give meaning to suffering.
16.
Nietzsche met Richard Wagner in Leipzig in late 1868 through the 
quite purposeful arrangement of the Ritschls.24 At first, Nietzsche had 
been sceptical about Wagner’s music and it was only after the 
"Meistersinger" that he became one of his disciples. At their first 
meeting, they talked about Wagner’s new opera and then about 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy -- especially about the importance 
Schopenhauer assigned to music. As the most immediate objectification 
of the will, music was not so much part of the world, but in fact 
paralleled and doubled the world. The discovery of melody was, 
according to Schopenhauer, the preferential task of the genius.25 
Hence, Wagner entered Nietzsche’s thinking as the incarnation of the 
genius described by Schopenhauer.26 In fact, for Nietzsche, Wagner’s 
life and creativity somehow confirmed Schopenhauer’s philosophy.27 
In a letter to Wagner, on the occasion of Wagner’s birthday 1869, 
Nietzsche states that only by regarding Wagner's "lonely and 
remarkable [merkwurdig] personality", he was able to explain many 
"purely scientific problems".28 However, already this early letter is 
peculiar. For in other sections, it reveals that, from the very beginning, 
Nietzsche’s commitment to Wagner was led by the expectation that, at 
some point, the as yet unquestioned genius, Wagner, would give way 





























































































At first, Nietzsche would mention Wagner’s name almost always 
in relation to Schopenhauer’s. What he liked about both was, in his own 
words, the "ethical air" in their works and in particular that both seemed 
to be the founders and creators of their own worlds.30 Die Geburt der 
Tragodie clearly was Nietzsche’s sacrifice to Wagner; it was a book 
written for Cosima and Richard Wagner and, as such, did have the 
predictable effect.31 In some sense, it was Wagner who gave 
Nietzsche a first mission and who inevitably destroyed Nietzsche’s 
career as a scientist. The story of the relation between Nietzsche and 
Wagner has been told many times in many different versions. I shall not 
repeat them, but will only summarize a few, altogether five, points. First, 
Nietzsche started distancing himself from Wagner at the latest in early 
74. His notebook entries from January of that year reveal that the 
phenomenon Wagner for the first time had become accessible to 
analysis. Second, again Nietzsche’s philological studies may have been 
the origins of his doubts. Nietzsche had been studying the art of 
rhetoric and the history of eloquence; he planned an UnzeitqemaBe 
Betrachtunq on Cicero that was supposed to be directed against pomp, 
bombast, and pathos.32 "Culture as veiling decoration" was one of the 
key terms. Apparently, Nietzsche was not able to avoid that, in his own 
studies, Wagner would come under fire.33 Third, the increasing 
distance between Nietzsche and Wagner was not just a consequence 
of the former’s metamorphosis; Wagner, too, changed.34 In fact, 
Wagner’s increasing anti-Semitism was one of the main reasons why 
Nietzsche broke with him.
18.
Fourth, Nietzsche’s crisis surfaced precisely while he was working 
on the fourth UnzeitqemaBe Betrachtunq. which was to be on Wagner. 
This piece on Wagner, projected perhaps at a time when he felt closer 
to the composer, was partly an expected, partly a self-imposed task. 
Already the third Betrachtunq on Schopenhauer might have been only 
a postponement of his discussion of Wagner’s project.35 For 




























































































burden. He was still too close to be able to reveal his distance. When 
he announced a first draft to Gersdorff in September 75, he considered 
it as "impossible to publish".36 In early October, he wrote to Rohde 
that the text was almost finished but would not be published because 
he was not yet "above" his experiences and acknowledged a lack of 
orientation.37 The text apparently remained as it was until the end of 
April 1876. In between there were six difficult months. The winter 75/76 
brought a rapid deterioration of his health, including a severe break­
down; he recovered only slowly. From mid February on, he was one 
semester on leave because of his health and spent some weeks with 
Gersdorff at the lake of Geneva reflecting upon his life-work.38 When 
his clumsy proposal of marriage to Mathilda Trampedach was rejected 
in April, Nietzsche seemed to have felt more than ever the need to 
define and then to follow his own way.39 Out of this mood, Nietzsche 
finished the fourth UnzeitqemaBe Betrachtunq. He added three sections 
presenting Wagner as a musician, a poet, and a writer. The text is very 
subtle, written as a homage to Wagner from an equal position. When 
the text was irretrievably sent off to the printer, Nietzsche was afraid of 
how it would be received in Bayreuth. Perhaps, this text was designed 
as Nietzsche’s last attempt to arrive at an exchange with Wagner -  an 
exchange, of course, that would place Nietzsche beside and not behind 
the composer. However, Nietzsche would be disappointed. Wagner’s 
response was overwhelming -  and superficial precisely because of 
that: He had not understood the text, perhaps had not even read it 
carefully. At that time, Wagner was too much involved in the staging of 
the first Bayreuther Festspiele, the opening of his own opera house.
19.
Nietzsche’s encounter with Wagner, his adoration of Wagner, his 
servant attitude towards Wagner, and his increasing doubts about 
Wagner, doubts which Nietzsche would have liked to diffuse but was 
unable to do, and finally the break with Wagner -  this story would mark 
Nietzsche’s life. Again and again, it kept cropping up in his letters as 
well as in his writings. The fifth and last point I would like to make here 
is, then: The phenomenon of Wagner introduced and confirmed a 




























































































the actor.40 Already the Geburt der Traaodie is very much inspired by 
the restlessness of the problem of the transformed man: What forces, 
what power provokes transformation?41 The book’s answer is implicitly 
given in Nietzsche’s presentation of the dionysian ecstasy as the origin 
of the tragedy. The tragedy does not begin with disguise and deception 
but instead with man being external to his previous life, to his roles and 
to the context in which he used to see himself: and most important: 
tragedy begins with man believing in his transformation and change. 
This analysis already contains as a germ the space in which the "actor" 
could appear as the one for whom authentic ecstasy is replaced by a 
game with ecstasy. The actor enjoys masks and purposefully stages 
himself in a game directed by him. He lives in a world between beauty 
and truth characterized by a staged show of ecstasy rather than by an 
absolute absorption in the latter.42 Nietzsche’s negative evaluation of 
"acting" was not a consequence of his break with Wagner, but its 
precondition. Nietzsche’s distance to Wagner originated in his 
assessment of the role of acting in Wagner’s art: this art was the art of 
acting, of imitation. Already in the fourth UnzeitgemaBe Betrachtunq, 
Nietzsche compares Wagner’s life with a comedy and it was later, in 
the summer of 1876, when he witnessed the opening ceremony of the 
opera house at Bayreuth, that Nietzsche discovered that it was Wagner 
himself who directed that comedy. Nietzsche arrived at Bayreuth on 
July 23 and left already on August 2 before the first performance. He 
spent two weeks at Klingenbrunn where he took the first notes of what 
would later evolve into the first volume of Menschliches, 
Allzumenschliches. He returned to Bayreuth, apparently in good mood, 
playing the new role of the now distant observer of a comedy.43 In his 
notes, Nietzsche would later remark that he was unable to accept any 
greatness which does not include honesty towards itself.44 The life- 
threatening crisis of 76 was brought about by this sudden opening of 
an abyss: his adoration for the dionysian spirits, the very dynamics of 
his writings, of his life!, might have been exploited by an actor; it might 
have been based, then, on delusion, on self-delusion! And with the 






























































































From June 1875 on, Nietzsche’s health deteriorated rapidly even 
if periods of recovery and aggravation kept alternating. Nietzsche had 
been ill almost throughout his entire life. The strong headaches started 
as early as 1859; from early childhood he was very short-sighted, and 
especially after his infection with dysentery during his voluntary work as 
a nurse in the Franco-Prussian war of 70/71, his colic-like attacks also 
led to persistent vomiting. The winter of 75/76 marked a first low; 
Nietzsche recovered in the spring after the university had exempted him 
from his duties for one term. Later, in May, Nietzsche requested a one- 
year leave -  not so much because of his health but because Malwida 
von Meysenbug had invited him to spent a longer time in Italy with her 
and some friends. However, even in this year without any teaching 
commitments, Nietzsche’s health remained precarious. A doctor in 
Naples told him, in February or March 1877, that there were two 
possibilities; his illness could suddenly disappear or lead to blindness 
and a complete weakening of the brain, i.e. madness. After another 
examination in Frankfurt in October 1877, he was not allowed to read 
or to write. Throughout this time, Nietzsche is continuously observing 
himself, trying to specify what weather, what food, what discipline would 
have what effect on his health. And still, in 1879, he counted 119 days 
with strong attacks -  which usually meant that he had to spend the 
entire day in bed.45 In May of that year, Nietzsche asked for his 
resignation from the university.46
21 .
Nietzsche always lived with the foreboding that he would turn 
mad. His father died in his 36th year after having turned mad; the 
diagnosis spoke of a "softening of the brain". Nietzsche was four years 
old at that time. And since apparently Nietzsche’s father had already 
been ill for several years before his son was born, doctors in school 
considered him to be a likely candidate for the same fate. Hence, the 
number 36 was a magic number for Nietzsche; Lord Byron, too, died 
at 36, and Holderlin was 36 when he was brought into a madhouse. 




























































































farewell letters.47 In fact, the winter of 79/80 marks the lowest point in 
the story of his illness. But the early 80s, by the same logic, are also 
the time when Nietzsche finally gained new hope; a new style emerges 
in his letters as well as in his texts. Although illness and the fear (or 
hope) of madness would continue to be recurring patterns of 
Nietzsche’s life, the sense of crisis disappeared in the first years of the 
new decade, especially when he approached his 37th birthday in the 
late summer of 1881.48 It was then, in the early 80s, when his thinking 
created its possibility.49
22.
His illness, his persistent suffering had ambiguous consequences 
for Nietzsche’s writings. On the one hand, it constrained Nietzsche’s 
thinking in so far as he simply could not work continuously for a longer 
period without interruption. The design and form of his writings, the 
aphorisms and the short enumerated paragraphs, were as much a 
matter of deliberate choice as they were a necessity.50 On the other 
hand, since Nietzsche felt particularly close to death throughout his life, 
he considered himself to be as free as one could be: "it is a privilege 
of the dying to say the truth".51 Finally, as he himself acknowledges, 
in his fight against death, against his illness, he did not have much 
choice but to accept life, to cultivate a will to life: out of my will to
health, to life, I created my philosophy".52
23.
In the winter of 74/75, the motif of loneliness attains increasing 
importance in Nietzsche’s letters. In February 1875, the composer 
Nietzsche was working on an hymn of loneliness, trying to capture it "in 
all its horrible beauty".53 Later, while he was working on the first 
volume of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches. Nietzsche deliberately 
withdrew into solitude. The common household with his sister at Bâle 
was dissolved in June 1878 according to his demand.54 From his 
Hydropathic cure at Baden-Baden, Nietzsche explains that it was only 




























































































much in line with his interest in hiding is also his wish to publish 
Menschliches. Allzumenschliches under a pseudonym; the plan failed 
for practical reasons: his publisher did not want to introduce a new, 
unknown author.56 After the publication of the book, Nietzsche 
observed a "strange alienation of many acquaintances and friends".57 
He became increasingly distrustful towards the whole world. For the 
summer he retreated to a small pension on a mountain near 
Grindelwald -  6-7,000 feet high -  and asked his friends not to reveal 
this new temporary address to others. The necessity of hiding, his wish 
to remain incognito, soon became one of the characteristics of his 
letters. Later in Italy he regarded it as helpful that he lived in a country 
where he could not understand the native language of its 
inhabitants.58
24.
For the rest of his life, Nietzsche kept an ambiguous relation to 
his solitude. Somehow, it was a necessity -  partly because he 
occasionally regarded the sheer presence of others as a cause of any 
worsening of his illness; and somewhat later also because he wanted 
to avoid any distraction from his work, from the fulfilment of "his" task. 
Yet another aspect of this solitude is that his books were sent into a 
complete nothingness: after Menschliches, Allzumenschliches,
Nietzsche’s books hardly provoked any response. Nietzsche did not 
even have enemies; he was simply ignored. He was aware of this 
already after Menschliches. Allzumenschliches. but might have hoped 
that this would change. After the publication of Morqenrote [Daybreak], 
he complained that most of those who received his book would not 
even bother to thank him.59 He soon began to equate loneliness with 
uniqueness -- in accordance with the contemporary cult of the genius. 
The more obvious the lack of recognition -  of an audience! -  would 
become, the more increased his determination to continue. And only 
sometimes would he allude to the tremendous strain behind this 






























































































The mid 70s see Nietzsche struggling with himself and his work. 
The disappointment about Wagner enforced his belief in the necessity 
of independence, of an autarky of knowledge: he must study harder, fill 
the gaps of his education in order to arrive at a now undisturbed view 
on "our old culture".61 In mid 75, Nietzsche intends to study the hard 
sciences including economics.62 This is the time when he, still unsure, 
tries to write about his "proper" vocation, about his "main point", his "life 
task" which he now sees clearer and clearer but still does not dare to 
reveal.63 He drew plan after plan trying to "put his life into a 
context".64 However, in spite of all efforts, a "kind of disappointment" 
accompanied Nietzsche in the fall.65 At the lake of Geneva in the 
spring of 76, Nietzsche finds time to reflect upon his life and his work. 
In his notes from this period, life plans and work plans alternate on one 
piece of paper. Thinking and living somehow merge.66 Still, in April, 
Nietzsche saw himself as "having been pushed into a jam", and this 
"with regard to many things".67 He hated the constraint of and his 
entanglement with the "whole civilized order of things" and was trying 
hard to get out.68 However, doubts about his doubts kept recurring. In 
mid 77 he even thought that, as a philosopher, he had been ill all the 
time whereas, as a scientist at Bâle, his health had been stable. In 
other but still his words: his "concern for thousand things which do not 
concern him" was the origin of his suffering. And: he could not live 
without the impression of being "useful".69 Yet when he finally 
designed the front page of Menschliches. Allzumenschliches in 
December 77, he did not want his title as a professor to be 
mentioned.70 As Nietzsche himself observed later, the new book 
marked "the end of a sloughing".71 In Menschliches, 
Allzumenschliches. he had "for the first time run down the periphery of 
his own thinking".72 He had been "outside of himself" and "only then 
was he able to see himself".73 And the problem was, then, to get back 





























































































What was at stake in Nietzsche’s crisis? For Nietzsche, no doubt, 
everything was at stake. The sheer possibility that all his enthusiasm, 
his adoration might have been based on deception and self-delusion 
could not but give rise to a fundamental doubt and suspicion towards 
the world. What he took for granted in order to find support, in order to 
establish the grounds from which he could pursue his undertakings, 
dissolved whenever he got too close to it. The places where he thought 
he could anchor his work, his mission -- and himself! -- sooner or later, 
whenever he pushed and questioned harder, gave in and evaporated - 
- leaving Nietzsche without hold. For Nietzsche, this came to be a 
typical experience: "To look for love -  only in order to always find 
masks, to find and to break the damned masks."75 Those he had 
adored as Gods, he revealed as comedians. There was always 
something deeply socratic about Nietzsche’s unveiling of masks, 
something he strongly disliked for, after all, he had identified Socrates 
as the murderer of Greek tragedy. And now even the great 
counterweight to Socrates, Wagner, had collapsed in Nietzsche’s 
thinking precisely, if you will, as a result of socratic questioning.76 And 
then, after Wagner had been unmasked, the questioner had to turn 
towards himself (and his very questioning!) as there was no one else 
left. In fact, once Nietzsche thought he had revealed the life-preserving 
power of his self-delusion, his suspicion had to turn primarily against 
himself. And precisely in this gesture he saw a step forwards: "the 
image of the free-thinker remained unfinished in the last century: they 
negated too little and had themselves left."77 The problem was, then, 
that Nietzsche’s thinking -  and his illness! and his loneliness! -- 
committed him to an extreme degree of self-awareness although the 
very same thinking came close to declare self-delusion to be its basis 
and purpose. In the preface he added later, in 1886, to the first volume 
of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches. he wondered "how much falseness 
he would need to permit himself again and again the luxury of his 
truthfulness".78 Nietzsche felt that he had to "forget himself";79 he had 
to lie to himself -- but how could he lie to himself once he knew he 
would lie to himself? In other words, how can one believe again once 






























































































However Nietzsche got out of his crisis, however he overcame his 
disgust at writing, the result was an immense creativity. Out of his crisis 
there unfolded two streams of writings: from Menschliches, 
Allzumenschliches onwards to Per Wanderer und sein Schatten (The 
Wanderer and his Shadow], and from Morgenrote to Zur Genealoaie 
der Moral. Within each of these two threads, each book was at first, i.e. 
before it got a title of its own, designed as a continuation or an 
appendix of the previous book. The second volume of Menschliches, 
Allzumenschliches was supposed to be an appendix to the first; 
Nietzsche even suggested to his publisher to simply continue the 
enumeration of the page numbers, i.e. the first page of the new book 
should have been page No.379, the first section should have been 
No.639.80 The third part of the book, too, would later evolve into a 
separate title: Der Wanderer und sein Schatten: it was published in 
1880 and would indeed be included in the second volume of 
Menschliches, Allzumenschliches in the 1886 edition. After the 
publication of Der Wanderer. Nietzsche for some time considered his 
life-work as done.81 The 1396 epigrams of this first threat were written 
between late 76 and late 79. During these three years Nietzsche was 
continuously and increasingly suffering from his illness and still he must 
have been feverishly producing texts whenever he possibly could. The 
second stream of writing began with Morgenrote and comprised Die 
Frohliche Wissenschaft [The Gay Science], Also sprach Zarathustra. 
Jenseits von Gut und Bose, [Beyond Good and Evil], and Zur 
Genealogie der Moral. The notes that Nietzsche later put together as 
Morgenrote were first written under the title Pflugschar [Ploughshare] - 
- i.e. the same title Nietzsche used for the very first notes of 
Menschliches. Allzumenschliches written at Klingenbrunn in 1876. 
However, Nietzsche soon changed his plans and also Koselitz who 
prepared the final drafts of Nietzsche’s manuscripts before they were 
sent to the printer agreed, after a short hesitation, that "Morgenrote" 
would be the most appropriate title.82 The first drafts of Die Frohliche 




























































































and then evolved Into a separate book.83 Jenseits von Gut und Bose 
was first announced as the second volume of Morgenrote before it got 
its own title.84 It was printed at Nietzsche’s own expense. Zur 
Genealoqie der Moral should have been a continuation of Jenseits von 
Gut und Bose and as such was already sent to Nietzsche’s publisher. 
Three days later, however, Nietzsche asked him to return the 
manuscript. The final text, now increased in length and a book of its 
own, was sent off again after 9 more days. Still, Nietzsche wanted to 
have the text closely related to his previous book.85 From these plans, 
one can see that the second thread of writing branched after 
Morgenrote. One branch led to Die Frohliche Wissenschaft and to 
Zarathustra. who appeared already in the fourth book of Die Frohliche 
Wissenschaft in section No.342, i.e. at the very end of the 1882 
version.86 The other branch included Jenseits von Gut und Bose and 
the Genealoqie. The famous plans of his never written Der Wille zur 
Macht [The Will to Power], first announced with Jenseits von Gut und 
Bose, indicate that this "final" book should have been a kind of 
synthesis of the two branches.87 Nietzsche came close to a first draft 
of the book, indicating that it was a "torture", but then decided against 
the project; again and again he postponed the great plan, this time 
(1888) for at least ten years.88
28.
This very rough and incomplete philological report on Nietzsche’s 
trajectory already indicates that he gained new momentum in the 
context of his work on what would later become Morgenrote. It was at 
this time, I will argue, when he finally arrived at a perspective in which 
he believed, a perspective which in itself created the distance it 
needed. Thus, in the early 80s, Nietzsche successfully handled the re­
entry of his project, which therefore continued as it did. In particular, 
this re-entry took place before the idea of the eternal return entered his 





























































































After the "twilight of his idols", i.e. after Schopenhauer and 
Wagner ceased to provide anchors for his being, Nietzsche faced the 
danger of running into the same fate: to simply dissolve under intense 
questioning. Somehow, he had to take care of himself -  and so he did. 
His solution is a very complicated gesture of thought which is at the 
centre of many of the ambiguities of his subsequent writings. On the 
one hand, when it came to himself, he stopped questioning and in fact 
started to generalize his own case. Yet on the other hand, precisely this 
gesture allowed him to continue questioning and observing. For now he 
could see himself in everything he saw in his environment and, more 
important, he could see his environment in himself. It was this move, 
this delicate mediation between self- and hetero-reference which slowly 
but surely allowed him to overcome the short-circuit of his observations, 
of his work. Nietzsche was prepared for this move: already 
Schopenhauer had taught that to be able to see the general in the 
specific was one of the crucial characteristics of the genius.89 For the 
Nietzsche of the early 80s, the specific where one could find the 
general was he himself. He was the evidence, the indication of an 
evolution affecting his contemporary society. "How strange!", he wrote 
in late 1880, "In each moment I am ruled [beherrscht] by the idea that 
my story [Geschichte] is not only personal, but that I do something for 
many people when I live in this way and form and distort [verzeichne] 
myself: it is always as if I were a plurality, and I talk to it intimately- 
seriously-comfortingly."90 A bit later, after the publication of 
Morqenrote, he thought it was time to continue the book as soon as 
possible for he would otherwise "forget his experiences (or 
‘thoughts’)".91 This last qualification which brings experiences so close 
to thought (in Nietzsche’s inverted commas!) points to the space from 
which he observes and to the new problems this space generates: 
Nietzsche, after all, had to hurry for he might simply forget the 
evidence, his past, i.e. the data that nurtures his philosophy and his 
observations. Perhaps he had adopted this new perspective already at 
the time of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, but it was only later that 






























































































In that Nietzsche generalizes his case, self-observation becomes 
the key to his observations of his contemporary society. Since self­
observation presupposes a distance in time, he can only relate his past 
to what he observes. He must see his past in the present and thus his 
own experience becomes a prophecy: society will have to go or goes 
through what he had to go through. From this perspective, Nietzsche 
must see himself as always at least one insight ahead. Shortly after he 
had finished the last corrections of Daybreak, he was moved to tears 
by a "new view" which he had "ahead of everyone".92 In this way, his 
perspective creates the distance which renders it possible; in some 
sense, this distance is a distance in time. But only in some sense! For 
whatever is observed through these lenses becomes a future past, a 
lens in itself. In this setting, distance is continuously created. This 
configuration is not just an imposition of the known upon the unknown. 
Rather, known and unknown are here mutually constitutive in a cyclical 
way: the imposition also affects the known.
31.
This perspective as such is, at first, seldom discussed explicitly 
in Nietzsche’s texts for it is the perspective from which he speaks and 
observes. For himself the circular link between self-observation and 
observation was held together through the notion of "necessity". It is 
later, especially in the prefaces he added to his books in 1886/87 and 
also in Zur Genealoaie der Moral (written shortly after the prefaces), 
that he explicitly justifies and reconfirms his writings and the position 
from which they were written via the concept of necessity. He added 
the prefaces precisely in order to reveal the necessity behind his own 
trajectory. And it is this necessity which makes his development 
representative.93 The new prefaces, he suggested, should be read one 
after another, as a sequence, and then would disclose the entry to "his 
cave, i.e. his philosophy".94 And this also meant that whoever starts 
reading his writings, must as well cope with all of them.95 In this series 
of prefaces, the introduction to Morgenrote contains the first hint to the 




























































































inevitable self-overcoming of morals took place for the first time!96 It 
is within Nietzsche that for the first time the truth behind the truth, the 
value of values is questioned. Nietzsche’s experience, in other words, 
is nothing but a first manifestation of the general "law of the necessity 
of ‘self-overcoming’": all ideas which claim universal validity must, by 
their own claim, also apply to themselves.97 Accordingly, his name 
would be remembered in the context of "a crisis so far unknown on 
earth”.98
32.
In the early 80s, however, the successfully established link 
between self-observation and observation surfaces in a new self- 
confidence. Nietzsche is now certain and positive about his mission; a 
new self-assured tone emerges in his writings. Still working on the 
epigrams that would later become Morgenrote. Nietzsche already felt 
that he had found "a way and an exit" in his "moral mine".99 At the 
end of 1880, his subterranean work has become an "attic-solitude" 
[Dachstuben-Einsamkeit] and for no other "attic-lodger" had "the 
daybreak shed light on things more charming and desirable".100 The 
book itself, also called "Daybreak", was supposed to be a "decisive 
step, a destiny more than a book" and, in any case, a book that would 
make him "immortal".101
33.
In order to understand Nietzsche’s euphoria, which went beyond 
his usual celebration of a new book, it is important to see how the 
newly established perspective solved several of his problems at once.
I will only mention two of them. First, Nietzsche managed to ensure a 
continuous self-observation in his observations. This opens the 
possibility that previously unobserved unobservabilities can re-enter the 
ongoing observations even if with a time lag. In fact, by generalizing his 
own case, Nietzsche is able to reinterpret and revalue this time lag in 
a positive, affirmative way: the time lag becomes an advantage; 




























































































peculiar duplicity. They refer to everything, to modern society but also 
to himself and (only) time mediates between these two poles. Thus, it 
is Nietzsche’s philosophy itself which assigns great importance to his 
biography, but it would still be against this philosophy’s claim to read 
it as an overdone biography. Second, in this gesture, Nietzsche 
managed to do both to accept and to forget himself. For what he must 
take for granted in his observations is his own past: "It always required 
time, recovery, remoteness, distance, before I desired to peal, to 
exploit, to expose, to "describe" (or however you may want to call it) a 
posteriori something experienced or survived, some of my own facts 
and fates for the purpose of perception". Thus, Nietzsche’s overcoming 
of his past is always embedded in his observations: "One should talk 
only about what one overcame."102 In this sense, to turn one’s life into 
a prophecy reflects the highest degree of self-affirmation. And precisely 
by taking his past for granted and himself as a reference to something 
beyond himself he was able to "forget" himself. Again, Nietzsche never 
studied himself in order to "find" himself; he never looked for himself. 
On the contrary, the moment when he saw himself was precisely the 
moment of his crisis.103 He was interested in his past only as an 
indication of a dynamics that would command society at large. Thus, in 
late 1880, he was able to write: "What I miss in myself: this deep 
interest in myself. [...] I have never deeply reflected upon myself."104 
The time unit in which he used to think was not a life time, especially 
not his life-time, but the millennium.
34.
The new perspective also brings some new problems. For if 
Nietzsche turns his experience, his being into a prophecy of society’s 
fate, then he burdens himself precisely with the future of this society. 
It is with his work on Morqenrote that the theme of the burden, the load, 
and the responsibility he has put on his shoulders appears.105 The 
motif becomes increasingly intense in the following years, sometimes 
as an intimidation or even coercion.106 In his writings, Nietzsche tries 
hard to at least lighten this burden. Occasionally, with a new text, he 
feels a relief, especially after he finished the first part of Also sprach 




























































































burden. In late 1887, after four parts of Zarathustra. after Jenseits von 
Gut und Bose, after Zur Genealogie der Moral, he still has to turn "to 
the main concern of his existence" because he is "condemned" to this 
turn.108 And the fourth part of Zarathustra is, after all, just an 
"intermezzo11.109 The burden Nietzsche feels as well as the 
impossibility of its removal is, of course, an immediate consequence of 
his peculiar perspective, a corollary and reflection of the position from 
which he observes. And this position, once it is occupied, reconfirms 
itself; again: it creates the distance which makes itself possible. The 
burden is only the fly-wheel of this dynamics. "There are ways, which 
do not allow that one follows them backwards; and thus I go forwards, 
because I must go forwards."110
35.
... the mask of the prophet. His life as a prophecy, the 
generalization of his own case: this way of thinking, of observing!, also 
had to imply that the problem of the mask became universal. "What 
wants to be regarded as true must not be true."111 In fact, in some 
sense it thereby ceased to be a problem for it became the characteristic 
of life and as such had to be accepted, to be respected. Reverence for 
the mask, "superficiality out of profundity"112: this is how Nietzsche’s 
tiring and dangerous uncovering of masks came to an end. It is only 
through the mask that life seduces life to its continuation. And in this 
way the search for truth, although a mask in itself, becomes a gesture 
against life; it becomes an attempt to end the play of the masks and 
thus turns against itself. An obvious conclusion was, of course, that 
Nietzsche himself had to accept, had to believe in a mask; yes, he 
needed a mask if he wanted to be heard! So he came to adopt the 
mask of the prophet. His life as a prophecy, the generalization of his 
own ...
36.
The circularity of the previous section illustrates, again, the 




























































































not set up a static situation; rather it referred to a way of thinking, of 
observing, of becoming. His mask covers and inaugurates a process of 
a continuous self-displacement; as the dynamics behind this process, 
however, the mask itself remained the same once adopted. In course 
of his project, Nietzsche invented the name Zarathustra for this mask 
and thus introduced a precarious and peculiar duplicity. Zarathustra is, 
in other words, the form in which Nietzsche’s project occurs in its own 
meaning world.113 Hence, it is no accident that the story of 
Zarathustra begins, after ten years of loneliness in the mountains, one 
morning when Zarathustra got up with the (D)aybreak,114
37.
The figure of Zarathustra and the idea of the eternal return, at 
first, appeared separately in Nietzsche’s writing. Apparently, the name 
Zarathustra stems from a Persian religion, zoroastrism; Nietzsche 
encountered the ideas of zoroastrism in his philological studies in late 
1870 or early 1871 and must have been fascinated by the idea that this 
religion could have dominated the Greeks if the Persians instead of the 
Romans had got upper hand over them. Nietzsche also considered that 
Heraclitus might have been influenced by at least some ideas of 
zoroastrism.115 In his notebooks, the name Zarathustra did not appear 
before late August 1881, and then already closely related to the idea 
of the eternal return and "a new way of living".116 The first entry on 
the "Eternal Return of the Same", however, was written three weeks 
before that, at the beginning of August 1881 in Sils-Maria, "6000 feet 
above sea-level and above all human concerns".117 It is quite possible 
that the eternal return entered Nietzsche’s thinking via categories of the 
natural sciences. In his clumsy efforts to prove the idea, he uses 
concepts such as "force" and "equilibrium". The "world of forces", so 
the argument, does not decrease for, in our infinite past, it would have 
been completely exhausted if it did decrease. Moreover, the "measure 
of the force of the universe" is finite at any moment in time so that, 
Nietzsche concludes, the number of "possible changes, situations, 
constellations, combinations" is finite although for all practical purposes 
incomprehensible. Thus, if these forces operated already for an infinite 




























































































keep recurring infinitely. Nietzsche tries several versions of this proof - 
- some more, some less subtle -  but never arrived at an explanation 
that satisfied him.118 However, his interest in the natural sciences at 
that time was to a large degree due to his wish to somehow prove the 
eternal return of the same. His efforts are interesting because they do 
indeed prove something: they show that what Nietzsche envisioned was 
the eternal return of the same, i.e. of precisely the same in all details. 
But there are also other reasons why only in this version, as the return 
of exactly the same, the idea fits into Nietzsche’s thinking.
38.
Although he perhaps never gave up the idea that he could 
eventually arrive at a proof of the eternal return, Nietzsche soon 
discovered that the concept as such would have tremendous effects 
once people actually believed in it. In his thinking, this possibility soon 
superseded any interest in a proof.119 What did, then, the eternal 
return mean for Nietzsche? From the outset, the idea always occurs in 
the context of a new yyay^of living, i.e. as an ethics or, if you will, an art 
of life. The most Important aspect of the eternal return is an omittance: 
the absence of any direction, of any teleology, of any "beyond". Thus, 
the eternal return was an antj-chris,tian idea based on the rejection of 
any hope of salvation, of any reliance on an (improved) life after death. 
It was designed to throw mankind back to itself. For if this, our life 
returns with all its details, "with each pain and each lust and each 
thought and sigh", then we must live accordingly, we must do 
something about it now: "What do we do with the rest of our life -- we, 
who have spent the greatest part of it in the most profound 
ignorance?"120 The proposal of the eternal return should "force 
mankind to take decisions which determine the entire future".121 It 
was supposed to function as a selective principle: those who are not 
able to endure the infipit^ recurrence of their current existence will 
either have to change or to perish, whereas those who are able to 
enjoy and affirm their lives will prevail.122 The final result of this 
-> selection is the Ubermensch, who wants his life as it is for eternity. The 
eternal return was, then, an educating lie or, in better words, an 




























































































the proclamation or, if you will, revelation of the eternal return was an 
act of "truth-telling",123 a "new enlightenment".124
39.
I repeat: from the way Nietzsche tried to prove his idea and from 
the frame in which this idea occurs, i.e. from the role it was supposed 
to play, I conclude that what was at stake here is the eternal return of 
the same, of precisely and exactly the same again and again. Only in 
this version expresses the eternal return the highest formula of self- 
affirmation. It must not leave any possible escape into any kind of 
"beyond"; it must not be mistaken, for example, with a return of the 
similar. "The similar is not a degree of the same: but something 
completely different from the same."125 In fact, Nietzsche is as explicit 
about this point as one can be. Even the subtle distinction in German 
between "das Gleiche" and "das Selbige" cannot diffuse his clarity: 
"Und wenn du einstmals wiedergeboren wirst, so wird es nicht zu einem 
neuen Leben Oder besseren Leben Oder ahnlichem Leben sein, 
sondern zu einem gleichen und selbigen Leben, wie du es jetzt 
beschlieBest, im Kleinsten und im GroBten.1,126
40.
The belief in the eternal return of the same is in line with 
Nietzsche’s mask, the mask of the prophet, which, too, was to reflect 
the highest degree of self-affirmation. However, the preaching and 
teaching of this belief is a delicate business for his project, which after 
all had universalized the problem of the mask: what wants to be 
regarded as true must not be true (section 35.). The universalization of 
his own case was indeed the key to Nietzsche’s escape from his crisis; 
it was literally this: a self-overcoming. But this implied, of course, that 
Nietzsche’s crisis and his escape, i.e. the re-entry, had to be 
generalized as well. In other words, Zarathustra’s problem to provoke 
a belief as a response to a crisis is precisely the generalized duplication 





























































































But Nietzsche’s earlier problem, his crisis!, was indeed resolved. 
It was resolved in a specific way: Nietzsche forced himself to believe 
in a specific mask, i.e. in his life as a prophecy. Once he entered the 
autocatalysis of this new perspective, he was able to justify this move 
simply because his new perspective was self-confirming. The move as 
such, the jump into the circle was justifiable only a posteriori; the circle 
contained its own reasons. These reasons, however, always 
presuppose the circle. They do not justify anything beyond the circle; 
in particular they cannot rationalize the creation of the circle in the first 
place. This lack of justification marks the singularity of the re-entry of 
Nietzsche’s project into itself. Moreover, Nietzsche was able to resolve 
the crisis precisely because he jumped out of it; precisely because he 
left the straight-jacket of reasons, i.e. because he lied to himself. He 
closed his eyes for less than a fraction of a second -  and that was 
enough to find, again, reasons, necessity, and determination: "One 
listens, one does not search; one takes, one does not ask who gives; 
a thought flashes like a lightning, with necessity, in its form without 
hesitation -  I never had a choice."127
42.
Accordingly (!), Nietzsche never justifies the eternal return of the 
same in his publications. He never discusses the consequences of the 
belief in the eternal return for mankind. In order to create this belief, its 
utility, i.e. its intended consequences must not be mentioned. In some 
sense, the idea of the eternal return exploits the dynamics of beliefs 
and truths in order to provoke mankind to take care of itself. And since 
believing presupposes the absence of reasons, it must not be revealed 
that this belief is precisely this: just a belief, a mask that covers a 
purpose and its effects. The difficulty for Nietzsche is to inaugurate a 
belief -  a mask, a self-delusion, a truth -  without revealing, i.e. without 
destroying the life-preserving function of beliefs in general. Hence "it is 
quite possible", Nietzsche wrote, "that I become dumb one day -  out 
of philanthropy!!!"128 Nietzsche’s secret is that his secret must remain 




























































































all he can do is to set the task "to guess what his purpose is".129 In 
fact, it is astonishing how inconspicuous the eternal return eventually 
emerges in the third part of Also sprach Zarathustra.130
43.
In the famous scene of Das Tanzlied, Zarathustra whispers 
something to Life, and Life responds: "You know this, o Zarathustra? 
Nobody knows this. --1'131 The text, of course, does not reveal what 
nobody knows, but other sources do: Zarathustra’s secret is the eternal 
return of the same and the tremendous scope of this idea.132 But the 
proposal of this idea remains a precarious task, a delicate balancing 
between secrecy and revelation. Zarathustra’s silence is as interesting 
as his preaching. His silence corresponds to Nietzsche’s inability to 
write the final, ultimate, synthesizing book -  Per Wille zur Macht. That 
Zarathustra knows what nobody knows is a contradiction and must be 
a contradiction. Zarathustra preaches out of the morass of logical 
paradoxes; in fact, he is a paradox which "combines all opposites into 
a new unity".133 In that they push logic to its limits, Nietzsche’s 
writings and Zarathustra’s preaching are on the borderline of what can 
be communicated; and one wonders what would happen if this 
borderline is eventually crossed.
44.
The end of the previous section leads over to the transition from 
observation to madness -  a theme which I cannot fully develop in this 
essay. To be sure, the final answer to the question of what caused 
Nietzsche’s illness and of what the relation between illness and 
madness was must remain open. However, there are still a few lines of 
investigation which to my knowledge have not yet been sufficiently 
explored. For the transition to madness was not just a break with the 
past; threads of continuity link Nietzsche’s trajectory of thought with 
what would later become symptoms of his madness. I will list here only 
four of those threads. First, in that Nietzsche’s madness surfaced as a 




























































































distance and loneliness. His madness appears here as a limit position 
characterized by an infinite distance to everything one can observe 
from this position or, rather, to everyone who can observe this position. 
In his search for distance, Nietzsche disappears into madness. Second, 
towards the end of his conscious life, Nietzsche returns to the theme 
of the mask -  but now in an extreme and puzzling form. In his famous 
.^5? letter of January 6, 1889, to Jakob Burckhardt, Nietzsche runs through 
a series of roles and masks, including the mask of god, and even 
observes that "strictly speaking [he is] all the names in history".134 
The gesture of these letters, i.e. the continuous self-displacement is, in 
some sense, just an extreme extension of the perspective Nietzsche 
had been employing all the time.135 Moreover, the mask of the god 
and therefore, if you will, Nietzsche’s megalomania corresponds to his 
self-assigned position of the creator of values. Third, since he always 
saw himself endangered by insanity, Nietzsche throughout his life gave 
hints as to how he interpreted madness. In Jenseits von Gut und Bose, 
for example, he presented insanity as a mask of an "unfortunate all-too 
certain knowledge".136 His self-confirming perspective, i.e. the 
autocatalysis of his project may well have produced certainty as a result 
of an sufficiently high number of runs through the same circle. An 
inescapable certainty would be, then, the infinite limit of Nietzsche’s 
— epistemology: "Not doubt, but certainty is what makes insane."137 In 
Moraenrote (!), Nietzsche describes madness as what always paves the 
way for new ideas.138 No doubt, from 1888 on, Nietzsche did not fight 
against insanity; rather, he devoted himself to it and, as far as possible, 
tried to design it. Fourth and finally, one may reflect on Nietzsche’s 
trajectory in the context of the three metamorphoses of the spirit 
Zarathustra describes in his speeches: the spirit first becomes a camel; 
and the camel, a lion, and the lion, finally a child.139 The innocence 
of the child, the innocent childish game of creation had been a 
persistent theme in Nietzsche’s thinking throughout his life. What is 
striking in the reports witnesses gave on Nietzsche after 1889 is the 
obvious regression to his early childhood behaviours. Fears he had as 
a child returned; his handwriting became childish again; and even his 
problems with the German dative return from his pre-school period. As 






























































































The previous discussion should not be misunderstood. The point 
here is not that Nietzsche had been mad all the time; that his writings 
were the writings of a mad man. The point is just the opposite: 
Nietzsche should be taken seriously including his slow metamorphosis 
into madness -  an end, by the way, which may seem sad to us, but 
perhaps was not so for Nietzsche. The question I would like to pose is, 
then, whether it is possible to approach Nietzsche’s insanity as the 
infinite limit of his project, of his observations. Is it, then, that in his 
madness he remained truthful to what he observed, to his perspective 
to the extreme? Is it that, in his madness, he exemplified the ultimate 
conclusions of truthfulness? "We make an experiment with truth! 
Perhaps mankind will perish with it!"141 Is it that he sacrificed himself 
for this demonstration? And, by relating truth and madness, does he not 
anticipate the ultimate conclusions of truthfulness?142 The 
































































































In 1976, a bit more than one year after the publication of 
Surveiller et Punir [Discipline and Punish], Michel Foucault published 
the first volume of a History of Sexuality under the Nietzschean title La 
Volonté de Savoir [The Will to Knowledge].143 The back of the book’s 
cover revealed that this volume was supposed to become the beginning 
of a series of not less than six volumes. It would be followed, so the 
plan, by La Chair et le Corps. La Croisade des Enfants, La Femme, la 
Mère et l’Hystérique, and by Les Pervers and Populations et Races. 
And as if that was not enough, Foucault announced yet another 
forthcoming book, Le Pouvoir de la Vérité [The Power of Truth], which, 
according to the pathos of its title, might have been designed as a kind 
of conclusion of not just this series on sexuality, but also of his life 
work. His ideas must have seemed transparent enough to him to let 
him believe he could finish one volume every three months.144 
However, already in December 1976, shortly after the first volume had 
come out, Foucault refused to comment on his new book and claimed 
that "finishing a book is also not wanting to see it anymore".145 In fact, 
as is well known, Foucault’s plans were never realized in the outlined 
form. He published his next books, L’Usage des Plaisirs [The Use of 
Pleasures] and Le Souci de Soi [The Care of the Self], -- although still 
as parts two and three of the sexuality series -- not less than eight 
years after the first volume. In between there was Foucault’s crisis -- 
self-imposed and seemingly unnecessary as one wonders why he had 
to put so much pressure on himself by publicly committing himself to 
such enormous undertakings. Soon he was confronted with rumours 
that he was finished, had nothing more to say.146 However, during 
those years Foucault was not just struggling with a book project that did 




























































































Foucault gave in 1976, he expressed radical doubts about his work as 
a whole -- the major point of this self-critique being precisely that his 
work was just repetitive and that it "had failed to develop into any 
continuous or coherent whole".147 The crisis, then, was not only 
related to books he planed to write in the future but concerned his 
entire intellectual trajectory, his relation towards his work and therefore 
his life.
47.
I started this discussion of Foucault’s trajectory in the way I did 
in order to point to similarities to what I had previously said about 
Nietzsche. In both cases, a moment of crisis occurred shortly after the 
thinker came close to a complete overview of what he would think in 
the future. Moreover, the similarities do not stop here. In both cases, a 
sabbatical year did not dissolve but only reconfirmed and intensified the 
problems; a peculiar silence encountered as response to one of their 
books played its part in the crisis;148 work on prefaces or proposals, 
in short self-reflection was the crucial operator in the changes or 
continuities the projects followed. Foucault, just as Nietzsche, at certain 
points had problems seeing himself as a philosopher and only later, in 
the early 80s, thought about his work in terms of philosophy.149 And 
one could go on like this for several pages: both Nietzsche and 
Foucault worked and wrote obsessively; both had severe problems 
relating to others and could be very harsh towards friends;150 there 
were times when both would give the impression of Dandyism;151 
both had a fragile health and both from early on were considered as 
bordering on madness;152 each book they wrote only seemed to 
intensify their wish to write new ones as the previous needed to be 
explained, qualified, enlarged, specified etc.; in both cases the crisis 
erupted in the year 76 and ended in the early 80s, i.e. the crises lasted 
equally long; both, at crucial moments in their lives and works, found 
consolation in the fact that at least some readers -  in the case of 
Nietzsche: Georg Brandes, in the case of Foucault: Hubert Dreyfus and 
Paul Rabinow -- were able to read their writings with sensibility;153 
and, of course, the topics of their work, their thinking at this or that 




























































































are due to a fundamental difference in the way the projects started, 
which makes Foucault’s crisis and his trajectory a completely separate 
case.
48.
Before I turn to this crucial difference which explains many of the 
similarities, I will now browse through some of the most obvious 
reasons why, already at the level of methodology, a discussion of 
Nietzsche must not be an archetype of a discussion of Foucault. First, 
there is an important difference in the kinds of sources upon which an 
essay like this one can be based. Since, in the case of Nietzsche, his 
complete oeuvre including sketchy notes, including thousands of letters 
he wrote as well as thousands of letters he received are easily 
available, it is indeed not too difficult to reflect upon the ideas, his 
moods and problems he had on, say, one specific afternoon. In 
contrast, my discussion of Foucault’s intellectual trajectory and his crisis 
must be based exclusively on the published materials -  books, articles, 
interviews -  and some of the lectures he gave at the Collège de 
France. The first biography of Michel Foucauit came out only in 1989 - 
- largely based on the same material and on interviews with Foucault’s 
contemporaries.154 Second, and qualifying the first point, there is in 
the case of Foucault nevertheless an important source which reveals 
his reflection upon his own work: his interviews. For, in contrast to 
Nietzsche, Foucault was already during his lifetime a successful writer 
in terms of the number of books sold. At the latest after Les Mots et les 
Choses [published in English as The Order of Things], Foucault was a 
celebrity. The book became so fashionable that it had repercussions 
even in films by Aragon and Godard.155 With the success came 
requests for interviews and, of course, the public lectures at the Collège 
de France. On several occasions, Foucault commented positively on 
these opportunities for self-reflection as they helped him to clarify his 
concerns.156 He considered the public justification and explanation of 
his work an integral part of his role as a writer and lecturer. In some 
(although remote) sense, these interviews and his responses to 
questions raised by his readers play a similar role now as Nietzsche’s 




























































































stages of his project looked at his own undertaking. In fact, what makes 
these interviews especially valuable is that they played a constitutive 
role for the way Foucault’s work developed. In the case of Foucault, the 
relation between interviews and work is more intense and immediate 
than the relation between letters and work in the case of Nietzsche. 
The third and final point in this short list refers to the different ways the 
projects came to an end: Foucault died in June 1984, only a few weeks 
after L'Usage des Plaisirs and Le Souci de Soi had come out. It seems 
as if Foucault had known (or at least: guessed) that he had AIDS at the 
latest in early 1984, if not earlier. He worked without rest in order to 
finish what could have been, and in fact became his last two 
books.157 And yet, even if he knew, the end that imposed itself on his 
project is difficult to relate to the project as such, whereas in the case 
of Nietzsche, it is not all that far fetched to relate thinking and madness 
-- especially since Nietzsche himself suggested this relation.158 
Moreover, Foucault’s untimely death makes it somewhat difficult, 
although not impossible, to assess the status of his late thinking, his 
latest concepts and methods, in the context of his entire project. I shall 
argue, nevertheless, that the Foucault of the early 80s successfully 
handled the re-entry of his project into itself.
49.
However, the most crucial difference between Nietzsche’s and 
Foucault’s intellectual trajectories, that is the difference which explains 
all the similarities, is also the most obvious of the differences one could 
list: not only are there precisely 100 years between their crises, but 
even more important: Foucault had read Nietzsche "by chance" in 
1953, i.e. before he started working on what would later become his 
major publications.159 Maladie mentale et Personalité [Mental Illness 
and Personality], his very first book (1954), still remained basically a 
non-Nietzschean work and was, accordingly, later completely 
renounced by his author. Whenever Foucault referred to his "first book", 
he always meant Folie et Déraison.160 Foucault stated several times 
that the reading of Heidegger and Nietzsche provided the decisive 
"philosophical shock" for his thinking and that, in the end, the latter 




























































































to him. He "read him with a great passion and broke with [his] life, left 
[his] job in the asylum, left France" for "through Nietzsche, I had 
become a stranger to all that."162 Foucault acknowledged that he had 
approached Nietzsche, "curious as it may seem, from a perspective of 
inquiry into the history of knowledge". Thus, although his serious 
reading of Nietzsche started with the UnzeitqemaBe Betrachtunqen. his 
relation to Nietzsche derived mostly from the texts written in the early 
1880s, especially, I sense, from Die Frohliche Wissenschaft.163 There 
are, at least, four aspects of Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault. First in 
terms of contents: Nietzsche became the determining experience for 
the abolition of the founding act of the subject.164 By breaking with the 
“double tradition of phenomenology and marxism", it was the reading 
of Nietzsche that gave access to the questions which would guide 
Foucault’s project.165 Second in terms of style and commitment: the 
"challenge of Nietzsche" also meant a striving for the "maximum of 
philosophical intensity".166 In this way, Nietzsche marked the 
beginning of Foucault’s "desire to do personal work".167 Third, 
Nietzsche’s thinking, his manifesto on the return of the masks, not only 
functioned as an orientation for Foucault’s inquiries, but was also 
available as an object of study, i.e. as a point which one could locate 
in the history of thought and which could therefore, in its strangeness, 
reveal something about that history.168 Moreover, the point in which 
Nietzsche’s project came to an end, madness, was precisely the topic 
from where Foucault departed.169
50.
Fourth and finally, what all this alludes to is that the circle 
underlying the Nietzschean perspective and its autocatalytic principle 
was present in Foucault’s thinking and observing from the outset. 
Nietzsche caused, if you will, a first re-entry of Foucault’s project into 
itself and thus brought it on its way. Soon after he had read Nietzsche, 
Foucault spoke frequently about a book he wanted to write about the 
philosopher.170 The plan never materialized. Foucault lectured on 
Nietzsche -  so in 1969/70 at Vincennes in front of some 600 students - 
- but in fact wrote very little about him. In 1975, Foucault even 




























































































this silence was only reciprocal to the importance Foucault assigned to 
Nietzsche. "The only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche’s", so 
his argument, was "precisely to use it", not to permanently comment on 
it.171 In his last interview, Foucault distinguishes three different types 
of thinkers: those he doesn’t know, those he knows and talks about, 
and finally those he knows and does not talk about. One always had to 
preserve a few thinkers to work with. Thus, had he written on 
Nietzsche, he would have had to establish a distance to the latter and 
thereby would have closed a major source of inspiration.172 In the 
preface to Folie et Déraison. Foucault had placed his own undertaking 
under "le soleil de la grande recherche nietzschéenne1'.173 In his 
interviews, he frequently referred to the circular, Nietzschean link 
between his observations and self-observations. His theoretical work, 
Foucault explained, was always based on his own immediate 
experience, "always in relation to processes [he] saw taking place 
around [him]." He hoped, in this way, he could recognize "in the things 
[he] saw, in the institutions with which [he] dealt, in [his] relations with 
others [...] a few fragments of autobiography."174 Foucault once 
located, although half-jokingly, the "nucleus of [his] theoretical desires" 
in the intense pre-war and war experience of his childhood (and his 
generation): "Our private life was really threatened" so that knowledge 
became a "means of surviving by understanding."175 His choice of 
topics, especially his early interest in psychology and insanity, at the 
time were usually regarded as reflections of personal concerns.176 In 
that Foucault’s work unfolded from early on -  and perhaps already 
before he actually read Nietzsche -  out of this Nietzschean circle, his 
project was always to a high degree autonomous; pursued without 
much attention being paid to disciplinary allegiances.
51.
It is important to remember that the circularity of this perspective 
based on the mutual constitution of the known and the unknown 
presented a solution for Nietzsche’s problems. His thinking entered the 
self-confirming circle in the early 1880s and then left it, if at all, only via 
what came to be seen as his madness. How did this circle, which after 




























































































it possible that the very gesture which was a solution for one became 
a problem for the other thinker? It is here, I suggest, in the way the 
circle was employed, where the similarities and differences of the two 
projects intersect. The point is not just that Foucault was aware of the 
Nietzschean experience and thus might have seen little reason to 
repeat its fate. The point is rather that there was a fundamental 
difference in the way the same circular design was utilized. For one can 
follow a circle with two different, in fact opposite orientations: clockwise 
and counterclockwise, if you will. Whereas Nietzsche generalized 
towards the unknown society he was part of in order to provoke it to 
take care of itself, Michel Foucault frequently stated that it was his own 
transformation that was at stake in his observations. Foucault, in other 
words, never wrote a Also sprach Zarathustra even if he might have 
agreed to Zarathustra’s silence.177 The passages in his L’Archéologie 
du Savoir [The Archaeology of Knowledge], in which he alluded to this 
peculiar relation he had towards his work, soon became famous: 
Foucault’s writings form a labyrinth "in which [he] can lose himself and 
appear at least to eyes that [he] will never have to meet again.” He 
wrote in order to have no face.178 In this way, he gave living example 
of his obstinate attempts to get out of the philosophy of the subject: he 
refused "to be tied to an identity by some conscience of self- 
knowledge."179 His problem was, then, the transformation of one's self 
by one’s own knowledge; he was motivated by that kind of curiosity 
"which would enable one to get free of oneself."180 No doubt, writing 
makes those efforts possible and difficult at the same time: after all, it 
is a means to exemplify one’s transformation, but precisely in this 
exemplification one leaves a trace which one is likely to become 
assigned to. "I started writing by chance. And once one has begun, one 
is a prisoner of this activity; it is impossible to escape.1'181 This 
ambiguity is present in Foucault’s trajectory from the outset. The early 
polemics against the notion of the "author", his persistent refusal to see 
discourse as a trace, as well as the proposed kinship between writing 
and death are facets of this ambiguity.182 In fact, there was always 
the danger of self-destruction implicit in this continuous attempt of self­
displacement. There was at least one attempt of suicide in 1948 and it 
is in line with Foucault’s statements to consider writing as a kind of 
continuation of suicide by other means. He accepted that his discourse 




























































































then.183 In an interview in 1975, Foucault referred to the self­
destructive potential of his work by describing his books as toolboxes 
that people could make use of "in order to short circuit or disqualify 
systems of power, including even possibly the ones my books come out 
of -  well, all the better."184
52.
This orientation of the Foucauldian perspective surfaces in his 
project also in the form of an imperative: "avoid, as much as possible, 
the universals of anthropology"; do "not accept anything of that order 
that is not strictly indispensable."185 The point here is not that 
Foucault universally rejected the possibility of universals; to be sure, he 
was hostile to the idea as such and cultivated a "systematic scepticism" 
about anthropological universals, unitary necessities, general theories, 
totalization,186 but in the end his position was a distinct indifference: 
he simply did not want to decide whether or not such universals exist., 
He struggled hard throughout his career in order to avoid precisely this 
decision as, whatever side -  yes or no -  he had picked, it would have 
eliminated an unforeseeable large set of possible transformations. 
Foucault did not mean to say that there were no subjects and no truths, 
but he studied the coming into being, i.e. the historical constitution of 
specific subjects and specific truths.187 In other words, in the cases 
Foucault dealt with, the putting into play of universal forms was itself 
historical.188 In fact, it seems fair to say that most of the occasionally 
monstrous criticisms Foucault encountered in his work was directed 
against things he had never claimed. In fact, if his discourse was to be 
a labyrinth and an opportunity for a continuous self-displacement, then 
Foucault had to keep it as open as possible. Every word he wrote bore 
the danger of an unnecessary commitment that could soon evolve into 
a burden.189 Accordingly, Foucault liked to present his work as "game 
openings", as taking place between "unfinished abutments and 
anticipatory strings of dots".190 He liked to open up spaces of 
research, to open up problems, and emphasized the necessity of a 
"demanding, prudent, ‘experimental’ attitude" within theoretical 
work.191 In the preface to the German edition (1971) of Les Mots et 




























































































piece, full of gaps, as he wrote, which refer either to earlier works, or 
to works which are not yet finished or which even have not yet been 
started.192 And that was his dream: a continuous changeable self- 
correcting work/ng "mit langem Atem", dispersed and open to the 
reactions it provokes,193 and supported by publishing houses for 
research which would show "work in motion", i.e. research in its 
hypothetical, provisional aspect.194 Following the dynamics of his 
perspective, Foucault developed an intellectual claustrophobia.
53.
In order to see how this Foucauldian perspective could lead into 
a severe crisis, I need to go briefly into the actual evolution of his work, 
i.e. into the topics he dealt with and to explore how it became 
increasingly difficult for him to live up to his maxim -- to be always able 
to think differently from what he thought before.195 For if that was his 
aim, a permanent access to otherness, to the different, became a major 
requirement of his project. Somewhere in what he observed, there had 
to be the opening of an escape route; the assignment was to 
permanently create and preserve the possibility to dissociate oneself 
from one’s thinking. In practice, this meant to locate one’s position 
always as close as possible to the borderlines, to the limits of what one 
sees as the space of possible experiences. Most likely, the route to 
otherness starts at the borders, at the extremities of the space one is 
currently exploring. The search for those limits, their conceptualisation 
and the play on those limits make up one of those themes which were 
present throughout Foucault’s project.196
54.
In Folie et Déraison. Foucault establishes the possibility of 
otherness in the way he relates insanity to reason: "The constitution of 
madness as a mental illness, at the end of the 18th century, affords the 
evidence of a broken dialogue, posits the separation as already 
effected, and thrusts into oblivion all those stammered, imperfect words 




























































































reason was made."197 Thus it is the Western, "our", culture which 
creates its own limits via the exclusion of otherness. Foucault struggles 
with the difficult logic behind this observation: reason appears as one 
of the two sides of a division and as its all-encompassing whole which 
created that division; reason, if you will, is its own reason. The division, 
as Foucault points out, is absolute: the absoluteness of a division like 
this is part of the prize subjects have to pay in order to be able to 
speak the truth about themselves.198 And yet Foucault’s own 
discourse depends in those formative years on that possibility to have 
access to that otherness without losing syntax. Madness must not 
become absolutely silent. And in fact it does not: "Ruse and new 
triumph of madness: the world [...] must justify itself before madness, 
since in its struggles and agonies it measures itself by the excess of 
works like those of Nietzsche, of Van Gogh, of Artaud." Foucault plays 
on this paradox he is part of: "In our time man has no truth except in 
the enigma of the madman, who he both is and is not,"199 This, if you 
will, ambiguity reflects one of the difficulties of Foucault's project: he 
needs the absolutely different in order to be able to think differently, but 
in order to get to this absolutely different place, it must be linked, 
through an escape route, to its opposite -  i.e. to the identical. The 
dream and the desires are presented as further examples of those 
nearest and most remote places of otherness, whose externality gives 
Foucault’s project its possibility.
55.
On his way to Les Mots et les Choses. Foucault moved through 
his escape route to the place which is now different from the different - 
- to the identical. Whereas in Folie et Déraison he had wanted to be the 
"archaeologist of all those threatening but rejected experiences" in 
order to "speak of the experience of madness", "to rediscover it" and 
even "let it speak itself",200 he now became the "ethnologist of his 
own culture", the one who alienated the identical from within by 
confronting it with otherness.201 A bizarre categorization of animals, 
allegedly taken from a "certain Chinese encyclopedia" and found by 
Foucault in a text of Jorge Luis Borges, serves as a starting point. For 




























































































a fundamental question: "But what is it impossible to think, and what 
kind of impossibility are we faced with here?"202 The book’s answer 
is implicitly given in its depiction of that realm of thought -- between the 
fundamental codes of a culture and its philosophical and scientific 
reflection -  which eventually surfaces as the foundation of the taken- 
for-granted codes and thereby invalidates their self-evidence. The 
impossibilities of thought are defined, then, by those "silent orders", 
which function until they become "visible".203
56.
Velasquez, in his famous painting Las Maninas (1656), did not 
dare to show both the act of representing "sovereign" individuals and 
those individuals. The painting shows Velasquez painting the Spanish 
king, Philipp IV., and his wife, but it neither shows the latter nor the 
front of Velasquez’ (painted) canvas. He solves the dilemma by re­
introducing the sovereigns as reflections of a mirror painted in the back 
scene of the ongoing representation, so that they are again present 
only as representations while being represented. For the great Spanish 
painter, a complete representation of the act of representing was 
neither possible nor admissible.204 The threshold to modernity, 
according to Foucault, lies precisely in the presumptuousness of that 
gesture of representing representation, i.e. of objectifying the subject: 
the sovereign becomes at the same time subdued.205 Since then, 
representation closes itself off from the world in that it tries in advance 
to represent the representing subject as reason for representation.206 
The representing subject locks itself into limitations and finiteness. This 
gesture marks the origin of that "rift in the order of things" which is 
called "man" -  a rift, as Foucault emphasizes, not more than 200 years 
old and, just as other rifts, likely to be erased "like a face drawn in sand 
at the edge of the sea."207
57.
The previous two sections are complementary in that they reveal 




























































































observes; it is as if the circle nurturing his project slowly contracts to a 
point. For how close is the idea to think the limits of thinking, i.e. to 
think the act of thinking to the idea to represent the act of representing? 
In other words, how close is the idea to think the limits of thought to the 
establishment of those limits? Under tense political circumstances in the 
late 60s, this question soon evoked political terms: if those limits, those 
systems exist which are part of discourse and yet inaccessible as taken 
for granted, where is then the starting point for political creativity, for 
invention? For progressive intervention? It is in this form, as a political 
problem, in which Foucault for the first time encounters the danger that 
the circular link relating observation and self-observation in his project 
might eventually collapse to a point. For Foucault, this question must 
have seemed legitimate as the possibility of self-transformation was 
also at the heart of his work. And yet, in that he responds by engaging 
in large methodological undertakings -  culminating in L’Archéologie du 
Savoir (1969) --, his very attempts to dissipate the danger and to 
dissolve the problem only reconfirm it. By reflecting on the possibility of 
change, of transformation, Foucault implicitly reflects on the very 
possibility of continuing his own project. In other words, the dynamics 
of the project re-entered into the project: what had been the taken for 
granted basis of his motivation to work as hard as he did now became 
an explicit concern, a problem, for that work. And in this specific case, 
this constellation had to turn out as a dead end, for if the possibility of 
change is problematic, then no change will occur until the problem will 
have been solved. "There are times in life when the question of 
knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive 
differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on 
looking and reflecting at all."208
58.
Foucault tried hard to avoid this path of thinking -- and precisely 
thereby entered it. As an immediate response, he claims that the issue 
of change was indeed at the centre of Les Mots et les Choses. What 
he tried to do was "to introduce the diversity of systems and the play 
of discontinuities into the history of discourses."209 However, much of 




























































































to provide late justifications of previous works, but seemed to have 
played the role of programmes. L’Archéologie du Savoir, too, was at 
first designed as an explanation of earlier studies, but then turned out 
to be, in parts, a radical self-critique.210 Foucault’s inaugural lecture 
at the Collège de France (December 1970), L’Ordre du Discourse 
[Orders of Discourse], continues this series of programmatic texts -  
each of which seems to invalidate the previous. All these attempts, 
which I will not analyze in detail, finally remain inconclusive: in the 
preface to the German edition of Les Mots et les Choses (1971), 
Foucault withdraws. The book was, after all, nothing but a comparative 
study of strictly limited scope; the problem of causality and therefore of 
change had to be bracketed as he felt incapable of offering a 
solution.211
59.
In the meantime, perhaps as a consequence of the 
inconclusiveness of his efforts, Foucault tackles the question where it 
was posed first: in politics. Apart from a short and, finally, unhappy 
affiliation with the Communist Party (1950-53), Foucault did not belong 
to any political movement. However, the first half of the 70s sees 
Foucault as the militant, the activist, closely and passionately involved 
in concrete struggles -  as if he had to prove to himself and others that 
he was everything but paralysed by his thinking. The Foucault who 
seemed prepared to battle with militant communists and who was seen 
throwing rocks at the police was also the one Georges Dumézil never 
believed in.212 To this period corresponds the increasing importance 
of the term "power" in Foucault’s writings up to the point where this 
concept came to be regarded as his major theme. Still, in this power- 
period, Foucault only repeats a gesture that was implicitly there already 
in Folie et Déraison and was explicitly discussed in Les Mots et les 
Choses. In the former, it was reason which re-introduced itself into a 
distinction between itself and otherness and thereby had to take itself 
for granted. The same kind of presumptuousness marked the beginning 
of modernity, where the possibility of knowledge became itself an object 
of knowledge and precisely thereby turned transcendental. Surveiller et 




























































































subsume the categories of reason and knowledge under the headline 
of "power" but maintain the peculiar logic Foucault observed earlier: 
disciplinary power turns subjects into objects whose existence then 
justifies disciplinary power.213 Moreover, the objectified subject 
produced by the logic of Bentham’s panopticum becomes a kind of 
genealogical precondition of the modern human sciences.214
60.
Power introduces distinctions -- it subjectifies -  and then re­
enters the distinctions on one of their sides -  it objectifies. The limits 
of power are indeed its pillars; hence, if there are no limits, then there 
cannot be otherness. Foucault’s power-period only repeated and in fact 
demarcated sharply a path of thinking which he had already covered 
before. Perhaps even more so than the truly radical and merciless self­
critique which opens the lectures of 76, La Volonté de Savoir, 
Foucault’s next book, marks the visible outbreak of the crisis that has 
been lurking in the background at least since Les Mots et les Choses. 
In fact, as he acknowledged later, the outburst of activity Foucault 
announced on its back cover was a sign of crisis rather than evidence 
of its solution. He commits himself to a kind of naive positivism pursued 
in a project that perhaps would last for several years -  a 
presumptuousness which was nothing but a way of giving up. A 
prescription of constancy and steadiness seemed to have replaced the 
search for self-transformation.215 The book itself confirms this 
impression. It gives a rather blunt expression of what Foucault had 
implicitly stated much earlier: the one place for the great heroic 
resistance against power does not exist.216 Again this is the political 
version of the problems Foucault had with his own project -  with 
himself. The statement looks like a delayed but nevertheless radical 
self-critique, which is directed not just towards earlier works, but also 
against his recent political activism. It reflects Foucault’s attempt to 
distance himself from many who, fighting against repression, might 
have seen Foucault on their side. But, according to the latter, the 
"repressive hypothesis" is just part of a game in which power and 
pleasure mutually constitute each other.217 Those who play this game, 




























































































benefit" -  the provision of which is precisely the function of the 
game.218 No doubt, in this book Foucault stages his own loss and 
lack of orientation. He publicly dismantles the position he thought he 
had spoken from, but is as yet unable to indicate an alternative. The 
conclusion one is left with is, then, that the book, too, is part of what it 
describes, i.e. part of that game that provides benefits for speakers and 
writers. Occasionally, Foucault falls back to his earlier position whereby 
the body and the desires form a basis for resistance.219 However, in 
general, the bluntness of his style, his all-too over-confident words, the 
superabundance of evaluating adjectives, and the striking repetitiveness 
of the book fail to cover a fundamental confusion.220
61.
What was at stake in Foucault’s crisis? The necessity of the 
permanent access to possibilities of self-displacement corresponded in 
his writings to the dismantling of the sovereign subject as the privileged 
source of causes. The discontinuities Foucault described in his books 
were then located at the level of those "silent orders", i.e. at the level 
of things taken for granted and therefore, to an unspecified degree, 
inaccessible for the observing subject. To be sure, Foucault never 
negated the possibility of change, but rejected "extra-historical 
mechanisms" such as the "nimble bottle-imp of mind" as means to fill 
up what others perceived as the "void of discontinuity".221 And so, as 
"the T had exploded", Foucault discovered another passion: "the 
passion for concepts and for what [he called] ‘systems’."222 The title 
of his chair at the Collège de France, "History of Systems of Thought", 
was suggested by Foucault himself.223 By giving up the philosophy of 
the subject, Foucault gave up the self-evidence of causality: change 
might be possible but the very question of how it was to be brought 
about became a problem. For who is doing the struggling if not 
subjects? "[...] this is what is preoccupying me. I’m not too sure what 
the answer is", Foucault responded in 1977.224 The problem, 
however, was not just political; it was personal as it was about the one 
who was struggling in and with his project. For the project now had to 




























































































itself. The circle of observation and self-observation had collapsed to 
a point and lost its centrifugal power.
62.
The rejection of an extra-historical causality opens the question 
of how history is able to generate change out of itself. In most abstract 
terms, the possibility of internal access to novelty is the problem which 
emerged at the place where the sovereign subject had reigned over the 
empire of causes. And it is ironic to reflect upon its similarity, but also 
its difference to the problem of Nietzsche, which was, after all, the 
possibility of the internal generation of beliefs. However, for Foucault 
the puzzle is particularly delicate because he cannot give an answer as 
general as the question: a general theory of change would, in some 
sense, remove forever the possibility of change for his own undertaking. 
In fact, there was not just a necessity to tackle and possibly solve this 
problem, but there was also the danger that the solution of the problem 
would amount to a dis-solution of the project.
Part 2
63.
Foucault’s self-critique of 1976 was not just purely destructive but 
contained a germ of what he considered to be an alternative 
perspective on power. For centuries Western societies privileged a kind 
of analysis which understood power "in purely negative terms of law 
and prohibition".225 Power, in this view, is a repressing force, a force 
which refuses, limits, obstructs, censors -  in short, "power is what says 
No".226 Part of Foucault’s self-critique was that, at least in Folie et 
Déraison as well as in his programmatic lecture L’Ordre du Discourse, 
he, too, had unwisely and without much reflection followed this juridical 




























































































it was the concrete experience of his work in and for the Groupe 
d’lnformation sur les Prisons (GIP), starting from 1971/72, that led him 
to regard this conception as inadequate.228 Moreover, he came to 
think of the thesis of a juridical, negative, repressive power as being 
itself a result of power. For its purpose was to impose the narrow form 
of transgression on any challenge of power and to reduce the 
fundamental operation of power to a speech-act: "Thou shalt not."229 
Power as domination, "its latent nature and its brutality", was thereby 
concealed by a discourse which kept on emphasising law, rights, 
sovereignty even after the 17th and 18th centuries had introduced new 
mechanisms of power -  surveillance, disciplining -- which were 
incompatible with the traditional relations of sovereignty.230
64.
As an alternative to the Western insistence on negative power, 
Foucault suggests to understand power as a productive network of 
relations which run through the whole social body.231 Foucault 
replaces the juxtapositions sovereignty/obedience and 
repression/struggle as the predominant approaches to the phenomenon 
of power with an analytic of relations of domination. The objective of 
this generalization was to provide a concept of power which 
presupposed less than previous concepts and which thereby left room 
for an analysis of how the traditional models came to be taken-for- 
granted. Foucault’s "power" differs from the traditional model in at least 
three related aspects. First, there is the new emphasis on power as a 
network of relations, as an open, "more-or-less organized", "more-or- 
less co-ordinated" cluster of relations.232 For the societies installed in 
the 19th century, these networks are centre-less: "power is no longer 
substantially identified with an individual who possesses or exercises 
it by right of birth; it becomes a machinery that no one owns."233 And, 
second, these networks cover the whole of society so that power "is 
‘always already there’"; in particular: "one is never ‘outside’ it".234 
Finally, and made necessary by the previous point, Foucault frequently 
stresses the productive aspects of power. In fact, he presents the 6- 
volume-project on sexuality precisely as a study in the "re-elaboration 




























































































product of power than power was ever repression of sexuality."235 
The point is, then, that the traditional objects of power are indeed its 
products: power produces knowledge,236 individuals, subjects,237 
pleasure, discourses,238 and most important: truth. The planed book 
Le Pouvoir de la Vérité, announced on the back cover of La Volonté de 
Savoir, presumably was to be about the circular relationship between 
truth and power which Foucault established in early 1976: "We are 
subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot 
exercise power except through the production of truth."239 Truth was 
"not outside power", but "a thing of this world" produced by "virtue of 
multiple forms of constraint", and inducing "regular effects of 
power".240 For, "in the end, we are judged, condemned, classified, 
determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or 
dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the bearers of the 
specific effects of power".24' Ultimately, he adds, the political question 
"is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology; it is truth 
itself."242
65.
At that time, there was no way for Foucault to avoid questions 
about the political implications of his reading of power. After all, he 
developed these ideas precisely at the as yet unnoticed end of a period 
which was used to see him as a spokesman of resistance and struggle. 
On several occasions, he is pressed to explain why his perspective 
does not simply inaugurate the almightiness of power and remove 
forever the possibility of resistance to repression. Foucault responds in 
a defensive way. On the one hand, the universalisation of power meant 
that "there are no relations of power without resistances", which now 
are "all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the 
point where relations of power are exercised; resistance to power does 
not have to come from elsewhere to be real.1'243 If power is 
everywhere, then "subversive recodifications of power relations", too, 
are possible everywhere.244 And yet, on the other hand, what all this 
means in positive terms is left open, to be decided in the future: a "new 
form of right" was needed, "anti-disciplinarian" and at the same time 




























































































political analysis and criticism, new strategies for the modification of 
force relations, as well as new forms of politicisation "have in a large 
measure still to be invented".246 But this play between standard 
questions and Foucault's evasive responses only reveals that the 
change in Foucault’s perspective was politically motivated only to the 
extent that thinking in terms of repression had turned out to be a dead 
end. What was at stake for Foucault, at first, was the beginning of a 
search for a new area of research, a new line of questioning which, in 
contrast to the "repressive hypothesis", would be autonomous in that 
its "validity is not dependent on the approval of established regimes of 
thought".247 To be sure, he never lost sight of politics; but now the 
political implications would have to be the results of work which was still 
to be done.
66 .
Whenever he talks about this new, enlarged conception of power, 
Foucault emphasises that contents and implications of his suggestions 
need further explorations. All that was accomplished so far was, at 
most, that he had got rid of a blind passenger of his work: a pre-given 
(negative) understanding of power. But the giving-up of the traditional 
juridical view also meant that he had to start anew. "To say that 
‘everything is political’ is to affirm this ubiquity of relations of force and 
their immanence in a political field; but this is to give oneself the task, 
which as yet has scarcely even been outlined, of disentangling this 
indefinite knot."248 The assignment was nothing less but to go back 
to the history of the West, now without compass, and to re-establish 
what power had meant concretely. In order to arrive at an 
understanding of how the specific form of power prevalent in modern 
societies was implemented, how relations of power emerge, change, 
diversify, etc., one had to start again from the scratch. And the only 
guidance the new theoretical frame provided was precisely this: start 
from the scratch; do not in advance restrict the range of your vision, 
because if power is everywhere, the clue could be everywhere as well. 
The new concept of power was not yet the answer to the crisis. Also in 
Foucault’s self-understanding, it merely outlined a tremendous task and 





























































































Foucault took a sabbatical year in 1977 in order to make progress 
on the sexuality series and, more important, in order to advance an 
empirical foundation of a new perspective on power. Foucault’s first 
lectures after the break clearly differ in style and in scope from the 
previous ones: in broad empirical studies, he tries to regain 
orientation.249 In 1978 and 79 he discusses topics and classical 
concepts such as security, pastoral power, raison d’état, police, state, 
civil society, interest, population, sovereignty in puzzling and new 
contexts.250 And yet, the trace that he leaves on his way does not 
seem to give any indication of an end or a beginning. He turns every 
stone, one topic smoothly leads to another. Occasionally he stops, 
pausing for a breath, pondering on whether the issue just arrived at 
might serve as a proper starting point for his analytics of power and, 
thus, as a point of attack where change could be provoked. The notion 
of "bio-power", already introduced in La Volonté de Savoir.251 crops 
up again and again, most likely as an attempt to asymmetrize the 
almighty power-phenomena. After all, power did have to take into 
account phenomena of life -  but, as Foucault became soon aware of, 
thereby was able to increase its efficiency. Foucault keeps on 
postponing a proper treatment of the concept as it would have been 
difficult for him, I sense, to discuss bio-power without committing 
himself to some ontology of human nature.252 The term 
“governmentality" for some time appears to have marked a new 
anchoring device for his project, but was then left in a somewhat 
underdeveloped version.253 Still, at some point, Foucault considered 
governmental rationalities rather than institutions to be the proper focus 
for resistance or rebellion.254 The major result of his tour d’horizon, 
however, is a renewed, and perhaps now confirmed, accentuation of 
the concept of "truth": "Isn’t the most general of political problems the 
problem of truth?"255 At the end of the first lecture in 1980, Foucault 
announces that the theme "government by truth" would now substitute 
the concept "power/knowledge".256 The concept of truth, it seemed, 






























































































With this shift of emphasis, Foucault gains access to a new way 
of organizing his entire work. Since Folie et Déraison, he had been 
concerned with the different modes by which, "in our culture", truth can 
be established about human beings: first, there are modes which give 
themselves the status of a science; examples of those were studied in 
Naissance de la Clinique [The Birth of the Clinic] and Les Mots et les 
Choses. Second, there are modes which produce truth by "dividing 
practices"; Folie et Déraison and Surveiller et Punir dealt with those. 
Third and finally, there are modes by which human beings establish 
truth about themselves; those "technologies of the self", as he self- 
critically observed, had been neglected so far in his project, yet became 
more and more relevant for his ongoing work in the framework of the 
sexuality series.257 Later Foucault would also present those 
categories in somewhat different terms. They referred, then, to the 
modes human beings are made into subjects; to the ways in which 
subjects become objects of possible knowledge; to the way truth was 
constituted about the subject; and finally they evolved into the "three 
axis of experience: truth, power, ethics".258 In fact, in that he 
structured the concept of experience in this way, he was led to claim 
that, although all his books emphasized one or the other of those axis, 
"each time [he has] tried to show how the two other elements were 
present, what role they played, and how each one was affected by the 
transformations in the other two."259 I shall not go into the subtle 
distinctions between the titles of Foucault’s categories, but merely want 
to point out that, in the early 80s, Foucault was able to look at his work, 
if not yet as a unity, then at least as something that could be given a 
unity. The three categories he had established lasted as a stable 
representation of the work he had done since the mid 50s. Moreover, 
this new perspective on his work, adopted five years after his 
proclamation that there was no coherence in his undertakings, gave 
clear hints as to where and how this unity was to be created. In fact, 
the categorization proved to be an important operator for the specific 
way in which Foucault’s project continued: a shift of focus towards self­
relations was needed and therefore, in some (some!) sense, a re- 





























































































As a cause and effect of this conceptual shift towards truth, the 
series on the History of Sexuality was completely redesigned. Only 
shortly after finishing La Volonté de Savoir. Foucault found it impossible 
to pursue the project as outlined. There are at least two obvious 
reasons why he changed his mind. First, the idea that "the time had 
now come when [he] could [...] simply unwind what was in [his] head, 
confirming it by empirical research", i.e. the idea that he could commit 
himself to a predictable work over a longer period of time, turned out 
to be -- predictably! -  as wrong as it could be: he "very nearly died of 
boredom writing those books."260 Later, in 1984, Foucault was not 
able to explain why he had announced with such ease a project of that 
kind and scope; in fact, he admitted that he did not even want to know 
why he had run "counter to [his] usual practice."261 The second 
reason mainly refers to the dynamics of Foucault’s research on 
sexuality. The idea had been to do historical studies on the notion of 
sexuality and the development of the specific knowledge behind it from 
the 16th to the 19th century. However, Foucault soon had to notice that 
he would miss an important question if he did not start his inquiry at an 
earlier moment in history: "Why had we made sexuality into a moral 
experience? Why is there this ethical concern, which, depending on the 
moment, appears more or less important than the moral attention paid 
to other realms of individual or collective existence, such as feeding 
behaviours or the discharge of one’s civic duties?"262 If Foucault had 
insisted on pursuing the project as originally planed, he more or less 
would have had to take for granted that discourse on sexuality evokes 
moral principles. But the whole point of the project was, after all, to 
inaugurate a line of questioning which would be autonomous to the 
extent that it does not depend on established regimes of thought. His 
earlier plan to start the analysis in the 16th century had to turn out as 
unsuitable since it would have required, again!, a prior objectification. 
The work, in other words, would have been based on an assumption 





























































































And so Foucault begins to search for a proper starting point for 
his analysis. In 1978, his course at the Collège still focused on the 16th 
century, whereas in 1980, Foucault lectures on the 3rd and 4th century. 
The course of 1982, L’Herméneutique du Sujet, mainly deals with the 
first two centuries, until he finally, in 1983/84, jumps back even further 
into the 4th and 5th century BC.263 The major result and justification 
of his time travel is that the themes of austerity usually ascribed to 
Christianity were already present in pagan culture, although in a 
somewhat different way.264 The classical concept of the care of the 
self now marks the place where a certain number of ascetic techniques 
developed, which were later transformed and thus not invented by 
Christianity: "We are not talking about a moral rupture between tolerant 
antiquity and austere Christianity."265 One of the reasons why 
Foucault tried so hard to illuminate the transition from antiquity to 
Christianity might have been that, by emphasizing the continuity behind 
the transition, he was able to continue and in fact correct Nietzsche’s 
Zur Genealogie der Moral.266 According to Foucault, the theme of the 
care of the self occurs at first in the socratic-platonic period (Alcibiades) 
as a general category of techniques of the self, which contained the 
obtainment of self-knowledge as a consequence. In this framework, the 
care of the self is what allows one to govern oneself and then to govern 
others. Thus, taking care of oneself reflected political ambitions. In a 
first shift, this orientation towards the government of others disappears. 
The first two centuries mark the time of the autofinalisation of the care 
of the self in that the latter becomes an end in itself. At the same time, 
the philosophical question of the possibility of truth evolves into a 
question of spirituality: How does the self has to work upon itself in 
order to obtain access to truth? This set of practices and questions 
makes up a line of practice and thought to which Christianity later 
connects: the obtainment of self-knowledge not only becomes 
predominant as compared to other techniques of the self, but it also is 
now oriented towards the renunciation of the self. The Christian self is 
what is to be renounced and not what is to be striven for. In other 
words, the practices of the self "whose aim was to constitute oneself as 




























































































"towards the hermeneutics of self and the deciphering of oneself as a 
subject of desire."267
71.
Foucault did begin to work on two books and almost finished one 
on early Christianity, but then, as a result of his attempt to write a 
preface, put it aside once he saw he had missed a decisive question. 
In early 1983, Foucault’s work and publication schedules looked as 
follows. As number two of the History of Sexuality, L’Usage des Plaisirs 
would show that the same codes concerning sexual ethics which 
existed in the Roman empire were already present in the 4th century 
BC -  the difference being that earlier they were related to aesthetics 
and not, as later, to normalization. The book would contain a chapter 
on the technology of the self; its time frame would end just before the 
rise of Christianity. The third volume of the series would be a revised 
version of the Christianity book, entitled Les Aveux de la Chair [The 
Confession of the Flesh], and would cover Christian technologies of the 
self. In addition, Foucault planed a book exclusively devoted to the 
notion of the self, which would include an article on Plato’s Alcibiades 
as one of the first ancient texts to develop the theme of the care of the 
self. This book, entitled Le Souci de Soi, was supposed to appear 
separate from the sexuality series.268 However, the discussion of 
Plato soon was amplified and Greek antiquity became the centre of 
L’Usage des Plaisirs. The thinkers of the first two centuries, i.e. those 
who wrote during the blossom-time of the culture of the self: Seneca, 
Plutarch, Epictetus, and Galen, filled Le Souci de Soi, which mutated 
into the third volume of the History of Sexuality, only followed by Les 
Aveux de la Chair as fourth and indeed final treatise in the series. 
Foucault briefly considered the possibility of publishing all his studies 
on sexuality in one big volume of some 800 pages, but finally decided 
against the idea since publication would have had to be delayed until 
the project was completely finished. He finished correcting proof for 
L'Usage des Plaisirs and Le Souci de Soi in May 1984 and thought that 





























































































The theme of the care of the self was precisely the missing piece 
which made the mosaic complete and thereby revealed the entire 
picture: now there were colours, shapes, silhouettes, patterns, and 
above all a new unity which did not require a frame! Moreover, and 
perhaps to Foucault’s own surprise, it allowed him to reintroduce the 
idea of the subject in a way which did not disturb but in fact 
strengthened the composition of the mosaic. It became possible to 
introduce the subject not as the frame, but as part of that moving 
picture: it had its place but still not as the condition of the possibility of 
experience. The Cartesian moment which had justified the subject’s 
immediate access to truth through its being a subject was just one 
specific moment in a long history in which subject and truth have been 
mutually and cyclically constituted.270 The history of the subject is not 
the history of an event -- an insight which partly explains the change in 
Foucault’s writing style in the late 70s and early 80s.271 To be sure, 
the refusal to accept the subject as a substance had been at the heart 
of Foucault’s undertaking from the outset, but as long as he focused on 
modernity, his refusal must have looked even to him more as an 
intuition than as a result. The ancient techniques of the self showed, 
however, that the subject "is not just constituted in the play of symbols; 
it is constituted in real practices -- historically analyzable practices.1,272 
And the possibility of a profound transformation of those practices 
constitutes, then, a historical fact, too.273 For Foucault, the time travel 
backwards offered a "certain theoretical advantage" in that it helped him 
to spare certain theoretical considerations.274 Finally, the subject 
Foucault discovered in this way turned out to be much less frightening 
than he might have thought. In fact, the way he described what he had 
found resembled too closely what he had always said about his own 
undertaking: the self-formation of the subject was "an exercise of self 
upon self by which one tries to work out, to transform one’s self and to 





























































































In this way, the discovery of the ethics of the care for the self 
solved a very specific problem for Foucault: he now could talk about the 
subject without objectifying it, without limiting its possibilities. He could 
resume talking without giving up his silence. It was this theme which 
gave him the opportunity to say something he was not able to say 
before; it was not just but also a language that Foucault discovered. His 
complex, all-too subtle style of writing, the hiding places which he 
painstakingly constructed in his sentences dissolved. It seems as if he 
finally felt more at ease with using words. The excitement about the 
new findings soon superseded whatever interest there might have 
remained in the question of power. Foucault’s last text on power is 
entitled "The Subject and Power" (1982) and begins with the 
observation that the subject, and not power, has been the general 
theme of his approach from the outset.276 What is striking about the 
text is that it does not add anything fundamentally new to what Foucault 
had said on power at a time when he thought that was his major issue. 
Power is still rooted deep in the social nexus; a society without power 
remains nothing but an abstraction.277 Just as in his interviews of 
1976/77, relationships of power presuppose freedom as a condition of 
their functioning: power can be exercised only over free subjects.278 
In lack of alternatives, the escape route had to be built into the concept: 
"For if it is true that at the heart of power relations and as a permanent 
condition of their existence there is an insubordination and a certain 
essential obstinacy on the part of the principles of freedom, then there 
is no relationship of power without the means of escape or possible 
flight. Every power relationship implies, in potentia, a strategy for 
struggle."279 He adds a distinction between relationships of power and 
states of domination in which an individual or groups of individuals 
manage to block a field of relations of power. Liberation is, then, a 
liberation from domination, not from power; liberation means to "open 
up new relationships of power, which have to be controlled by practices 
of liberty."280 Yet again, liberation inaugurates nothing but 
relationships of power -  a gesture of thought which can be traced back 
at least to La Volonté de Savoir. In that Foucault, after six years of 
intensive work, simply repeats what should have been the starting point 




























































































power, he confirmed that his universalisation of power had been the 
beginning of the end of his interest in the topic. For to see power 
relations everywhere was a theoretical response to the self-imposed 
requirement of not again being taken in by any pre-given 
conceptualisation of power. To universalise power was the last thing he 
could say before leaving the topic altogether. In particular, after 1976, 
Foucault never changed his mind on power: there is no exit.28' On 
the contrary, his réintroduction of the subject even includes self­
relations into an all-encompassing chain which connects power 
relations, governmental rationalities, the government of oneself and 
others.282 The subject provided a solution for Foucault not by 
revealing an immediate way out; in some sense, the dead end still 
remained a dead end. But, as I will explain later, with the réintroduction 
of the subject, the space limited by the dead end becomes potentially 
infinite. And for the fish in the ocean, acknowledging the emptiness of 
the proposition that the ocean it lives in is a prison, opens up the 
possibility to escape from that very prison: "Power is not an evil."283
74.
Foucault’s half-hearted attempts to finally close the power-chapter 
only reveal that it has never been the central chapter of his life-book: 
"At the limit, I would say that power as an autonomous question, does 
not interest me." He emphasized that he "in no way" had wanted to 
construct a general theory of power; nor was he interested in an 
"analysis of power as it exists today."284 After all, the problem 
power/knowledge turned out to be merely "an instrument allowing the 
analysis -  in a way that seemed to [him] to be the most exact -  of the 
problem of the relationships between subject and games of truth."285 
But the point Foucault made in his late interviews is even more 
fundamental: essentially, his work was not political. He was convinced, 
then, that the fact that he had been "situated in most of the squares of 
the political checkerboard" without settling down in one particular area 
of that board did not reflect the incompetence of those who tried to 
situate him, but ultimately must have had something to do with him. He 
agreed that what interested him was "much more morals than politics 




























































































to deliver the exit to this power-less world of otherness because he 
could not. For Foucault, this was the opposite of a failure; it was his 
victory: he did not break his silence. To direct others, to govern others 
presupposes a prior objectification; one cannot define otherness without 
imposing limits onto the identical, i.e. onto the present world: "It is 
impossible to direct man without operation in truth." Foucault was able 
to analyze those objectifications but was and had always been unable 
to participate in them. By maintaining his silence, i.e. by refusing to 
participate, Foucault finally found his very personal otherness.
75.
Therefore, the entire field of self-relations must have seemed 
particularly interesting to Foucault: "The idea of the bios as a material 
for an aesthetic piece of art is something which fascinates me. The idea 
also that ethics can be a very strong structure of existence, without any 
relation with the juridical per se, with an authoritarian system, with a 
disciplinary structure. All that is very interesting."287 To be sure, self­
relations presuppose objectification as much as any other field of 
experience. But they are specific in that the establishment and 
maintenance of those relations cannot be anything but a continuous 
self-referential and recursive process -- i.e. a process in which thought 
and practice or, if you will, truth and the subject are cyclically co­
constituted.288 Apparently, Foucault needed to study sexuality, which 
he understood as the ultimate and original form of self-relations,289 in 
order to discover this circularity. And it is the circle and its peculiar 
geometry which provided a solution to Foucault’s problems. The circle 
is bound; it does not provide an exit, but still knows neither an end nor 
a beginning and thus reflects endlessness. Combined with the renewed 
emphasis on truth, the discovery of the circle translates into two 
propositions. First, nothing leads outside truth; there is no strategy 
exterior to it. "We escape domination of truth not by playing an external 
game, but by playing another game, another set."290 Second, "the 
task of telling the truth is an endless labour" and, if that is so, this could 
only mean that "there is always the possibility, in a given game of truth, 
to discover something else and to more or less change such and such 




























































































this circle where Foucault finally found enough space to locate himself; 
the late self-descriptions of Foucault’s project unfolded out of this circle.
76.
In 1980, Foucault declared that he had never met any 
"intellectuals"; the very word struck him as "odd" because, for him, 
intellectuals simply didn’t exist. Fie had met "people who write novels, 
others who treat the sick. People who work in economics and others 
who write electronic music. [Fie had] met people who teach, people who 
paint, and people of whom [he had] never really understood what they 
do. But intellectuals never."292 In the spring of 1984, only a few 
months before his death, Foucault claimed this very title of the 
intellectual for himself; moreover it was precisely because he was an 
intellectual, and not just an academic, that he could not write the 
FHistory of Sexuality according to his plans of 1976. Foucault’s own 
ethics had now become the new raison d’être of the intellectual: "to 
make oneself permanently capable of detaching oneself from oneself." 
The circle of truth and its endlessness, which is both a completeness 
as well as a permanent incompleteness, provided room for this activity, 
for this practice: "I would like it to be an elaboration of self by self, a 
studious transformation, a slow, arduous process of change, guided by 
a constant concern for truth."293 And that was the point: one could 
trust truth -  not because it would lead to the one and only possible 
solution (which would be a dead end); but because, on the contrary, it 
could always be questioned and because it always questions.
77.
All these shifts of perspective, the alternation and oscillation of 
concepts did not occur, of course, in a neat sequential order as the 
previous sections might suggest. All this happened simultaneously in 
a highly non-linear fashion, and yet it seems as if it was not without 
purpose, not without direction: the more Foucault struggled, the more 
he tried to get rid of himself, the more he had to realize that he might 




























































































the care for the self as a practice that Foucault’s project re-entered 
itself. Foucault’s trajectory, indeed, is full of ironies. For was it not 
precisely this re-entry that he had wanted to avoid? This confrontation 
with himself? "Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we 
are, but to refuse what we are."294 However, precisely in this refusal 
he re-discovered himself, and at least for some time, until his death, 
seemed to have refrained from refusing. And is it not all-too 
understandable that for this radical and yet also smooth shift of 
perspective, which in strictly logical terms must remain unjustified, he 
would need almost 8 years; that he would have to go through an 
intellectual and personal crisis, which he perhaps was able to 
understand and acknowledge only after he had solved it? As if he had 
worked all those years -  silently, blindly, irresistibly, unwillingly, 
involuntarily -  only in order to arrive at this point of re-entry.
78.
In late 82, Foucault indicated that, after having studied 
subsequently (1) "the relations we have to truth through scientific 
knowledge", (2) "the relationships we have to others through those 
strange strategies and power relationships", and (3) the relations we 
have to ourselves, his trajectory would now lead him back to the first 
issue, to his point of departure, and thereby bend into a circle.295 
However, he did more or something else than that. For the re-entry 
meant precisely that he would now have access to the entirety of his 
work, i.e. that he could begin to thematize what it was that kept the 
three axes of his work together. This move was implicit in Foucault’s 
discussion of the notion of parrhesia [jtappqcaa], which refers to the 
various practices of "truth-telling" as they occurred from about 400 B.C. 
in Greek literature (Euripides) up to the fifth century A.D. in the patristic 
texts (St. John Chrysostom).296 In Euripides’ texts, parrhesia refers to 
a relationship between the speaker and what he says. If a speaker 
uses parrhesia, he emphasises that he in fact believes what he says, 
i.e. that, by saying what he says, he makes a commitment to the 
contents of the words spoken: "I am the one who thinks this and that 
to be true".297 For the speaker, this commitment entails a risk 




























































































made accountable and liable for the words he spoke. By using 
parrhesia, the speaker accepts that the uttered words are indeed his 
words, that he reveals a personal truth. Usually, parrhesia takes place 
in a context where this risk is real to the extent that the speaker faces 
an interlocutor who is powerful enough to actually make the speaker 
liable. Parrhesiastic acts occur under conditions of inferiority, e.g. when, 
as described by Plutarch, Plato and Dion criticise the tyrant 
Dionysos.298 However, although one cannot, then, use parrhesia 
towards oneself, parrhesia nevertheless necessitates that the speaker 
establishes a relation with himself; the speaker projects himself into the 
future: "I am the one who will have said this and that".299 In some 
sense, parrhesia is what the speaker uses in order to establish (in a 
specific context) an identity over time. He makes himself predictable for 
others by declaring truth more important than his (well-)being. And 
precisely thereby the situation turns unpredictable for himself as the 
others now can exploit his commitment. Parrhesia is the creation of 
unpredictability through predictability; parrhesia is the truthful self­
constitution of identity by providing others with an occasion to exemplify 
their power; it is a focal point where truth, power, and self-relations 
come together, and where the three axes truth, power, ethics intersect 
and mutually constitute each other.300
79.
Of special importance for Foucault was, of course, the Socratic 
form of parrhesia for it was Socrates who linked parrhesia with 
epimeleia heautou, the care of the self. The Socratic parrhesiastic 
game took place as a kind of interrogation in a personal, face to face 
relationship. The listener was led by Socrates’ questions into "giving an 
account of himself, of the manner in which he now spends his day, and 
of the kind of life he has lived hitherto".301 Here, "to give an account 
of oneself" did not mean to provide an autobiography or to confess 
one’s faults; at stake was the question of whether the listener was able 
to show that there was a relation between the rational discourse, the 
logos, he was using, and the way that he lived, the bios. Socrates was 
interested in discovering whether there was a harmonic relation 




























































































game was the present relation between the listener’s life and truth. The 
point was not, then, just to esteem truth in specific situations which 
required courage, but to live in truth. And he, Socrates, was accepted 
and respected as a parrhesiastic figure precisely because he 
exemplified what he said. Socratic parrhesia had a long tradition 
through the Cynics and other Socratic schools. In fact, in the Greco- 
Roman period, the role of the parrhesiastes, the one who could use 
parrhesia, moved from the well-born citizen and, later, the political 
leader (or his advisor) to the philosopher. By the time of the 
Epicureans, parrhesia’s affinity with the care of the self had developed 
to the point where parrhesia itself was primarily regarded as a 
technique of spiritual guidance for the "education of the soul".302 The 
target of the new form of parrhesia was to convince someone that he 
must take care of himself and (then) of others -- which usually meant 
that he must change his style of life (not just: his opinion). At the centre 
of this philosophical parrhesia was the assumption that an harmonic 
relation between oneself and truth would grant access to further truth 
and knowledge. In this circle, Foucault identifies one of "the problematic 
enigmas of Western Thought -  e.g. as in Descartes or Kant",303 or, 
one might add, in Foucault himself. That Foucault established a special 
relationship between himself and his work and between Socrates and 
his parrhesiastic practice is evident not only from the fact that, in 83 
and 84, he began again to look at himself as a philosopher, but also 
from the way in which Foucault thematized Socrates’ last words in his 
lectures in 84. These lectures were held at a time when Foucault knew 
that he was going to die soon.304
80.
Foucault was able to integrate the possibility of the 
autofinalisation of the practices related to the care of the self into his 
work in such a way that it seemed to confirm the very possibility -  the 
independence! -- of his work. But this possibility had become 
problematic only as a special case of a much more general problem -- 
the problem of change, i.e. the problem of the internal access to 
novelty.305 It was through the gigantic lens of this problem that 




























































































come thus far, the temptation must have been great to return to the 
original lens via a generalization of what had become the solution to his 
problem. The new problem was, then, to trace circularity not just in self­
relations but to establish it as a general phenomenon. For Foucault, this 
problem must have been as delicate as Zarathustra’s silence for 
Nietzsche. In his most outspoken attempt, in the intended preface to 
the second volume of the History of Sexuality, Foucault presents the 
abstract notion of thought as a kind of universal host of self-reference: 
"transformation could not take place except by means of a working of 
thought upon itself."306 However, it is not accidental that this version 
remained an intended and never became an actual preface. He had 
difficulties in conceptualizing the distinction between autonomy and self­
reference and might have feared to evoke reservations along the lines 
of what Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow had called, in a different 
context, "the illusion of the autonomous discourse."307 Still, in some 
sense, thought remains also later the place where the possibility of 
recursiveness lives -  a move which finally allows Foucault to propose 
the history of thought as a distinct field of inquiry. But now this 
possibility of recursiveness becomes embedded in a more complex 
composition of relations between being, experience, thought, and truth - 
- a composition which Foucault subsumes under the title 
"problematization". This concept marks Foucault’s cautious attempt to 
generalize the consolation he had found in the circle of truth. His last 
methodological writings are exclusively devoted to "problematization". 
In that his project reappears in its own meaning world under this title, 
the concept of problematization plays a similar role for Foucault’s 
project as the figure of Zarathustra for Nietzsche’s.
81 .
"The fundamental codes of a culture -- those governing its 
language, its schemes of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its 
values, the hierarchy of its practices -  establish for every man, from the 
very first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within 
which he will be at home. At the other extremity of thought, there are 
the scientific theories or the philosophical interpretations which explain 




























































































can account for it, and why this particular order has been established 
and not some other."308 "The ordering codes and reflections upon 
order itself": these two extremes, which Foucault had established in Les 
Mots et les Choses. can finally merge and thereby bend the line 
segment they had delimited into a circle. This process, in which "being 
offers itself to be, necessarily, thought",309 is what Foucault calls 
"problematization" -- a term which he had used before, but started to 
isolate only in 1983.310 A problematization is "the totality of discursive 
and non-discursive practices that introduces something into the play of 
true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought."311 In that 
a domain of action or a behaviour can enter the field of thought only 
after it became uncertain, after it lost its familiarity, after a certain 
number of difficulties occurred around it, the problematization is a kind 
of response to those difficulties; it is an answer, which consists in the 
development of a given into a question. Problematization responds to 
difficulties by developing the conditions in which possible responses 
can be given; it defines the elements that will constitute what different 
solutions attempt to respond to.312 In other words, a question is 
always based on a previous answer; and the level of that previous 
answer is precisely the level of problematization. The concept 
proposes, then, a fundamental paradox, i.e. an incompleteness and 
openness which is inherent in the relation between being and thought. 
Apart from describing them as "social, economic or political processes", 
Foucault does not specify what factors precisely have the power to 
make taken-for-granted things problematic. He emphasizes, however, 
that these factors do not completely prescribe or determine the specific 
problematization they instigate. These factors are not causes in a strict 
sense; there is, again, a distinct element of thought in the 
problematization, which may influence whether or not, when, and how 
thought intervenes. A problematization is more than a mere 
representation of a pre-existing object; it is something else than the 
creation by discourse of an object that doesn’t exist; it is not the 
immediate, direct, or necessary expression of the difficulties. Rather, it 
is an original or specific response, a work of thought, a kind of creation, 
which has real effects on the conditions under which it was instigated. 
The source of novelty lies, after all, precisely in this step in which being, 
through thought, establishes distance to itself, portrays itself in order to 




























































































problematizations; and problematizations are what makes a history of 
thought both distinct and possible. Through problematizations, the 
power of thought becomes historically analyzable -  and this was, after 
all, what Foucault had exploited in all his studies since Folie et 
Déraison.313
82 .
Thought can bend reality and link it to itself; the distinctness of 
thought is the source of its power. Distance is, then, implicit in thought: 
thought "is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or 
reacting"; it is "freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by 
which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and 
reflects on it as a problem." Aptly summarizing his own efforts, Foucault 
concludes that the study of thought is the analysis of freedom.314 In 
this way, i.e. by conceptualizing the relation between thought and being 
via the concept of problematization, he skilfully managed to put the 
circularity of self-relations in a political context. It is through ethics, 
through techniques of the self, through an aesthetics of existence that 
one can train and design the distinctness of thought. The ethics of care 
for the self becomes eventually a practice of freedom -  especially if it 
could be possible to uncouple ethics from scientific knowledge. For 
Foucault, the question of whether there could be an ethics of acts and 
their pleasures, without references either to law, to marriage, to 
science, etc., which would still be able to take into account the pleasure 
of the other, was essentially a political question.315 This did not mean 
that a renewed culture of the self would solve current political problems. 
In particular, Foucault never proposes the ancient Greek ethics as an 
alternative. On the contrary, he was "quite disgusted" by the Greek 
ethics of pleasure, which was "linked to a virile society, to dissymmetry, 
exclusion of the other, an obsession with penetration, and a kind of 
threat of being dispossessed of your own energy, and so on".316 Nor 
did he want to suggest "that the only point of resistance to political 
power (as a state of domination) lies in the relationship of self to 
self'.317 But he did claim that the elaboration of a new ethics would 
have political relevance. "Recent liberation movements suffer from the 




























































































on so-called scientific knowledge of what the self is, what desire is, 
what the unconscious is, and so on."318 And since "the lifting of the 
codes and the dislocation of prohibitions have probably been carried 
out more easily than people thought they would (which certainly seems 
to indicate that their purpose was not what it was believed to be) [...], 
the problem of an ethics as a form to be given to one’s behaviour and 
life has arisen once more."319
83.
In his late interviews, Foucault seems to look for opportunities to 
talk about problematization. The introduction of this concept reflects the 
successful re-entry of his project into itself, because it always has a 
double reference: it refers to the phenomena Foucault studied as well 
as to the very activity of studying them. Foucault problematizes 
problematizations;320 he exemplifies what he sees and thereby, i.e. 
by doing this, provides evidence that problematization as a work of 
thought is feasible. In this way, Foucault’s project is able to validate 
itself by its continuation; it is able to anchor itself within itself. It has 
overcome itself not by escaping from itself or by getting rid of itself, but 
on the contrary by integrating itself into itself, by accepting itself, by 
taking itself for granted. The double reference implicit in the notion of 
problematization reveals that the circular link between observation and 
self-observation has been re-established, but now with a significant 
difference: in that the circle of truth seemed to warrant the possibility of 
self-transformation (as a practice), the problem now was to generalize 
this possibility towards society, towards politics. In other words, the 
circle which had been at the centre of his project from the outset 
reversed its orientation at the moment of re-entry. The circle collapsed 
to a point and unfolded out of this point with the opposite orientation: 
finally, Foucault adopted the epistemological design of the Nietzsche of 
the early 1880s. When Foucault declared in his last interview that he 
was "just a Nietzschean", he was right as he perhaps had never been 
before.321 And just as Nietzsche, he could now return to everything 
he wrote before the re-entry, to his earlier “form of philosophy", and 
"use it as a field of experience to be studied." The re-entry made it 




























































































think it differently, and to see what [he] had done from a new vantage 
point and in a clearer light". "Sure of having travelled far”, he found 
"that one is looking down on oneself from above." For Foucault, this 
experience confirmed that he was following "a more radical way of 
thinking the philosophical experience."322
84.
But Foucault does not stop there. For once he established a link 
between observation and self-observation, i.e. once he was able to look 
at himself in terms of what he studied, he came to reflect on this very 
activity of establishing such a link as an aspect of his present. In fact, 
precisely because this link had been established by then, any 
observation of the present, of his actuality, presupposed and caused a 
reflexion on where Foucault could locate his own activity in what he 
observed as his present. His starting point for this exercise is a 
discussion of Kant’s text "Was ist Aufklarung?" [What is 
Enlightenment?], which Kant wrote as a response to the Berlinische 
Monatsschrift, which had asked the question in 1784.323 According to 
Foucault, the importance of this "minor text" does not so much lie in its 
contents but in the design of Kant’s argument. The text is a reflection 
by Kant on the contemporary status of his own enterprise: by describing 
Enlightenment as “the moment when humanity is going to put its own 
reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority" Kant proclaims 
the necessity of critique, since "its role is that of defining the conditions 
under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what 
can be known, what must be done, and what may be hoped."324 In 
his interpretation of the present, Kant finds a place for himself. For 
Foucault, Kant’s text "Was ist Aufklarung?" marks the origin of that 
gesture; it marks the first appearance of the question "of the present as 
a philosophical event incorporating within it the philosopher who speaks 
of it."325 The philosopher’s inclusion in this present was no longer a 
question of his adherence to a doctrine or a tradition which he would 
accept once and for all, but it became the cause and the result of his 
reflection on the present. In the philosopher’s reflection, his doing and 
the present became linked in a circular way. Thus, according to 




























































































mode of reflective relation to the present; it indicates the beginning of 
the "attitude of modernity".326
85.
Modernity was not to be envisaged, then, as a fixed regime of 
thought which was in some sense different to "premodern" or 
"postmodern" regimes; modernity should be envisioned as an attitude, 
even as a permanent task. However, Foucault does not simply read this 
attitude into Kant's text and then links his (Foucault’s!) present and his 
doing to the tradition that unfolded out of this attitude; that would have 
been, according to Foucault’s own interpretation, precisely a step back 
to pre-Kantian thinking. Instead, Foucault radicalises the Kantian move 
by applying it to Kant himself. The Kantian critical question of knowing 
"what limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing" had to be 
transformed "into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible 
transgression".327 Critique, then, was necessary not only to discipline 
reason, but also to discipline (the Kantian form of) critique -- for critique 
is reason, too. Foucault’s version of the attitude of modernity comes 
very close, then, to a presentation of the dynamics of his own 
undertaking. For, in his version, it referred to a kind of inquiry which 
was oriented towards the "contemporary limits of the necessary", 
towards "what is not or no longer indispensable for the constitution of 
ourselves as autonomous subjects";328 it referred to a "limit-attitude" 
which understood critique not as an imposition of limits but precisely as 
"an historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and as an experiment 
with the possibility of going beyond them";329 it meant work done at 
the limits of ourselves; it would amount to an "historical ontology of 
ourselves", i.e. to an "historical investigation into the events that have 
led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects 
of what we are doing, thinking, saying"; as such it could "separate out, 
from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of 
no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, think";330 it would 
conserve "the question of the historicity of the thought of the 
universal";331 etc. In this ingenious move, Foucault exemplifies the 




























































































the circular link between observation and self-observation precisely by 































































































Whenever he is at home in Oerlinghausen, Niklas Luhmann 
spends each and basically the whole day writing: in the morning from 
8.30 to noon, in the afternoon from about 14.00 to 16.00, and then 
finally in the evening until about 23.00. The workday is interrupted only 
by meals, walks with his dog and highly concentrated periods of 
relaxation which usually do not last more than 15 minutes. Writing, it 
seems, is more a routine than a struggle; in his work, Niklas Luhmann 
never enforces anything and only does what comes easily to him. Once 
he feels he has come to a standstill in his work, he immediately turns 
to something else. In that he always works on several books, articles 
or projects at the same time, he is never blocked in his work. Writing, 
again, does not represent a burden or strain to him which has to be 
justified or rewarded by periods of non-work; on the contrary, he feels 
that his thoughts follow hot on the heels of one another, and that there 
are too many problems he has not as yet properly understood, so that 
on trips abroad it takes only a few days until he thinks he now has to 
go home and continue writing.332 The result of this disciplined and 
from the outset well organized work is a bibliography which by now 
should list some 320 entries, including some 40 books;333 the result 
is, in other words, a more or less uninterrupted stream of writing which 
provides everything but the evidence of a crisis as severe as 
encountered by, say, Nietzsche or Foucault.
87.
In the last chapter, I started the discussion of Foucault’s trajectory 




























































































only in order to continue, then, with a reference to the decisive 
difference which explains the parallels between the trajectories of the 
two thinkers. The opening section on Luhmann, however, starts with a 
difference -- the absence of crisis! -- to the previous openings and, if 
the architecture of this part were just a reversion of the architecture of 
the part on Foucault, I should now continue by marking the decisive 
similarity which explains the differences between the projects of 
Foucault and Luhmann. In some sense, this is precisely what I intend 
to do -- only that it cannot be done immediately.334 Nietzsche’s 
writings were very much present in Foucault’s work from early on so 
that a discussion of only the latter can hardly avoid to mention and 
include the former as well. For Luhmann, no such intense relation to 
any other thinker can be established. Although he certainly learned 
tremendously from Talcott Parsons’ theory of action systems, from its 
problems, its reception, its failure, and although he admired the scope 
and courage of Parsons’ design, Luhmann has never been a 
Parsonian. Already before Luhmann went to Harvard and actually met 
Parsons in 1960/61, his work was based on an understanding of the 
concept of the "function" which differed significantly from the one 
offered by Parsons’ structural-functional method.335 Parsons 
remained, though, an important reference point throughout Luhmann’s 
writings, partly as someone who was simply too popular to be ignored, 
partly as someone to establish differences to.336 Especially during its 
formative years Luhmann’s work showed all the advantages and 
disadvantages of the work of an outsider who would first follow his own 
thoughts and then, only after he made his points, would look for 
similarities and differences to other thinkers. Therefore, because of its 
independence, I will first have to present Luhmann’s undertaking on its 
own and postpone an elaboration of the relationship between Foucault’s 
and Luhmann’s design until the concluding part of this essay.
88 .
There was, at first, a conspicuous distance between Luhmann’s 
interest in sociology and philosophy and between his actual studies and 
his work. Between 1946 and 49, he studied Law at the University of 




























































































firm, until he got bored and, in 1954, changed to the 
Oberverwaltungsgericht Luneburg, where he worked as a civil servant, 
largely occupied with administrative issues. Only one year later, 
Luhmann profited from a change of government in Niedersachsen and 
became referee at the local parliament in Hannover, where he was in 
charge of a juridical review of cases of reparation for victims of the 
Nazi-regime. And yet, although the position he occupied at the age of 
only 28 promised to be a starting point for a steep career as civil 
servant, Luhmann apparently never considered what looked most 
obvious to others. When confronted with the requirements he would 
have to fulfil if he were to take the route that seemed so obvious, he 
responded "I am reading Holderlin.1,337 Due to this lack of enthusiasm 
for his work, it seemed a question of time until he would get bored 
again with the monotony of administration, especially since the 
continuation of his career would have required, sooner or later, an 
affiliation with a political party. It was by chance, then, that he found an 
announcement of a competition for a Harvard-fellowship on his desk.
89.
Throughout these years he spent in small law firms, at the court 
in Lüneburg, or finally at Hannover, Luhmann systematically pursued 
his interest in philosophy and sociology. In 1952, at the age of 25, he 
had understood, as he explained later, that he had to plan for a lifetime 
rather than for a book, and began to systematize his note-taking. 
Instead of leaving the notes in the books he read and instead of 
collecting them in folders which remained difficult to survey, Luhmann 
started to build up his own archive of notes according to a principle 
which he now keeps for more than 40 years. The organizational 
principle is of surprising simplicity. Notes are not categorized according 
to topics or subjects but are marked only by a code, a string of 
numbers and characters, which indicates the place where to find them 
in the system. Within the text of the note, references to other notes are 
included so that, say, a note with the code 57/12 can either be 
continued as 57/13 or, starting from a specific word or idea, can be 
specified under 57/12a, and so on. In this way, the system remains 




























































































via its internal references in a non-linear fashion; in fact, after some 
time the very organization of the system becomes an additional source 
of information. The^main system primarily memorizes Luhmann’s own 
thoughts, seldom quotations; a separate system takes care of 
bibliographical references and both systems are linked.338 30 years 
after he began to organize his ideas in this way, Luhmann explains his 
productivity and creativity by referring to his archive: to write a 
manuscript is basically to communicate with this system, which not only 
provides the notes taken over three decades but also suggests 
surprising cross-connections between them. The maintenance of the 
archive, however, now takes up more time than writing books.339 
Luhmann’s working style reflects and promotes features of his work 
which are present throughout his writings: a refusal, very much inspired 
by his wish to preserve possibilities of change and learning, to accept 
any kind of a priori categorization according to subject matters, as well 
as a very independent line of questioning and observing, which follows 
its own internally developed standards rather than newspaper events.
90.
Even before he went to Harvard, Luhmann had a clear sense of 
what his interests and immediate projects were. The stay at Harvard 
was supposed to help him writing a book on the theory of organization 
that would later evolve into Funktionen und Folqen formaler 
Organisation [Functions and Consequences of Formal Organization], 
his first proper book.340 His readings in the mid and late 50s focused 
on Descartes and Husserl; he also mentions an interest in Kant, 
whereas he did not find much inspiration in Hegel or Marx. In 
sociological theory, Luhmann studied the early functionalism of 
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, and was thereby led to cultural 
anthropology and ethnology. However, he always disliked the German 
philosophical anthropology.341 Well-equipped with knowledge and 
interests as he was, Harvard did not become the sensational key event 
that would change his life. To be sure, Luhmann’s efforts to work 
himself into the architecture of Parsons’ theory, the acquaintance with 
Parsons, their disagreement on the meaning of the functional method 




























































































this helped him to clarify, to specify, and to discern his own concerns. 
And yet, although Parsons’ theory became the stadia rod which was to 
be overcome, the momentum by which this should be achieved had 
earlier roots.
91.
His application for the Harvard-fellowship already expressed an 
interest in leaving civil service and in intensifying his sociological 
studies. After his return from the States, Luhmann was looking for an 
occasion to switch from administration to "science".342 At the research 
institute of the University for Administration at Speyer, Luhmann finds 
more time for his theoretical interests and finishes his book Funktionen 
und Folqen formaler Organisation (1964). It must have been around 
that time that Luhmann’s work caught the attention of one of the most 
influential German sociologists, Helmut Schelsky, who would soon, in 
65, promote him to the position of a head of department at the 
Sozialforschungsstelle Dortmund. During the second half of the 60s, 
Schelsky was very much involved in the foundation of the university at 
Bielefeld, which was supposed to become, at least in Schelsky’s plans, 
a reform university with a strong emphasis on research and 
interdisciplinary work. So far, Luhmann had been sceptical about an 
academic career; he had always envisioned the university as something 
small, narrow and repetitive.343 However, Schelsky managed to 
convince Luhmann that Bielefeld would be a different experience.344 
In 1966, Luhmann’s Funktionen und Folqen formaler Organisation and 
his Recht und Automation in der offentlichen Verwaltunq [Law and 
Automation in Public Administration] (1966) were accepted as 
dissertation and habilitation at the university of Munster by Helmut 
Schelsky and Dieter Claessens. Somehow Schelsky’s influence 
overcame all bureaucratic obstacles in Luhmann’s appointment at 
Bielefeld; still, for formal reasons, Luhmann had to study sociology for 
a brief time. He had opted for a chair in sociology because he thought 
that, as a sociologist, one can basically do everything without being 
limited by some particular subject matter. Luhmann gave his inaugural 
lecture under the title "Sociological Enlightenment" on the 25th of 




























































































Bielefeld in 1968 after the opening of the new university. Although, 
Schelsky’s hopes with regard to Bielefeld were disappointed -- Bielefeld 
turned out to be a "pretty normal university" (Luhmann) Luhmann 
apparently never thought about leaving the place. By now, Luhmann 
has taught and worked for 25 years in Bielefeld.
92.
From 1968 on, Luhmann was on his own, then, free to follow his 
own ideas, free to devote most of his time to his theoretical interests. 
By then, two concerns had moved to the centre of his writings: first, 
there was the issue which distanced him from Parsons from the outset, 
i.e. the re-definition of the concept of the function implying a critique of 
the predominant functionalism of the time, and second, there was the 
program of sociological enlightenment, which he summarized in his 
inaugural lecture. Both concerns are linked in that the latter entails 
methodological prescriptions made necessary by the former; and both 
flow into the necessity of a truly universal approach.
93.
Luhmann’s response to the circularity of functional explanations 
was an attempt to understand the functional method not as a causal 
explanation but rather as a method for searching for alternatives, as a 
technique of comparing.345 Functionalism as it was practised by 
Parsons ultimately led into the well-known dead-end where everything 
that happens within a given structure or system was causally reduced 
to the necessity of preserving the original structure. The question of 
what the function of structures or systems in general might be remained 
inaccessible in this design.346 For Luhmann, however, a reference to 
a function never prescribes in what specific way it is to be fulfilled. 
Inspired by the mathematical definition of a "function", Luhmann 
presents in his very first publication (1958) the reference to a function 
as an opening of a (limited) space for a variety of possible causes that 
may all bring about the desired effect. Functional analysis, thus, cannot 




























































































cause and one effect; functional analysis must be seen as a search for 
functionally equivalent causes with regard to one problematic 
effect.347 It is, then, a search for possibilities of replacement (not: of 
deconstruction!).348 Therefore, a function should be understood as a 
problem to which several (or none) solutions may exist.349 The 
formula of the problem finally replaces the formulae of maintenance and 
preservation.350 This slight shift of perspective, taken seriously, entails 
a departure from ontological metaphysics which accepted as "being" 
only everything that was not non-being and thereby excluded from the 
sphere of true being all phenomena of becoming, vanishing, movement 
and the mere possible. The ontological view of the world abstracted the 
concrete world towards constant features and not towards principles of 
variation. In contrast, Luhmann’s functional method cannot define 
identity, being over time that is, as an exclusion of other possibilities, 
but on the contrary only as a form of organization or order of other 
possibilities. Hence, identity is not a self-sufficient substance, but a 
coordinating synthesis, a system which always contains references to 
other possibilities and which therefore always remains fragile, 
problematic.351 The essence of things cannot be defined by or 
reduced to some given kernel of substance but can only be defined by 
their positions in a texture of other possibilities, i.e. by the conditions of 
their replacement.352
94.
2000 years of searching for the substance have led then, 
according to Luhmann, to a universal problematization of identity, unity, 
stability or being in general. From now on, each identity has to be 
understood as a system, i.e. as a structured openness for other 
possibilities.353 The concept of the system stems from this cluster of 
notions such as being, identity, problem, and thus refers neither to pre­
conditional or unconditional, substantial entities, nor to first or ultimate 
causes, but to a problematic invariance which requires stabilization, i.e. 
activity in an unstable environment, and which can be maintained in 
various possible ways.354 By implication, a universal systems theory 
turns everything that is self-evident into problems and all substances 




























































































reveal that everything is an illusion; the point of this move is not to 
repeat scepticism. As a methodological prescription, it simply demands 
to find for everything that is a reference point from which it can be 
questioned with regard to its replaceability. For Luhmann, this change 
of perspective entails an advancement in rationality which is not based 
any more on the certainty that being [das Seiende], in some of its 
qualities, remains what it is. On the contrary, the advancement consists 
in a new certainty that, under specific circumstances, being need not 
remain itself. It gives access to a specific kind of freedom, a libertas 
indifferentiae, attainable through cognizance [Erkenntnis].355
95.
At first, Luhmann proposes this perspective as an universal 
research method capable of uniting the social sciences and wonders 
whether a uniting theory would be possible as well.356 By replacing 
the concept of the function with the concept of the system as the most 
important concept in his thinking, Luhmann gives implicitly an 
affirmative answer to the last question: "systems theory" is now the 
preferred label for his work.357 But this change in the early and mid 
60s is a synthesis rather than a shift from method to theory. As an 
implicit theoretical claim, Luhmann’s method presupposes an inversion 
of the classical ontological picture whereby the world was the cosmic 
sphere of necessities where the facticity of the mere possible became 
a problem. Instead the world is contingency itself, in which it becomes 
a problem to justify necessities and truths. In other words, the world 
does not provide validities but only the problem of validity.358 As a 
theory, Luhmann’s perspective had to have strong implications, in turn, 
at the level of methodology as well. The notions of theory and method 
merged.
96.
In that ontological metaphysics isolated the system by defining its 
being via its internal relations and its independence, it neglected the 




























































































problems had to seem unstable and transient in principle. Functional 
systems theory, in contrast, understands precisely the stabilization of 
a system as the permanent problem of maintaining the relative 
invariance of the system's boundaries in an unsteady environment, 
which changes regardlessly of the system.359 From the outset, then, 
Luhmann’s theory is about the system and its environment; it has 
always been a system/environment-theory.360 The identity of the 
system is not a self-sufficient unity, but is the difference between 
system and environment. The universal problematization of identity 
corresponds to this decision to start theorizing with difference rather 
than unity.
97.
There is no adequate logic for the concept of the problem. If a 
problem uniquely prescribed its solution, it would cease to be a problem 
as it would immediately evoke its one and only (dis)solution. The 
concept of the problem implies that there are several possible solutions 
so that the actually selected solution cannot be deductively inferred 
from the problem. As a first conclusion, logical deduction is to be 
replaced by a thoughtful and careful reception of empirically found 
structural responses to problems.361 Moreover, if the finally 
implemented solution is nothing but a selection from a variety of 
possibilities, the solution cannot be the endpoint in the history of the 
problem for its acceptance is based on the banishment of other 
settlements. Instead, solutions always multiply, proliferate, disperse, 
circulate, diversify, diffuse the original problem. A theory utilising the 
notion of the problem must be able, then, to provide tools for the 
analysis of both problems and solutions. And any conceptualization of 
the relationship between the two must not repeat the mistake of 
dialectics, i.e. it must not ascribe too hastily the quality of a motive, a 
tension, an incentive or impulse to problems in general. By implanting 
stimuli for the search for solutions already into the problem or 
contradiction, dialectical theories have no choice but to elevate the 
problematic of the problem to the level of facts without reflection and to 
consider problems as inherently unstable. This view, implicit in Hegel 




























































































development, progress. It reflects a specific pre-conception of man as 
filling the gap between the recognition of a problem and between the 
vision and creation of a new situation. Man presupposed himself as the 
locus where the dimension of facts was transposed to the dimension of 
time, where the imperfection of facts was transformed into progress, 
and where the increasing interdependence of behaviours was translated 
into an increasing velocity of change.362 The problem is, then, to 
depart from dialectics and to build a theory with the concept of the 
problem in its centre without evoking transcendental conceptions of 
man who, as a problem-solver justifying solutions but not the problems, 
bridges the gap between problem and solution.
98.
"Soziologische Aufklarung" [Sociological Enlightenment] was the 
title of Niklas Luhmann’s programmatic inaugural lecture in 1967.363 
It also became the title of a series of books in which he collected 
articles he had published before in various journals, added by papers 
originally written in order to round off these books. For Luhmann, the 
putting together of these books provides an occasion to overview his 
writings of preceding years, to locate gaps, omissions, and deficiencies. 
Five of those books have been published so far in 1970, 1975, 1981, 
1987, and 1990 respectively. Thus, the title "sociological enlightenment" 
accompanies Luhmann’s entire writings from the 60s to the 90s. What 
is, then, sociological enlightenment? According to Niklas Luhmann, the 
program of enlightenment had been based on two central propositions: 
first, on the idea of an equal participation of all people at some common 
reason that existed without institutional mediation and, second, on a 
great optimism with regard to the ability to bring about right, true, and 
reason-able situations. Sociology does not emerge, later, as an 
application of enlightenment but rather as an attempt to delineate the 
limits of enlightenment. For this purpose, the sociology of the 19th 
century invents the technique of "incongruent perspectives":364 the 
meaning of acting is not explained by immersing into its essence but by 
applying standards which, form the point of view of acting, appear 
strange, alien, inadequate. Marx deduces thought from economic 




























































































parallel arguments only that he refers to libidinous impulses; and 
Nietzsche approaches Christianity in strictly irreligious terms.365 Not 
closeness but distance to the object of study leads to knowledge. The 
result of this business of disappointment was the revelation that the 
social determination of the actor went much beyond what the actor 
might have wanted to admit. Suddenly, the world of the actor appeared 
as a kind of illusion, full of tricks fulfilling functions that remained 
unconscious. The confrontation of the actor and his free will with this 
life-preserving chimera amounted to a discreditation of the actor, 
culminating in the delicate consequence that he now had to be 
emancipated -  as if he had been a slave before!
99.
Functional systems theory changes this perspective from 
"discreditation" and "unmasking" to "overtaxation" and "overcharging": 
the world of the actor is not an illusion driven by unconscious ulterior 
purposes, but an incomplete selection whose incompleteness is made 
necessary by the fact that comprehension of world complexity must be 
coordinated with the possibilities of its reduction. World complexity, in 
other words, becomes comprehensible and even accessible only via 
selectivity, i.e. via the reduction of complexity. These formulations were 
made possible by a conceptual shift in Luhmann's writings in the 
second half of the 60s. Complexity replaces as the most important 
concept the concept of the system, which earlier had already 
succeeded the concept of the function as key term. Luhmann proposes 
complexity as the ultimate reference point for functional analysis. It is 
now the function of a social system to make world complexity 
accessible by reducing it, i.e. by shifting the problem of complexity from 
the outside to the inside of some system which, after this process of 
concretization, represents selected aspects of complexity to which it 
can respond.366 The concept of complexity is introduced in Luhmann’s 
writings at first as a kind of panacea lacking a proper and precise 
definition. At some point, it occurs as the totality of all possible events 
(world complexity), and then as a relation between (any) system and 
the world which is always asymmetric: for all real systems, including 




























































































that it always contains more possibilities than the system can respond 
and adapt to.367 A system is called complex if its structure is 
compatible with a variety of possibilities.368 The slope of complexity 
between the world and a system is later specified as the difference 
between the indeterminate, undeterminable, unmanipulatable 
complexity of the world and the concrete, determinate, manipulatable 
complexity a system represents to itself.369 Departing from the 
systems theory of the natural sciences, which uses the number of 
elements or the degree of internal differentiation of a system as a 
measurement of complexity, Luhmann understands complexity as the 
problem to which the building up of systems is a "solution".370 
However, in this provisional design, world complexity as such remains 
inaccessible for functional analysis; it turns transcendental. Luhmann 
acknowledges the problem in his exchange with Habermas in the late 
60s, early 70s, expressing a dissatisfaction with the term complexity 
and the way he had handled it before.371 To some extent, Luhmann 
recalls the term in the following, partly because of its deficiencies, partly 
because some of its functions were taken over by the newly refined 
concept of meaning. In a new version of the concept, suggested in 
1978 at the latest, complexity refers to situations of "enforced 
selectivity", in which systems cannot connect all their elements with all 
the other elements.372 This is also the version which remains valid 
until today.
100 .
The world, then, is a problem not with regard to its being but with 
regard to its complexity.373 Under the headline of the reduction of 
complexity, everything (with the world as the only exception) becomes 
comparable to everything else. In particular, any kind of a priori defined 
limitation of what is possible, any kind of objective order of subjective 
experiences represents just one way of reducing complexity and as 
such can be problematized in comparison with other ways of reducing 
complexity. This perspective allows a vista of the limits of 
enlightenment; it invites, in other words, an enlightenment on 
enlightenment. Sociological enlightenment is, then, an enlightenment 




























































































dogmatization of sociology since any limitation imposed on meaningful 
problematizing is now a positively defined constancy. Thus, sociology 
requires a permanent on-going decision-making with regard to what 
structures are not being problematized for what purposes. Sociology is 
forced to accept responsibility for itself.375
101.
Another important consequence of sociological enlightenment is 
the réintroduction of history as a field of interest. With its optimism 
towards equality, the enlightenment had required the levelling and 
smoothing of differences which were "only" historical and not rooted in 
nature or reason. Equality and freedom converge only in a hostility 
towards history. The repelling of history corresponded to the postulation 
of a metaphysics of an intersubjectively valid reason. In contrast, 
sociological enlightenment includes history not because it values 
tradition, but because history itself is a means for the reduction of 
complexity: by disappearing into the past, events lose their 
"replaceability", i.e. their ability that they could also have been different. 
A typical question of sociological enlightenment is, accordingly, how the 
entering into the past solidifies aspects of the world. Hence, it is not 
history as such, as a reservoir of "objective" facts, which interests the 
sociologist, but history as it is present in the present and as it is a 
precondition of the future.376
102 .
Over the following 25 years, more characterizations of 
sociological enlightenment are given. In 1979 sociology is presented as 
the "science of the second view" -  a terminology which anticipates the 
semantics of the second order observation of the late 80s/early 90s to 
which I will return later.377 In 81, sociology is the science of societal 
self-reflexion, even if this reflexion takes place only in a subsystem of 
society: in science.378 Three years later, the task of sociology is given 
as an enlightenment of society on its own complexity.379 In the 




























































































1987, Luhmann explains again that sociological enlightenment is not an 
unmasking critique or the ultimate disclosure of what society really is, 
but an observation which observes itself, a description which describes 
itself.380 The following volume indicates in the preface, written in 
March 1990, that what is and has always been at stake in sociological 
enlightenment is "a critique of knowledge";381 the latest formulation 
(1991) summarizes the program of sociological enlightenment as an 
attempt to create a semantic space in which modern society can reflect 
upon itself.382
103.
The universal problematization of identity and the universal 
refusal to accept any kind of a priori are mutually implicative. The 
universality behind this refusal imposes strong methodological 
instructions on the type of work that tries to live up to those standards. 
For example, the very field of inquiry the work tries to cover cannot be 
taken for granted. In fact, it cannot be defined as a kind of substance 
which is somehow specific in that it is different from everything else for 
any such definition would require to accept this difference and 
specificity as an a priori. Hence, whatever the work picks up as a 
problem, the problem itself remains problematic. In such a situation, 
one can either skilfully avoid specifications of what one’s work is about 
or start theoretical work with universal claims. From the outset, 
Luhmann chose the second option and, accordingly, the specificity of 
his work does not lie in a limited range of topics but in the configuration 
and geometry of its concepts. The claim to universality turns out to be, 
then, a certain form of not making claims at all; it expresses a form of 
modesty.
104.
Theoretical work evolving according to those standards of 
universality can neither accept some unconditional beginning nor some 
kind of end. The work must, of course, begin somehow but then, after 




























































































problematize its starting point. A type of work is required which carefully 
and sensibly tries to get in touch with the world and then, once it feels 
that it did get in touch with something, reflects upon getting in touch 
with the world as an aspect of that world. Clearly, the design of such 
a theory must be recursive, i.e. self-referential. The reflexivity of the 
program of sociological enlightenment re-appears here as the 
methodological implication of the rejection of a prioris and of the 
uneasiness about an hasty acceptance of identities in general. This 
requirement of reflexivity goes beyond the usual academic litany that 
one should always be modest and reflexive in one’s work and that one 
should always look at it from a metaperspective. The problem here is 
to design a theory whose architecture is flexible enough to handle this 
re-entry of the theory into itself; the problem is to work in a theoretical 
frame which cannot even take itself for granted but which nevertheless 
should allow the generation of some results so that the theory in fact 
grows. In light of this task, it is not at all surprising that it took Luhmann 
more than twenty years until he overcame his doubt and hesitation and 
made a commitment to a theory design that he thought fulfilled the 
necessary requirements.
105.
The key to the problem is, of course, the relation between 
observation and self-observation as it is or is not manifested in the 
theory’s architecture. In that universal claims or doubts cannot but 
include the entity that expresses those claims or doubts, they force a 
theory to realize at least some capacity for self-observation. Somehow 
the theory must make explicit how it theorizes about itself and where 
it locates itself in its universal claims. Claims to universality enforce, 
then, an oscillation between observation and self-observation, i.e. 
between self- and hetero-reference, and thereby transform a theory into 
a kind of research practice, into an attitude towards sociological 
research.383 From the outset, this effect is intentional in Luhmann’s 
work; in fact, it constitutes one of the features that give unity and 
continuity to his work. The early, purposeful conflation of the notions 
"method" and "theory" is as well part of this as is Luhmann’s inclination 




























































































reporting how he came to be interested in science, Luhmann explained 
that he had been fascinated by the idea that a theory becomes more 
complex like a practice when it is given time and the possibility to 
improve its propositions according to its own standards.385 In 87, he 
added that a methodology of this type presupposes an open future with 
the prospect of infinite continuation (with self-produced operations).386
106.
Another justification of claims to universality is Luhmann’s 
continuous effort to make sociology responsible for what it produces by 
giving positivity to its position. If sociology can be represented by some 
autonomous architecture of concepts, sociology itself will become 
accessible for critique and will cease to provide an hiding-place for easy 
critique, opposition, and deconstruction, which all legitimate their 
inability to replace what they destroy as "Wertfreiheit" [value- 
freedom].387 To represent the unity of sociology as a discipline in a 
theory, however, requires universality: all aspects of social life have to 
be covered -  again: including the theory itself. Throughout his project, 
Luhmann tries to define this unity as a common problematic 
[Problemstellung], His first proposal, as already mentioned, is to look 
for a sufficiently abstract problem which unites sociology in that 
everything considered to be part of social life appears as functionally 
equivalent with regard to its being a response to that problem. For 
some time, until the early 70s, the problem of the reduction of (world) 
complexity serves as such a uniting problematic although Luhmann 
never was completely satisfied with this design.388 The attempt to 
define sociology positively is complemented by parallel attempts to give 
positivity to the all-encompassing social entity, i.e. to society, which, for 
Luhmann, can only be world society.389 According to Luhmann, this 
concern -  explicitly directed against the wisdom of post-modernity -  
makes it necessary that, later, the concept of the social system must 






























































































The necessity of a recursive theory design, of reflexivity and 
therefore the necessity to locate self-reference somewhere in that 
design was evident in Luhmann’s work from the outset -  even before 
he explicitly introduced sociological enlightenment as a reflexive 
enlightenment. However, the issue of self-reference not only appears 
as a methodological problem or solution; from the beginning, it is also 
thematized as an aspect of social life. An article of 1966, entitled 
"Reflexive Mechanismen" [Reflexive Mechanisms], presents the 
possibility that processes become reflexive -  e.g. that it is learned how 
to learn, decided how to make decisions -  as a product and condition 
of civilization. If those steps of reflexiveness are connected in series, 
a process dramatically increases its selectivity, i.e. its ability to reduce 
complexity. Reflexivity is a response to complexity. Already in the mid 
60s, then, the differentiation and functioning of systems is closely linked 
to reflexivity, i.e. to the ability of systems to apply their operations to 
their operations.391 Slowly but surely, over the next 10 years, these 
early indications condense. In 1967, Luhmann observes that the old 
hierarchical-transitive models implicitly presupposed that what brings 
about change was "stronger", "higher" or "more persistent" than what 
changes, and added that this bias did not fit the empirical evidence of, 
say, the relationship between politics and administration. Here, an 
unstable part of a system -  politics -  is certainly able to direct a more 
stable part -- administration. He concludes with a call for circular 
models.392 In the written version of his inaugural lecture, Luhmann 
refers to the circular interdependence of causal relations as the main 
reason why a disentanglement of those relations in form of 
asymmetrical causal laws ultimately fails. The permanence of the 
conditions which the system exploits by existing usually depends itself 
on the existence of the system.393 Not much later, he proposes a 
cyclical relationship between action and action system: one 
presupposes the other, and is surprised by the proximity of cybernetics 
and his functional systems theory.394 In the early 70s, Luhmann 
publishes an article on the self-thematization of society, subtitled as 
"On the category of reflexion from the perspective of systems theory", 
in which he discusses the relationships between concepts such as 




























































































hypostatization. A first hint is given that a systematic employment of 
those terms may amount to an exit from the philosophy of the subject 
by generalizing what were the subject’s privileges.395 And in 74, 
Luhmann emphasizes that, to a great extent, our cultural tradition was 
brought about by self-selective, autocatalytic processes, which were 
made possible and impelled by the use of communicative media.396
108.
By 1975, it was clear to Luhmann that self-reference must 
somehow be a central pillar of his project. In a crucial article published 
in that year, he reflects on how other pillars -  systems theory, the 
theory of evolution, the theory of communication -  had become self- 
referential: a theory of society is a reflexion of society upon itself and 
social systems may contain, entail, or be based on reflexivity; the newer 
theories of evolution explain later stages of evolution not by teleology 
but by references to earlier stages of evolution; and finally, a theory of 
communication is communication about communication. As a next step, 
then, Luhmann proposes to connect a variety of self-referential theories, 
but groans with regard to the implied terminological problems. The 
argumentation, he adds, will neither be linear nor cyclical, but 
labyrinthine; its goal is the production of contingent (not: final) truths. 
He ends on an optimistic note, proclaiming that there are theoretical 
contexts in which it is possible to learn without restricting abilities to 
learn.397 Still, in the preface to the second volume of Sozioloqische 
Aufklarung. he presents his ideas as transient, as a "Nullserie1 in his 































































































Independently of Luhmann’s efforts, the mid 70s witnessed a new 
development in general systems theory which would soon become 
popular and then even highly fashionable In the early 80s. The 
important innovation lay in a generalization of the concepts of self­
organization, which had been popular since the 60s. Not just the 
structures, but even elements, that is last components, which are, at 
least for the system itself, undecomposable, were now considered to be 
produced by the system itself. Thus, in the second half of the 70s, the 
systems of general systems theory became truly self-referential. In 
order to distance the idea from the earlier notions of self-organization 
and in order to mark its novelty, the two Chilean biologists Humberto 
R. Maturana and Francesco J. Varela coined a new word for it: 
autopoiesis, which, translated from Greek, means something like self­
production.399 Autopoietic systems are systems which produce and 
reproduce the elements they consist of with the help of the elements 
they consist of. And everything these systems use as an unity -  their 
elements, processes, structures, the systems themselves -  is being 
produced and determined precisely by all those unities within the 
system. There is, then, no input of unity into the system and no output 
of unity out of the system.
110.
This is not the place to give a detailed introduction to the theory 
of autopoiesis. Instead, a brief discussion of two metaphors should 
illustrate the self-referential closure of autopoietic systems. As they are 
metaphors, their relevance in the theoretical context under examination 
should not be taken too literally. First, imagine someone dreaming how 
he prepares a dinner for his girlfriend and himself at a lovely summer 
evening. He sees himself cooking, laying the table, lighting the 
candles,and then, eventually, his alarm clock rings. But, instead of 




























































































longed for doorbell: his loved one has arrived and the dinner can begin 
(and the dream can continue).400 This dream should portray how 
causality is produced by the ongoing dream: it is the dream, who, 
according to its own internal dynamics, is able to pick up the noise 
coming from its environment and to transform it into an irritation; it is 
the dream, who assigns the status of a cause to the noise and 
produces order from that noise. For autopoietic systems, too, openness 
is a result of the systems’ activities; it is an achievement (which may 
still have disastrous consequences for the system). The environment 
offers impulses and perturbations, but it is not able to determine their 
effects on the system. Thus, the concept of autopoiesis goes beyond 
and, in some sense, generalizes the distinction between open and 
closed systems. Autopoietic systems are self-referentially closed, they 
evolve according to their internal dynamics and thereby produce 
openness; they produce openness on the basis of closure. They 
reproduce themselves precisely by submitting themselves to this self- 
reproduced selectivity.
111.
A second metaphor which can be used to illustrate the same point 
has become famous in a somewhat different context: the butterfly 
effect. Exemplifying the possibility that, in a non-linear context, 
microscopic fluctuations may induce macroscopic changes, the butterfly 
effect refers to a situation where a butterfly, happily beating his wings 
over Florence, "causes" a local turbulence which is then amplified to a 
hurricane over the atlantic ocean. For the causal sciences, this 
possibility poses severe problems, which even led to the inauguration 
of a new science: Chaos Theory,401 However, an interpretation of the 
butterfly effect in terms of autopoiesis looks rather different as it 
emphasizes self-reference instead of presupposing asymmetrical causal 
relations. For, after all, butterflies do not cause hurricanes 
independently of the weather conditions. It is the weather, then, which, 
at some point or other and always according to its own internal 
dynamics, opens itself and allows the butterfly to have the impact it 
has. It is the weather (temperature, atmospheric pressure etc.) which 




























































































needs the unintended, coincidental cooperation of the weather in order 
to make an unintended difference. The situation looks much more 
symmetrical, and therefore much less surprising, from this perspective: 
both the weather as well as the butterfly are "causes" because the 
outcome, the hurricane, needed both. The assumption of a directed, 
asymmetrical causality, which runs from the butterfly to the weather, is 
not, then, an inherent quality of the situation, but only a traditional and 
problematic scheme employed by an observer.402 In other words, * 
causality is always added to a situation by processes of attribution.403
112 .
By the time systems theory begins to thematize self-reference as 
a general organizational principle, Niklas Luhmann had already arrived 
at the conclusion that self-reference must somehow be explicitly 
incorporated into his work; for various reasons, it must be assigned a 
central position in a theory of social systems. But this theory, in the mid 
70s, was still to be written. Clearly, Luhmann had from very early on 
kept the title "systems theory" for his venture, but so far his theoretical 
work consisted of a variety of articles dispersed in various journals, 
some of which where collected in the series Sozioloqische Aufklarunq; 
however, the unity of the work was not accessible in one single 
theoretical volume. In fact, Luhmann had held the title "systems theory" 
only on credit. His work in its formative years is very much an attempt 
of a hypothetical self-interpretation; it is guided by the expectation that, 
sooner or later, his major concerns could be expressed in a sound 
theoretical context which would deserve the label "theory". In 66, 
Luhmann presented his work only as a "preparation" for a more 
fundamental theory of the reduction of complexity.404 One year later, 
he claims for the first time that his work "outlines" [skizziert] a systems 
theory, only in order to confess, in 1968, that the "philosophical 
meaning" of the premises of his work remains "obscure" [dunkel].405 
In the preface to the first volume of Sozioloqische Aufklarunq. written 
in December 1969, Luhmann explains that his theoretical papers are 
nothing but provisional drafts and, therefore, were published only as 
articles. When challenged by Habermas, he repeats that so far he just 




























































































to their end.406 And again, in the preface for the second edition 
(March 1972) of Soziologische Aufklarunq 1, he justified the 
"beforehand publication of partial results out of larger working contexts" 
only by referring to the interest his book had provoked in the heyday of 
the debate with Habermas. As there was a demand to which he had to 
respond, he decided "not to hold back any publication until more 
extensive and systematically matured and developed pieces of work 
can be presented".407
113.
In the second half of the 70s, Luhmann apparently intensifies his 
efforts to put together the dispersed pieces of his work, to make 
concepts more compatible and to clarify them in this process. The 
major result of these efforts, visible at the latest in 78, fully developed 
in 84, is a careful and sensible introduction of the concept of 
autopoiesis into the network of concepts Luhmann had established by 
then. In particular, Luhmann follows the general trend of systems theory 
at the time and proclaims self-reference as the basic organizational 
principle of living, psychic and social systems, which are strictly 
distinguished according to whether they use life, consciousness, or 
communication as modes of autopoietic reproduction respectively. In 
addition to this threefold distinction, psychic and social systems differ 
from living systems in that they are able to internally represent the 
complexity of the world as meaning [Sinn].408 Systems are defined, 
then, as autopoietic systems; by putting self-reference in the very 
centre of any system, Luhmann finally arrives at a general concept of 
the "system" which does not require references to the disputed and in 
all forms of structuralism worn-out concept of the "structure".409
114.
Before I will turn to the consequences of this move, I will first give 
a brief review of the context of the theoretical choices Luhmann had 
made earlier into which autopoiesis was inserted. The distinction 




























































































corresponding location of psychic systems in the environment of social 
systems is probably as old as Luhmann’s project; at the latest in 64 this 
design was explicitly introduced and then kept throughout the 
years.410 It collides with the notion of "intersubjectivity", which 
Luhmann at first uses somewhat uncritically in lack of alternatives.411 
The problematic of the term seems to have surfaced during the 
Habermas-Luhmann-debate: the "inter" and the "subject" do not go as 
easily together as any idea of "intersubjectivity" might suggest.412 
Luhmann finally abandons the concept in the late 70s indicating that the 
idea of "reflexion" and its related problems cannot even be properly 
formulated in terms of intersubjectivity.413 The problem to which 
intersubjectivity was an inadequate answer is solved, then, by the 
autopoietic autonomy of social (communicative) systems.414 This step, 
in turn, was prepared by a shift from action to communication as the 
basic mode of social autopoiesis. The relationship between action and 
communication had remained a source of confusion until about 1978, 
when action was presented as socially constituted and not as 
constitutive of the social.415 The move towards communication is 
made explicit in 1981 and, with a footnote giving credit to Habermas for 
this shift, in 1982.416 The term "action" now finds its place in the 
context of the self-descriptions and self-simplifications of social 
systems.417
115.
Another crucial pillar of the entire manoeuvre is the concept of 
meaning. As it was precisely the term which was at the centre of the 
exchange with Habermas, Luhmann did not have much choice but to 
concentrate his theoretical work on a clarification of the meaning of 
meaning, so that it was fully developed in its present form already in 
1971.418 As a common achievement of their co-evolution, psychic and 
social systems employ meaning as a mode of representing complexity. 
For meaning supplies the actual state of the system with redundant 
possibilities of further experience and action so that actuality always 
appears as surrounded by possibilities. The function of meaning is, in 
other words, to identify all operations of a system as selections and, at 




























































































and only actual state: meaning mediates between "actuality that is 
certain but unstable, and potentiality that is uncertain but stable".419 
According to Luhmann, the references to other possibilities as an 
inherent aspect of actuality cannot be suppressed.420 A rudimentary 
version of this concept of meaning was visible also already in 67, but 
was at that time still explicitly needed for the very definition of a system 
as a meaning context of actions [Sinnzusammenhang von 
Handlungen].421 Meaning occupied and still occupies a strategic 
position in Luhmann’s theory design for at least three reasons. First, as 
it marks the segregation of psychic and social systems on the one hand 
from living systems on the other, it helps to distance the theory from 
allusions to the -  in the context of social systems: highly problematic - 
- metaphor of the organism.422 Second, in that meaning is the way 
systems handle selectivity enforced by complexity and, in other words, 
in that complexity and meaning are different expressions of the same 
fundamental problem of order, linking the two contributes "to an 
elimination of the technological bias of systems theory".423 Finally and 
most important, as systems now operate in accordance with their 
meaning world (rather than with the world), the assumption of an all- 
encompassing system, which comprises, among other things, social 
and psychic systems, has become unnecessary.424 Luhmann gives 
Parsons the credit for having been the last one to think of the relations 
between the psychic and the social as /rtfra-systemic relations.425
116.
Again, this is not the place to give a detailed presentation of how 
Luhmann envisions social autopoiesis. After all, he needed 660 pages 
to fully introduce the idea in 1984, and the majority of his writings 
thereafter can be understood as attempts to theoretically digest the 
implications of his own proposal. Instead, an example of a social 
system may illustrate some of the principles of social autopoiesis. As 
already mentioned earlier, on the basis of the ongoing self-referential 
activity of an autopoietic system, everything the system uses as an 
entity, everything it treats as undecomposable is being produced by the 
system itself. In some sense, this activity of producing is to be 




























































































or decompose the entities serving as elements or, in general, as 
unities. In other words, the production of unity corresponds to the taking 
for granted of the unity in question. As an example of an autopoietic 
system, the Department of Economics at the European University 
Institute uses mathematical models as basic elements of its 
reproduction. Each model invites the production of further models which 
are elaborations, deviations, clarifications, and confusions of previous 
models. The autopoiesis of the system consists precisely in the ongoing 
and unquestioned assignment of the status of an element to those 
models. Of course, one could, if one wanted, "deconstruct" the unity of 
those elements and find that it is a conglomerate of assumptions about 
epistemology, life, the world, the universe, and everything, but the 
system, as long as it operates, takes and must take all this for granted. 
To be sure, taking things for granted always entails a risk -- the risk, for 
example, to be considered as naive -- but only by accepting that risk is 
the system able to build up complexity and to transform unlikelihood 
into likelihood, so that today the models of the economists are so 
sophisticated that even mathematicians wonder what they are about. 
In general, deconstruction either destroys a system or forces it to 
construct new inviolate levels, i.e. new elements. But even in the case 
of the system’s destruction, the function it fulfilled may require a 
functionally equivalent replacement. In this way, any deconstruction is 
at the same time a construction or, in other words, deconstruction and 
construction are, in some sense, functionally equivalent.
117.
By inserting the concept of autopoiesis into the centre of his work, 
Luhmann in fact achieved what he set out to do: he successfully 
establishes a link between observation and self-observation; he finds 
a theoretical context which, in its design, represents a universal 
problematization of identity (see section 118.), and, moreover, is 
thereby able to find an exit from the philosophy of the subject (section 
119.). The loop between observation and self-observation is given by 
the theory’s self-understanding as a self-referential system. In some 
sense, self-reference is precisely what the theory shares with what it 




























































































the theory is a system of the type it theorizes about.426 The self- 
referential theory sees reality in terms of self-reference;427 from its 
observations, it always learns something about itself and thereby 
becomes increasingly precise: as it observes practices, structures, 
problems, solutions, systems, programs always with a view towards 
itself, the theory will accumulate statements as to whether it is or is not 
a practice, structure, problem, solution, system, program. The theory’s 
self-reference is not, then, a tautology. On the contrary, self-reference 
is the guarantee that the theory is able to extract guidance from its 
environment; it guarantees that the theory is a growing texture of 
analytical tools which are rendered precise in relation to each 
other.428 Ultimately, the fruit of the always implicit self-observation 
should be that the theory develops its own epistemology as an 
(empirical!) result instead of an a priori rule which fixes how science 
must work.429 For if scientific research is a system, then research on 
systems will reveal something about research itself.430
118 .
In order to see how the insertion of autopoiesis anchors the 
universal problematization of identity in the theory’s foundations, it is 
important to remember that self-reference is a mode of contact with the 
system’s environment. If the environment did not matter at all to the 
system so that it did not even feel bound by its own history, it would 
lose all orientation and would not dispose of any selective principle that 
I could somehow help selecting the system’s next state. In other words, 
self-reference without environment is a paralysing tautology.431 
Whatever move the system makes, it is either an internally generated 
response to an internally identified environmental irritation or a 
response to the system’s history, which is, after all, made up of 
meaning sediments left behind by those irritations. In other words, 
autopoiesis implies a need for causes which, for the system, appear as 
not produced by the system; it implies a need for the externalization of 
self-reference-, it implies a need for an uninterrupted interruption of 
circularity; it implies the necessity of an environment.432 However, 
how a system externalizes its self-reference, how it picks up and 




























































































into order cannot be theoretically deduced. In fact, after the 
universalization of self-reference, the externalization of self-reference 
now becomes the universal reference point for functional analysis.433 
Thus, to inscribe self-reference as an internal feature into all living, 
psychic, social systems is to avoid any a priori theoretical assumptions 
as to what system do or do not do.434 And the question of how 
systems come to do what they do (and nothing else) in spite of the 
paralysing arbitrariness of their self-reference now is the decisive 
empirical question. The major theoretical statement of the theory is, 
then, a two-fold methodological prescription: first, everything has to be 
explained, and second, everything has to be explained as a 
construction relative to a system.435 Already in its architecture, 
Luhmann’s theory of autopoiesis bars any way back to the idea of 
nature as being prior to cognizance, or to an anthropological conception 
of man, to humanism.436 The strict distinction between psychic and 
social systems, too, serves this purpose.437
119.
According to Luhmann, medieval scholastic debate had identified 
the individual itself as the source of its individuality. In this tradition, all 
kinds of individual beings, not only humans, had been defined by self­
reference. In the traditional connotations of hypokeimenon/subiectum - 
- something "lying under" and supporting attributes -  the concept of the 
subject had referred to something that underlies and carries the world 
and, therefore, to something that exists in its own right as a 
transcendental and not as an empirical phenomenon.438 On the basis 
of a fundamental doubt and scepticism towards scholastic tradition, 
Descartes and the 17th century replaced the unitary world with a duality 
-- res cogitans/res extensa -- of subjects and objects, thereby opening 
the world of objects for empirical scrutiny. The only certainty that 
Descartes considered immune from scepticism lay in the factual 
operation of consciousness, which, independently of whether its 
contents was true or false, at least knew the facticity of its own 
operation: cogito ergo sum. Self-reference now counted as a privilege 
of consciousness, which could self-referentially control and check its 




























































































still continue to operate.439 After Kant, the human individual (not only: 
the Cartesian mind) emerges as subject of the world; a new kind of 
subjective individualism became possible: "experiencing the world, the 
individual could claim to have a transcendental source of certainty 
within himself. He could set out to realize himself by realizing the world 
within himself. [...] The individual leaves the world in order to look at 
it."440 Thus, in some way or other, this path of thinking kept 
reproducing the transcendental status of self-reference; self-reference, 
in other words, was being denied the status of being empirical -  even 
in sociology: "It is unpardonable: sociology did not see an entire 
world".441 Luhmann’s theory of autopoiesis exits from this path 
precisely at this point; two of its major theoretical claims are that, first, 
self-referential systems are empirical, i.e. that they have no 
transcendental status whatsoever, and second, that self-reference is an 
internal feature of any living, psychic, and social system and not a 
privilege of a specific kind of system. Systems theory dissolves the 
distinction between subjects and objects not by abandoning the concept 
of self-reference, but by generalizing it.442 For Luhmann, the 
dissolution of this distinction requires a new form of distance between 
sociology and society. Since it was only the taking-for-granted of the 
difference between subjects and objects that enabled the subjects to 
(de)value their objects without affecting themselves, the end of that 
difference marks the end of "critical" sociology. In fact, the very idea of 
the "critique" needs to be reconsidered.443
120.
A first optimism with regard to the question of whether the 
program of sociological enlightenment could be translated into a 
theoretical working context arises in Luhmann’s writings in the mid 70s 
-- precisely at the time when he realizes that the principle of self­
reference must play a central role also in the architecture of a theory 
of social systems. Accordingly, this is also the time when he begins to 
complain that classical, linear and sequential means of presentation like 
books cannot adequately express the theory’s design.444 In 1978, the 
ideas of autopoiesis are implicitly present in Luhmann’s work: elements 




























































































together, but as artifacts of the very systems which consist of those 
elements. Since labelled theories, as he observes, are accepted more 
easily -  the label gives the impression of unity and closure -  Luhmann, 
in the late 70s, is looking for a label for such a theory based on the 
circular relationship between system and elements.445 In a lecture 
held in 79 before the Deutsche Akademie fur Sprache und Dichtung, 
Luhmann for the first time presents a structure for a book on social 
systems. It consists of a graph which connects 12 different concepts via 
arrows; meaning and self-reference are the concepts with the highest 
number of incoming and outgoing arrows. However, the highly non­
linear graph is presented as the reason why the book has not yet been 
written.446 The second half of the 70s marks also the period when 
theories of self-reference explicitly occur as the fourth pillar of the 
project in addition to systems theory, theories of evolution and 
communication theory.447 After Parsons’ death in 1979, Luhmann 
concludes that self-reference and complexity were precisely the 
concepts which Parsons’ design was unable to incorporate.448 But the 
late 70s, early 80s also show indications of impatience. Introducing the 
English translation of some of his articles, he presents "the highly 
abstract language" as "only a hint of what would really be 
required".449 And in the preface to the third volume of Sozioloqische 
Aufklarung (1981), he ironically presents his lecture "Unverstandliche 
Wissenschaft", which deals with the problems of formulating a general 
theory, as a provisional substitute for such a theory.450 However, to 
this collection of articles written during the previous years he adds a 
crucial text, entitled "Vorbemerkungen zu einer Theorie sozialer 
Systeme" [Preliminary Remarks on a Theory of Social Systems], which 
was originally prepared for that volume. To my knowledge, the label 
"autopoiesis" appears in his writings, then, for the first time in 1982; the 
justification of the idea behind the label being the absence of absolute 
limits of modern science’s capacity for resolving: in a world which 
appears, in this sense, as bottomless, "elements" are being constituted 
only by a refusal to resolve them. They are, then, created by the 
system consisting of them. The same article which introduces the word 





























































































The book Soziale Svsteme [Social Systems] itself was probably 
finished by December 1983, the date of its preface. Its modest subtitle - 
- "Outlines [GrundrilB] of a General Theory" -- indicates doubts and 
hesitation. Whereas contents and the final versions of the concepts did 
not pose any problems in the process of writing, Luhmann spent a lot 
of time on the arrangement of the concepts.452 The decision to put 
an introductory section on a "paradigm shift" in general systems theory 
at the beginning of the book was taken very late; it was finally taken 
because, at that time, general systems theory was already well 
introduced, i.e. for strategic reasons.453 In the preface, the theory 
which exemplifies its own contents is presented, again, as a "labyrinth" 
rather than "as a highway to a happy end".454 Most of the 660 pages 
of the book were written during a sabbatical year funded by the 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). One year after the 
publication of the book, Luhmann refers to it as his "first proper 
publication" and, again, describes his previous works as "Nullserie" in 
his production of theory; future works would be located at a lower level 
of abstraction.455
122.
Why did Niklas Luhmann adopt the term "autopoiesis"? At first 
sight, this decision seems rather unlikely. After all, he had suffered from 
his earlier choices of key concepts. When he spoke about "functions", 
he was wrongly considered a Parsonian; when he spoke about 
"systems", he was automatically accused of not being able to explain 
social change. The decision of the late sixties to speak of "complexity" 
and its "reduction" was a conscious attempt to avoid the worn-out 
concept of "contingency".456 Much of Luhmann’s writings are 
propelled by a need to run away from the wrong discussions. All the 
more, the decision to incorporate the label "autopoiesis" must have 
been difficult and risky. Especially since the ongoing debate in systems 
theory was far from settled. Autopoiesis could have turned (and still can 
turn) out as a temporary fashion provoking great excitement without 




























































































concept to the social sciences was not Luhmann’s. Already in the late 
70s, very early 80s, the issue was debated on conferences -  with 
Maturana, but as yet without Luhmann.457 The publication of Soziale 
Svsteme came at a time when the interest in this debate began to 
decrease. What all this suggests is, of course, that Niklas Luhmann 
made this commitment to the label "autopoiesis" very much out of the 
internal dynamics of his ongoing project, and that the adoption of the 
term can be justified only by the "perfect fit" hypothesis: autopoiesis 
only labelled what had been -- implicitly and perhaps even explicitly 
from the outset -- at the centre of Luhmann’s writings. The concept 
helped him to organize, summarize, bundle, radicalize, and sell all his 
previous writings as a unity. In Soziale Svsteme. Luhmann refers to all 
the various periods of his work -  not in order to establish a distance, 
but most of the time in order to present previous works as explications 
of topics he could only indicate in the new book. The book was not the 
final answer to the problems he had been addressing -  he never 
looked for final answers -  but it provided a coherent theoretical context 
which reflected his specific way of posing questions. And he was able 
to integrate the notion of autopoiesis precisely because the concepts 
he had been using expressed (and thus were compatible with) an 
emphasis on self-reference. In the new tendencies of general systems 
theory, he could "feel confirmed in [his] theoretical tendencies";458 in 
fact, in the group of scientists promoting the shift towards concepts of 
self-reference, he even found company.459 The widely held view that 
the introduction of the concept of autopoiesis marked a decisive 
discontinuity in Luhmann’s oeuvre, i.e. that we have to strictly 
distinguish between a "pre-autopoietic" and an "autopoietic Luhmann" 
is unjustified.
123.
Accordingly, the book did not mark an endpoint in Luhmann’s 
theoretical work. Luhmann frequently mentions that the idea of social 
autopoiesis remains highly disputed; and he refers to his book as being 
only the beginning of sociology’s serious participation in this 
dispute.460 Already in 1984, Luhmann wonders whether the 




























































































the theory’s capacity for circulation. Theories of adequate complexity 
may "turn out to be unsaleable". More general, the open question is 
whether the traditionally strong impact of theories on social affairs can 
continue. In fact, "we cannot even be sure that ‘theory’ will be and will 
remain the right designation of [societal] self-descriptions".461 The 
preface to the fourth volume of Soziologische Aufklaruno attests a 
further need for systematical elaboration, especially related to a theory 
of society.462 As a response to the emerging secondary literature on 
his work in the second half of the 80s and early 90s, Luhmann finds it 
"too early" to pass a final judgement on his proposal, and indicates that, 
"more than the publication can express", the proposal was "tormented" 
[geplagt] by doubts, uncertainties and already visible necessities of 
further learning. The change proposed by his book should not be 
understood as a "revolution"; the evolution of his own thinking as well 
as the observation of the theoretical discussion has shown to him that 
the thinking through of the consequences of the principle of self­
reference requires a lot of time.463 A publication on the issue cannot 
represent, then, a final report or a state of perfection.464 There are 
also beginning doubts as to whether the introduction of the label 
"autopoiesis" by Maturana has indeed fulfilled its purpose, i.e. whether 
it has helped to stabilize a body of ideas and precise concepts against 
everyday language.465
124.
Autopoietic systems are paradoxical: whereas the term 
"production" implies a difference between cause and effect, the idea of 
"self-production" states that the different is the same.466 More general, 
the observation of self-reference always encounters a paradox in that 
the two sides of the distinction the observation employs are being bent 
onto each other by the symmetrical, circular object of the observation. 
Hence, paradoxes are, if at all, problems only for the observation but 
not necessarily for the operation of self-referential systems; autopoiesis 
does not stop in face of logical contradictions.467 For the observation, 
however, the short-circuit caused by the encountered paradox 
questions the presupposed distinction and thereby transforms the 




























































































reference is externalized precisely by hypostatizing the necessity of 
externalizations. For the observation can now continue by observing 
how its self-referential object externalizes its self-reference. In other 
words, it then becomes observable how the observed autopoietic 
system, on the basis of its ongoing self-referential reproduction, picks 
up irritations from its environment and integrates them into its meaning 
world, i.e. it becomes observable how the system narrows its choices 
by taking for granted what it takes for granted. In particular, the 
observation can see, then, that the system cannot see what it cannot 
see. The insight into the necessity of invisibilisations is itself the 
necessary invisibilisation of the observation of self-referential, observing 
systems.468 The situation applies as well in the special case of self­
observation, i.e. when the system tries to observe its unity -- with the 
peculiar difference that now the system has to make visible its own 
invisibilisations; it has to question what it takes for granted. In the late 
70s, Luhmann understood the logical problems involved in this paradox 
of self-observation as the main reason why a synthesis of the efforts to 
arrive at a theory of self-referential systems had not been established 
by then.469 It is at this point where he connected to the work of 
George Spencer Brown, which from then on became a crucial reference 
for Luhmann’s work.470 Spencer Brown’s proto-logic allows the re­
entry of a distinction on one of its sides. As an application, it proclaims 
the possibility that the distinction between system and environment, 
which the system cannot but take for granted while it operates, re­
enters on the side of the system: the system is then able to reflect on 
everything it takes for granted as its environment. In this way, the 
distinction between system and environment -  which is, after all, the 
unity of the system -  may become a reference point for the system’s 
operation. In some sense, the procedure of the re-entry doubles the 
distinction between system and environment in such a way that the 
double is and is not the same as its original. Spencer Brown’s proto­






























































































Since classical logic is an attempt to exclude paradoxes from 
reasoning, and since traditional science somehow had inferred non­
existence from logical indescribability, self-reference and its related 
paradoxes have been traditionally under-exposed themes in scientific 
inquiries. The 20th century, however, has addressed the issue and 
turned it into the philosophical theme of the time. Luhmann suggests to 
read Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein, Godel, Feyerabend 
and many others as responses to problems of self-reference.472 In 
philosophy, paradoxes are not avoided but celebrated and even 
solemnized. Although this celebration has not always been fruitful, the 
question remains whether philosophy observed features of modern 
society which sociology, lacking a proper terminology, has simply 
overlooked.473 In this context, the concept of the re-entry fills a crucial 
gap as it is supposed to lead to a non-arbitrary thematization of self­
reference. Through a re-entry, systems may obtain access to higher 
degrees of complexity; a representation of the distinction between 
system and environment within the system at least opens the possibility 
of a more coherent, focused and efficient exploitation of irritations 
picked up from the environment. Because the re-entry can sharply 
increase the selectivity of the system, it can process larger sets of 
potential selections. The re-entry is the transformation of a paradox into 
complexity. Retrospectively, Luhmann noticed that the creative power 
of paradoxes was one of the themes he neglected in Soziale 
Svsteme.474 An immediate conclusion for theoretical work is, of 
course, the directive that a theory should preferably be based on 
distinctions which allow re-entries.475
126.
The inclusion of the "explosive" self-reference into systems theory 
must have consequences for epistemology -- this was the insight which 
ended Soziale Svsteme. The final chapter of the book deduced the two 
major novelties of the theory which would have epistemological 
implications: first, the exclusion of the inclusion of uncontrollable 




























































































Accordingly, much of Luhmann’s recent work is on epistemology. For 
in that the theory rejects finalities, it cannot but question on what stable 
grounds the program of sociological enlightenment could be 
anchored.477 At stake is, in other words, the status of the work in 
relation to reality. Luhmann’s recent emphasis on Heinz von Foerster’s 
second order cybernetics is implicitly an answer to this question. Two 
concepts are crucial: the concept of the eigenvalue or eigenbehaviour 
and the principle of second order observations. A world in which 
elements are undecomposable only relative to a system neither puts 
natural ends to observation nor provides natural objectives for 
observation. A first question is then whether, at least in principle, the 
observation of observations of observations of observations o f ... may 
lead to some kind of result, i.e. to a situation of relative stability in 
which, to some extent, observations are being confirmed by further 
observations. At a higher level of abstraction, the question is whether 
the recursive application of an operation to itself converges, and the 
answer is, of course: sometimes it does. For von Foerster, this insight 
justifies a definition of cognition as an aimless recursive computation of 
computations of computations of computations of ... . In the case of 
convergence, the result is called eigenvalue or eigenbehaviour of the 
operation in question.478 Already in relatively simple situations, the 
existence -- not to mention the specific form -- of eigenvalues cannot 
be theoretically deduced; eigenvalues can only be produced: they will 
or will not be found in a recursive application of operations.479 The 
stability of eigenvalues is based, then, only on the recursiveness of the 
procedure which has brought them about and, of course, on the fact 
that they were (somehow) brought about. The concept does not look for 
assurances in some kind of correspondence (adaptation!) to an 
environment.480 As a consequence of this conceptualization of 
cognition, Luhmann suggests to regard the self-reference of a (social) 
theory, i.e. whether or not it can be directed towards itself, whether it 
applies to itself, as a necessary precondition for "correctness".481
127.
Systems producing their elements, the building up of complexity 




























































































brings the theory of autopoiesis close to epistemological positions 
usually categorized as constructivism,482 By accepting this label, 
Luhmann faces the usual accusations of inviting relativism, solipsism, 
and arbitrariness. None of these terms, however, adequately grasps 
Luhmann’s position. Luhmann does not deny that the real world exists, 
that a real contact with it is possible and necessary as a condition for 
the real operation of systems. What is being denied is that the world 
contains something that corresponds to negativity, possibility, 
distinctions, denotations, uncertainty, selectivity, and to all other 
modifications of meaning which for the system warrant that it can 
connect further operations to its operations. Autopoietic systems -- as 
empirical systems -- operate (really) in a real world but reality is 
precisely the sphere which remains inaccessible to them; reality is 
precisely what remains cognitively inaccessible.483 Cognition is 
nothing but whatever results from a transformation of limitations into 
conditions of augmentability; and the non-arbitrariness of cognition is 
due only to the fact that these transformations are being performed 
systematically, i.e. by a system-with-history and a system-in-an- 
environment. This perspective indeed represents a radical relativism, 
but it is a relativism which has lost its opposite concept.484 Moreover, 
the acknowledgement of relativity does not amount to an 
acknowledgement of arbitrariness. On the contrary, to accept relativism 
is to make inevitable the question of how systems narrow their choices, 
how they select what they select (and nothing else). Relativity does not 
lead to an "anything goes" but to processes of self-binding, de- 
flexibilization and the establishment of traditions.485 For whatever 
systems do, they only do what they do. Arbitrariness does not exist in 
the real world.
128.
Observations of observations are observations of second order. 
The concept refers to the observation of other observing systems or to 
self-observation requiring either spatial or temporal distance 
respectively. By observing observations, the distinction which the (first) 
observation can only use but not observe becomes itself observable: 




























































































observing system cannot see what it cannot see. The second order 
observation sees as a selection, i.e. as contingent what the first 
observation must take for granted. In some sense, this insight into the 
observable unobservabilities, i.e. into the necessity and visibleness of 
blind spots replaces the traditional a priori justifications of 
epistemologies. The necessity of blind spots now occupies the place 
where earlier a conscious self-confirming reasoning had been; systems 
of recursive observations move to the place where the subject had 
found self-confirmation in the verification of the a priori conditions of 
cognition and knowledge.486 The level of second order observations 
does not mark a "higher” level which is somehow privileged. As 
observations, second order observations are bound to the same 
limitations: they, too, employ and thus do not observe a distinction; 
they, too, need and create a blind spot.487 The question is not, then, 
what the second order observation gains as compared to the observed 
observation. Rather, the question is what eigenvalues -- if at all -  a 
system generates which directs the recursiveness of its observations 
towards the observation of what earlier observations were not able to 
see. For Luhmann, this is a crucial -  through and through empirical -  
question about modern society.488
129.
More or less from the outset, Luhmann’s work on a general theory 
of social systems has been paralleled by theoretical and empirical 
undertakings aimed at a conceptualization of the specificity of modern 
society -- a concern which, according to Luhmann, had been the initial 
task of sociology as it emerged in the 19th century.489 The major 
result of these efforts is Luhmann’s proposal to distinguish three 
different stages in the evolution of society according to its primary 
principle of differentiation. First, the principle of segmentation means 
that the subsystems of society presuppose their environment as a set 
of equal subsystems, so that e.g. tribes only see other tribes in their 
environment. Second, the principle of stratification means that 
subsystems presuppose their relation to their environment in terms of 
a rank order of systems. Finally, the principle of functional differentiation 




























































































presuppose that their environment cares for the rest.490 The evolution 
of European society is characterized, then, as a transition from 
segmentary to stratificatory, and then from stratificatory to functional 
differentiation.491 According to Luhmann, only modern European 
society (and those following its model) implemented functional 
differentiation as its primary principle of differentiation.492 The 
adoption of functional differentiation has several momentous 
implications: an increase in complexity, a loss of redundancy, an 
increasing interdependence and differentiation of subsystems, an 
increase in visible contingency,493 the giving-up of the possibility of an 
unrivalled representation of society within society,494 a release of 
further possibilities of negation,495 the transformation of subsystems 
into self-substitutive systems,496 an increasing distance and mutual 
differentiation of psychic and social systems,497 etc. Luhmann 
considers society’s move to functional differentiation as irreversible.498
130.
As soon as action, in the late 70s, ceased to be the element of 
social systems and became socially constituted via attribution, the 
previously introduced theoretical perspective inspired an empirical 
research project: the transition from stratificatory to functional 
differentiation should be displayed also in a transformation of the ways 
actions were communicatively constituted. In other words, structural 
changes of society should have been prepared and paralleled by 
changes at the level of semantics.499 In 1980, Luhmann begins to 
publish studies on "historical-social semantics" which document the 
semantic transition to modernity. The studies are collected in a series 
of books entitled Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik [Societal Structure 
and Semantics]; by now three volumes were published in 1980, 1981, 
and 1989 respectively. Studies on the semantics of love, originally 
planed as a contribution to the series, soon increased in size and then 
developed into a separate book, Liebe als Passion [Love as 
Passion].500 Luhmann emphasizes that these studies do not 
presuppose causality at the level of ideas; the picture is not that ideas 
somehow go directly from culture into the minds and from there into the 




























































































different stimulates activities from which success selects systematizable 
contents. Accordingly, the objective of these studies was (is) not to 
provide causal explanations.501
131.
In agreement with the overall design of his theory, Luhmann links 
the characterization of modern society and the epistemology of second 
order cybernetics in a cyclical way.502 For a constructivist 
epistemology corresponds precisely to the way functional differentiation 
conditions the possibilities for societal self-observation. In lack of an 
archimedean point, society has to reduce the social impudence of 
knowledge: it is easier to propose and to follow constructions than to 
claim and enforce perception as truth. Constructivism marks an 
endpoint in this development.503 Polycontexturality, observations of 
second order, and the recursive distinguishing of distinctions represent 
the semantic requirements of functional differentiation. An epistemology 
based on these concepts witnesses and exemplifies the adaptation of 
science to modern society.504 For science, this implies a transposition 
from what- to how-questions; for society it leads to an emphasis on 
contingency. What had been nature at some point is now being 
revealed as the consequence of selections, i.e. decisions -  even if the 
identity of the decision-maker cannot be established.505 Again, the 
consequences are observable at the semantic level: the semantics of 
"danger" is replaced by the semantics of "risks"; the future is no longer 
an extension of the past and becomes dependent on decisions.506 





























































































Five The Art of the Re-entry
132.
"Attention, ne laissez pas passer le génie", Georges Dumézil 
wrote to his colleagues at the Collège de France who where about to 
decide whether Michel Foucault should be admitted to the famous 
institution.508 For Foucault, his chair at the Collège must have 
seemed as a deliverance: from one day to the other he was able to 
bypass all academic procedures in order to obtain the maximum degree 
of freedom and independence French academic life could possibly 
concede. From now on, the only formal requirement he had to fulfil was 
to give weekly lectures over three months per year and to present new 
material each year. Although Foucault, who always took this 
requirement very seriously, would now and then struggle to live up to 
this task, there can be little doubt that his position at the collège 
provided optimal conditions for the pursuit of a truly independent line of 
inquiry. Nietzsche, too, had his mentor, Friedrich-Wilhelm Ritschl, who 
would promote him to a chair at the University of Bâle. At the age of 
only 24, Nietzsche bypassed all the standard academic procedures and 
suddenly arrived at the top without having written a proper dissertation. 
Still, at that time, he was part of a discipline, philology, and his chair at 
Bâle both prolonged his allegiance to the discipline and accelerated his 
search for independence. And, finally, Niklas Luhmann, too, eventually 
arrived at the top of a discipline without having been disciplined in the 
usual way. Promoted by Helmut Schelsky, his first two books, written 
out of his own personal theoretical interests, ended up as dissertation 
and even habilitation of Professor Niklas Luhmann.
133.
All three, then, eventually found themselves in a position which 
gave them a so far unknown degree of freedom, time, and 




























































































were given the opportunity to develop their works according to their 
own ideas, to choose topics (almost) at will, and to decide for 
themselves which way to go. Having come thus far, they were free to 
pursue their works not according to the expectations of disciplines, not 
as answers to questions prescribed externally, but instead as 
autonomous projects which could unfold also with an eye to 
themselves, to their unities, i.e. as autonomous pieces of art. And on 
their routes towards autonomy, Nietzsche found himself or better: he 
created himself, Foucault discovered self-relations, and Niklas Luhmann 
came to emphasize self-reference. In all three cases, the cutting off of 
external references, of references to nature and, in particular, to human 
nature, required some thematization of self-reference in order to give 
unity to the work. Thereby, self-reference substituted conceptual 
completeness and turned the works of these authors into practices: 
flexible, transformable, self-corrective, recursive, and moving. The 
incorporation of self-reference, however, did not occur with tantamount 
ease in the three cases. For Nietzsche and Foucault, the discovery of 
self-reference came as a true discovery: as something that had to be 
added to their works, something that had been lacking before. And their 
struggle with this acknowledgment that the work, instead of being 
anchored in itself, had been based on an uncritical adoption of 
externally given configurations of thought, as well as with the 
subsequent effort to establish autonomy and unity through self- 
referential closure was at the heart of their crises. In contrast, self­
reference had been an explicit part of Luhmann’s work both in its 
contents and in its design from the outset. In fact, the discovery of self­
reference must have occurred before Luhmann started publishing and 
might even mark the very origin of his project. This re-entry, the first 
encounter with self-reference, is not, then, part of the subsequent work, 
which therefore unfolded smoothly, steadily, with changes but, as far as 
known, without conceptual turning points loaded with personal crises.
134.
Moreover Luhmann achieved what Foucault had been striving for 
throughout much of his early project: perhaps one could not say that 




























































































mention this to be an explicit goal (a silence which is, too, part of 
having no face). However, in his work, Niklas Luhmann, his face, 
seems absent -- so absent indeed that he even questions the 
authorship of his (?!) writings.509 In his absence, in this explicit 
devaluation of biography, Luhmann exemplifies the contents of his 
theory: namely, in this case, the strict distinction between psychic 
(personal) and social systems. The theory has place for him, the 
psychic system Niklas Luhmann, but as communication, it must focus 
on communicative, i.e. social systems. The theory’s competence stems 
precisely from the fact that it restricts itself to what it knows about 
communication from being communication. With his theory, Luhmann 
cannot be polemical; discretion and tact are being anchored in the 
theory’s design. The absence of polemics was also characteristic for 
the work of Michel Foucault, but his attempts to write in order to have 
no face, all these attempts about which he spoke and wrote a lot, were 
successful, if at all, only in a perverse sense: in the cult which soon 
evolved around his name, his face was multiplied, diversified, diffused, 
dispersed, disfigured, and ultimately defaced.
135.
The works of Foucault and Luhmann are not just complementary 
with regard to the way the authors (dis-)appear in them but also with 
regard to their designs, in their works, the requirement to rely less and 
less on pre-given entities such as "reason", "nature" or "human nature" 
and to ensure that everything which is taken-for-granted in the course 
of the work remains open for problematization at a later stage, was 
translated into very different, almost opposite forms of research 
practices. For there are two ways of saying nothing, i.e. of abstaining 
from privileging sectors of reality as ontological: one could either remain 
silent, refrain from general theoretical claims or, in contrast, one could 
promise to say everything, to include every-thing into the realm of 
possible problematizations precisely by proclaiming universality. 
Concrete research which follows the first of these two lines of inquiry 
will form a carefully organized sequence of empirical studies where 
theoretical claims are not explicitly part of the work but implicit in its 




























































































and are not part of this work. The second line of inquiry is likely to be 
translated into a universal theory, a network of ideas and concepts 
stabilizing each other, which parallels and guides empirical studies. I 
understand the works of Foucault and Luhmann as representatives of 
these two opposite or complementary ways of avoiding a priori 
commitments. In other words, they represent two different modes of 
implementing the same attitude towards research and, if you will, 
towards the world.510 It is this common attitude which makes it 
possible to relate Foucault’s and Luhmann’s projects; and out of this 
attitude the two projects unfolded in different directions.
136.
The thematization of self-relations and self-reference requires 
conceptual provisions for logical paradoxes. The circle defies whatever 
distinctions are imposed on it -  including the distinction between "true" 
and "false". The incorporation of self-reference amounts, therefore, to 
an exit from logic. Whatever entity is considered to be self-referential, 
its operation cannot be understood as being subject to logic and, if you 
will, truth. If the access to novelty is directed internally, if, in other 
words, there is no direct, immediate input of novelty from outside 
without the cooperation of the self-referential entity in question, the 
production of novelty will have to be a paradoxical move. To make 
provisions for such moves is to admit that those entities empowered 
with self-referential operational modes actively employ and use logic 
rather than passively obey requirements of logical consistency. The 
problematization of truth and the thematization of self-reference are two 
sides of the same coin. Both Foucault and Luhmann therefore had to 
explicitly introduce concepts which reflect the logical incompleteness 
and hence creativity of self-reference. In the work of Foucault, the 
concept of "problematization" serves this purpose; Luhmann solved the 
problem by adopting Spencer Brown’s notion of the "re-entry" -  the 
very same notion which, by the way, is also at the centre of this essay. 
The relation between the two concepts is obvious: in Foucault’s use, 
"problematization" refers to the re-entry of "being" into the side of 
"thought" in the distinction between "being" and "thought". The two 




























































































of the work, its completeness is achieved only through the inclusion 
and, if you will, domestication of logical incompleteness.
137.
It would be easy to give a puzzling list of sentences which, almost 
up to the choice of specific words!, were written by Foucault as well as 
by Luhmann. And yet, even if the words are the same, their contexts 
are completely different. Luhmann writes precisely in a space where 
Foucault never wanted to write, but he writes in such a way that 
Foucault, could he have read and followed, would have rediscovered 
his (Foucault’s) own concerns. The two works are like parallel lines: the 
same and still completely different; the same and still without 
intersection points. These two lines delineate a semantic space in 
which it is possible to speak about the world without taking its form and 
its features for granted, without accumulating final, ultimate verdicts, 
without restricting one’s ability to learn.
138.
And the first one who glimpsed at this space in which the world 
looks like a boundless fluid, permanently moving without fixed points, 
without orientation -  was Friedrich Nietzsche. Yet Nietzsche never 
managed to conquer this new world he discovered. To be sure, like no 
one before him he was prepared to question whatever his time took for 
granted; like no one before him he problematized the idea of truth, but, 
conspicuously, where Foucault and Luhmann speak of 
"problematization" and "re-entries" respectively, Nietzsche only offered 
Zarathustra’s silence. Nietzsche never developed a concept that would 
stand for paradoxes, for logical incompleteness -  and the price he paid 
for this, if you will, omittance was the incompleteness of his work. 
However he tried to put his work together, to arrive at the great 
synthesis, his efforts turned out to be a torture and, finally, impossible: 
Per Wille zur Macht remained unwritten; his work did not close. 
Perhaps he was, after all, too systematic, unable or unwilling to make 




























































































precisely the self-reference of his work would have required such 
compromises in the form of explicit provisions for logical 
incompleteness. Instead, Nietzsche could not think beyond the self­
overcoming of Christian truthfulness. He could think only in terms of this 
enormous, ultimate crisis which he, Nietzsche, embodied; he thought 
in terms of necessities rather than possibilities. Whereas for Foucault 
and Luhmann, truth is linked to openness, infinity, change, variation, 
and to creation, Nietzsche considered living in truth a self-restriction, a 
straight-jacket; ultimately, truth and even thought were hostile to 
life.511 Still, he once got out of this straight-jacket and thus gained 
access to the novelty of a world without god, a world that referred only 
to itself, a self-referential world -  but he did not take off (or did he?); 
he remained a frightened eagle, caught in his time and his loneliness.
139.
In his last interview, Foucault admitted that he was "just a 
Nietzschean", and in fact, after he resolved his crisis, the design of his 
work was almost congruent with Nietzsche’s design. Yet the two 
projects evolved in very different ways. In some sense, and perhaps 
precisely because he admired Nietzsche’s oeuvre, Foucault became a 
reversed Nietzsche: he started where Nietzsche had left his work, with 
a work on madness, and ended where Nietzsche had started, with 
studies on Greek antiquity (in which he, like Nietzsche, put special 
emphasis on the role of Socrates for Western thought). And even if 
Foucault closely linked his own concerns with Nietzsche’s, the two 
projects ended on different, almost opposite notes. Whereas Nietzsche 
never got rid of his suspicion towards thought, Foucault finally elevated 
thought to be the source of novelty: through thought, being gained 
distance to itself, was able to look at itself, to reflect on itself and, then, 
to change. Occasionally, Nietzsche came close to the gates of similar 
views. In that being established distance to itself, something "new, 
deep, unheard-of, mysterious, contradictory, promising [zukunftsvoll]" 
arose on earth, a "spectacle, too nice, too wonderful, too paradoxical", 
which made "man one of the most unexpected, most exciting strokes 
of luck" ever played by "Zeus or chance". Through that distance, man 




























































































if, with man, something was announced, something prepared; as if man 
was not a goal, but just a way, an incident, a bridge, a great 
promise...'1.512 But for Nietzsche, this distance between being and 
being remained a distance that being maintained against itself; the 
paradox he discovered was man’s suffering from himself. This distance 
was perhaps creative, perhaps necessary, but ultimately a tragic 
distance. The re-entry he could think of was an instant, a crisis of the 
greatest proportions, an event which would happen once and thereby 
fundamentally remove or alter the distance between being and being. 
And, again, he exemplified this view. But the re-entry was not, for 
Nietzsche, something that one could purposefully employ, again and 
again, in a practice. The re-entry, the paradox was dangerous, 
accessible only to "daredevils of the spirit'1.513
140.
The fact that the projects of Nietzsche and Foucault ended on 
such different (but also: similar) notes does not contradict my 
observation that their intrinsic geometries finally coincided. The re­
entries of the projects into themselves only ensured or even installed 
their distinctness and independence. For in that self-observation 
becomes systematically linked to observation, a project will inevitably 
evolve in a path-dependent way: its future depends on how it has 
arrived at the present. Since Foucault and Nietzsche arrived at their 
points of re-entry on different routes, they could not but continue on 
different routes in the aftermath. Whatever the intrinsic geometry of an 
observation after a re-entry, the re-entry (only) makes the project more 
distinct, more differentiated: similarities and differences to its 
environment are likely to surface more sharply afterwards. In particular, 
congruence at the level of geometry does not necessarily imply 
congruence at the level of contents. Its intrinsic geometry is, after all, 





























































































Accordingly, none of the previous remarks should be 
misunderstood as evaluations or as a critique. At the level of its 
geometry, Nietzsche’s work is not less sound, or less relevant, or less 
advanced than Foucault’s or Luhmann's. No criteria exist upon which 
a hierarchy among the three thinkers can be established. Writing in 
their respective times, struggling with their respective problems, they all 
managed to start their projects, which, after some time, were able run 
on their own. They all arrived at a recursive design of their works, they 
all must have performed, then, the art of the re-entry. Due to this 
recursiveness, due to this independence!, the three thinkers remained 
and remain lonely figures in academic life -- in spite of their success 
and in spite of the discussions they provoke. Already in 1983, during 
his lifetime!, a bibliography of works on Michel Foucault listed 791 
entries -  but none of these entries in any sense eliminates this 
loneliness.514 And if their audiences responded or respond at all, then 
this response often consists of puzzlement, confusion, evasion, 
outspoken silence.516 For who, given the time constraints of academic 
work, wants to take up the burden to work oneself into the labyrinths 
and loops of their thinking, into their endless bibliographies, into the 
sheer complexity of their oeuvres?
142.
Due to the recursiveness and non-linearity of the designs of their 
work practices, these thinkers were able to realize a degree of 
complexity in their writings which is partly the reason for their uneasy 
and problematic reception. If self-observation and observation are 
linked, then one can see the observer in what he observes. Having 
traced the observer as he re-appears in his observations, we can, of 
course, continue and try to delineate what this "doubled" observer 
observes. In other words, if the observer recurs in his observations, 
then he recurs with his activity of observing and accordingly with what 
he observes. Thus, in the observation, the observed somehow contains 
itself within itself. The situation is more complex than the image one 




























































































camera and shows what the camera films. For in the present context, 
each step from observation to the observer and from the observer to 
the observation is logically incomplete and thus a source of novelty. 
The situation is not, then, a perfect circle, a tautology, but instead a 
structure of infinite depth as each step opens the procedure for 
distortions and deviations. For us, as we observe (from the outside) and 
study the works of Nietzsche, Foucault, and Luhmann, the situation is 
likely to resemble a fractal image: an image where the magnification of 
arbitrarily small sections reveals new details which almost look like the 
original image (see overleaf for an example). No wonder, then, that the 
reception of the work will be infinite. No wonder, also, that the reception 
reveals as much as -- or perhaps even more than -  about the recipient 
as about the work.
143.
One can distinguish two different ways of questioning and 
observing society. First, one can start from assumptions about how the 
world should be, about what should be considered normal, true, correct 
or perfect. And then, with those assumptions, one can observe the 
world, accumulate confirmations of the original assumptions and 
administer deviations. From this perspective, deviations are 
automatically exceptions and therefore the preferred objects of 
explanations: the "social-problems-sociology", for example, is interested 
in the history and conditions of slums, but not in a genealogy of the 
comfort of city life.516 In contrast, the second approach starts by 
declaring the normal to be unlikely. It dissolves the normal, the self- 
evident, the grounds of everyday life into the realm of the unlikely, and 
then faces the task to make comprehensible how the now unlikely 
nevertheless occurs with sufficient likelihood. This second perspective 
combines, if you will, "constructivism" and "deconstructivism". Niklas 
Luhmann observed that an interest in the second type of questioning 
recurs almost periodically: at first with Descartes and Hobbes in the mid 
17th century, then around 1800 inspired by the French Revolution, and 
then again in the middle of the 20th century, but now the transformation 
of the normal into the unlikely takes place in the demarcated sphere of 























































































































































































Clearly, Nietzsche (as a transient figure, i.e. as a precursor), Foucault, 
and Luhmann all exemplify the latter type of inquiries in the most 
radical way.518 The problematization of all external references or, at 
least, the provisions they made for a problematization of those 
references required, as we have seen, some thematization of self­
reference. And it is here, in the problems these thinkers encountered 
in their efforts to establish a workable design which radically 
implements a specific way of observing, where they could turn out to 
be most useful for our own work. For the conditions of modern society 
are likely to preferentially produce similar types of work, and similar 
types of doubts in the future.
144.
For what is peculiar about this society which assigns an almost 
eerie and permanent relevance to the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, and 
which cannot explain away the doubts expressed in the work of 
Foucault and Luhmann? What is characteristic about modern society 
that it cannot diffuse those doubts about the costs of the transformation 
of unlikelihood into likelihood, about the risks of the building up of 
stabilities (and expectations) on instabilities? A society which, by means 
of self-observation and self-description, attempts to establish truth about 
itself will most probably, sooner or later, encounter the logical 
incompleteness of this very procedure. Due to the self-reference 
involved in the search for truth about the self, no self-description can 
ever achieve the status of a truth proven in a logically closed way. 
Thus, for logical reasons, each suggestion of a self-description contains 
in itself the seeds of its problematization. This mechanism is likely to 
develop into a dynamics -  the dynamics of truthfulness: society may 
generate and follow, now and then, self-descriptions, but it will find itself 
unable to argumentatively diffuse doubts about the status and the 
implicit liabilities of such self-descriptions. Ultimately, this may amount 
to a renunciation of what was proposed a societal truth and thus, given 
truth-expectations, to disappointment, to a sense of failure. The result 
is an intensification of self-observation: we must try harder to reveal the 
truth! If the truth is not were we thought it would be, then it must be 




























































































reference and, hence, its logical incompleteness turns the search for 
truth into an autocatalytic process, nurtured by the impossibility to 
anchor self-descriptions in truth.
145.
The dynamics of truthfulness is the invisible black board 
mentioned in the introduction of this essay upon which thinkers are 
being grouped, categorized, and measured: whoever tells the truth 
about society participates and thus continues this dynamics. And as 
society has to extract and generalize its truth from more and more 
successive self-descriptions, the task gets increasingly delicate. For 
whatever new societal truth is being proposed, society will have to 
convince itself that the new truth, as truth, has been there all the time 
and in fact can explain both the success and the failure of previous 
truths. If (if!) we follow the lines of this thinking, we may ask what kinds 
of societal self-descriptions this dynamics is likely to produce in the long 
run. Are there, in other words, self-descriptions which are more 
resistant to this alternation of hope and frustration, more resistant to 
disappointment? If truth is to be deduced from an increasingly diverse 
history, the most resistant form of truth-telling is, evidently, to claim that 
there is no truth. The most resistant form that can evolve under the 
dynamics of truthfulness is a self-renouncing truth, a paradox: the 
uncertainty becomes certain; at least in one’s doubts one can be sure. 
Once proposed and established, this most abstract truth sponges upon 
any further disappointment encountered by other proposals. And as 
soon as the self-renouncing truth prevails, as soon as it becomes true, 
society puts itself into a delicate tension. For on the one hand, this new 
truth will be as unprovable as any other truth. It cannot escape the 
logical incompleteness, which is, after all, the basis of its success. It 
must remain vulnerable. Still, on the other hand, the self-renouncing 
truth can only be the final and ultimate attempt to save the very idea of 
living in truth, to save the idea of truth. The dilemma is, then, that the 
persistence of a self-renouncing truth depends on conditions which also 
expose it to dangers to which its proponents, if they value truth at all, 





























































































For a society which lives with and in a self-renouncing truth, a line 
of questioning which proclaims what is true and then registers and 
explains evident exceptions will become increasingly untenable. The 
pretentiousness of truth now presents itself as an insistence on 
contingency. For some time, the slaughtering of what was normal, the 
dissolution of what was taken for granted will be celebrated as 
"liberation", but this "deconstruction" does not as yet provide a stable 
position; it is not even based on a complete question. For if, in this way, 
the normal is exposed as contingent, then the question is precisely how 
it nevertheless became normal, i.e. how it became possible, through 
processes of self-binding, to build up and maintain expectations, to 
build up complexity. Much of the discussion on "post-modernity" misses 
this second, somewhat indirect consequence of a self-renouncing truth. 
While prominent truth-tellers announce the end of truth, modern society 
continues to do what it does: to build up complexity on the basis of the 
transformation of unlikelihood into likelihood, and thus to generate 
expectations. Post-modernity takes place, then, only in semantics, 
leaving fallow what would be most crucial: its relation to being.
147.
And precisely this, being, was taken into account by Nietzsche, 
Foucault, and Luhmann. They developed and exemplified lines of 
questioning which seem to fulfil the requirements of a self-renouncing 
truth and hence of a radically modern society. The persistent relevance 
of Nietzsche should not come, then, as a surprise. He anticipated what 
post-modernity has as yet to discover. Similarly, the dynamics of 
truthfulness is likely to return again and again to the works of Michel 
Foucault and Niklas Luhmann. Their relevance remains as yet to be 
fully appreciated. For they provide examples of how, through a careful 
substitution of self-references for external references, one can continue 
to pose questions, to observe!, even under the paradoxical conditions 
of a contingent truth and a true contingency. We may not want to 
merely copy their designs, but at least we can learn from the problems 




























































































to provide and test some conceptual tools which may further this 
learning process.520
148.
In his late methodological writings, Michel Foucault emphasized 
that "what [he has] tried to maintain for many years, is the effort to 
isolate some of the elements that might be useful for a history of 
truth".521 Although he indeed provided more than just "useful 
elements", the task of writing such a history of truth remains to be 
done. From everything I have said in this essay and from the task itself, 
it is clear that a history of truth must be framed in a self-referential 
design. But my essay suggests even more. It suggests that the history 
of truth can be traced down by relying on indirect evidence, namely on 
the status and the location of self-reference in various truthful, societal 
self-descriptions. For, again, the problematization of truth as the 
ultimate external reference goes hand in hand with a thematization of 
self-reference. A history of truth and a history of self-reference are 
complementary projects. We may have to go back, for this purpose, to 
antiquity, above all back to Descartes, then to Kant, Nietzsche, 
Foucault, Luhmann, and others. We may have to re-enter the circle.
149.
The bottle of Klein, named after the great mathematician Felix 
Klein (1849-1925), is a geometrical surface which one obtains by 
attaching the circular ends of a four-dimensional cylinder to one 
another, but with opposite orientation. Clearly, it is somewhat difficult 
to imagine the result in four dimensions. But we may project the whole 
thing onto three-dimensional space, just as the projection of a ball from 
three-dimensional space onto the two-dimensional plane will produce 
a disk. If we project, then, from four to three dimensions, the result will 




























































































As the figure indicates, the re-entry makes self-intersection 
unavoidable. Moreover, the points where the bottle re-enters itself, i.e. 
the points of self-intersection form a circle (a cross-section of the neck 
of the bottle). These points are called singularities. In general, 
singularities are characterized by the fact that, in some sense, they 
have multiple meanings. In our example, the points on the circle 
belong, on the one hand, to the bottle’s body and, on the other hand, 
to its neck. Singularities are always important. Even global 
characteristics of surfaces often depend only on what happens in 
arbitrarily close neighbourhoods of those singularities. Surfaces without 
singularities are mostly easy to comprehend and to classify; 
singularities, in contrast, make the life of mathematicians both difficult 
and interesting. The bottle of Klein itself, by the way, does not have 
singularities. In four dimensions, the re-entry is possible without 
ambiguities. But in three dimensions, i.e. after the projection, there is 
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alone, my disciples, you too, go now, alone. Thus I want it. [etc.]". See Also sprach 
Zarathustra. Part 1.
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20.8.1880, KGA 111,1, No.49.
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133. Nietzsche on Zarathustra in Ecce Homo. Also sprach Zarathustra, No.6.
134. Letter to Burckhardt, 6.1.1889, KGA III,5, No.1256.
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Zarathustra and the eternal return: "The incessant transformation -  you must go through 
many individuals in a short time. The means is the incessant struggle." (KGA Werke V,2, 
11(197], p.418)
136. Jenseits von Gut und Bose. Was ist vornehm?, No.270.
137. Ecce Homo, Warum ich so klug bin, No.4.
138. Morgenrote. No.14: Bedeutung des Wahnsinns in der Geschichte der Moralitàt.
139. Also sprach Zarathustra. First Part, Die Reden Zarathustras, Von den drei 
Verwandlungen.
140. See Ross, Der anostliche Adler, p.796. On the three metamorphoses see Erich 
Heller, Zarathustra's three metamorphoses: Facets of Nietzsche’s intellectual biography 
and the apotheosis of innocence, in Heller, The Importance of Nietzsche, (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1988), pp.70-86. Neither of the two authors sees this 
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143. Histoire de la Sexualité 1: La volonté de savoir. (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1976); 





























































































144. Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault 1926-1984. translated by Betsy Wing, (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp.273-274.
145. Eribon, p.277.
146. Eribon, p.321.
147. See the beginning of his lecture given on January 7,1976, (in the following referred 
to as Lecture One), which also opened the course of 76, in Colin Gordon (ed.), 
Power/Knowledqe: Selected Interviews & other Writings by Michel Foucault, 1972-1977, 
(New York: Pantheon, 1981), pp.78-92 (78-79).
148. Foucault, by 1976 already a celebrity, must have felt that his work did not provoke 
the reactions he had wanted to see. At that time, he saw his work "surrounded by a 
prudent silence" and interpreted this silence as a failure on his part. See Lecture One, 
7.1.1976, p.87. In the context of Naissance de la Clinique, too, Foucault was struck that 
"the question [he] was posing totally failed to interest those to whom [he] addressed it." 
See Truth and Power, in Power/Knowledqe, pp.109-133 (109-111). This interview was 
first published in 1977.
149. For his problems see e.g. Questions of Method, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, 
Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect -  Studies in Governmentalitv, (Hertfordshire: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991 ),pp.73-86 (74). This text is based on a round-table debate 
with Michel Foucault in May 1978. Before its publication in 1980, the text was extensively 
recast by Foucault. In contrast to his statements in Questions of Method, see his later 
remarks in Critical Theory/lntellectual History, in Lawrence D. Kritzman (ed.), Michel 
Foucault: Politics. Philosophy, Culture -  Interviews and other writings 1977-1984, 
(London: Routledge, 1988), pp.17-46 (33,36). In the following I will refer to this interview 
as the "Telos-interview", as it was first published in Telos in 1983. See also Politics and 
Ethics, in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader. (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 
pp.373-380 (374), an edited version of an interview with Michel Foucault conducted in 
April 1983. In his last interview, Foucault even considered his early books, Histoire de la 
Folie. Les Mots et les Choses. Surveiller et Punir, as philosophical studies even if of a 
specific kind. See Die Rückkehr zur Moral, in Eva Erdmann, Rainer Forst, Axel Honneth 
(eds.), Ethos der Moderne: Foucault’s Kritik der Aufkiaruno, (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 
1990), pp. 133-145 (133); an English translation of this interview is in the volume edited 
by Kritzman. Interestingly, before and up to 1976, Foucault did not seem to have 
problems with the label "philosopher". He considered everyone who was concerned with 
questions such as “What is knowledge?", "What is truth?" to be a philosopher, including 
himself. See Questions on Geography (1976), in Power/Knowledqe. pp.63-77 (66).
150. See e.g. Nietzsche’s angry response to Paul Deussen, who had congratulated him 
to his chair at Bâle University in such "infinitely unimportant and trivial manner" that 
Nietzsche threatened to end the friendship. KGA 1,2, No.622,623. For Foucault see 
Eribon, pp.16,25-26,292-293.






























































































153. Nietzsche emphasized that it was the way in which Brandes dealt with his texts (in 
addition to the fact that Brandes read him and lectured on his writings) that gave him the 
feeling that he had been, to some extent, understood. See Nietzsche’s letter to Fritzsch, 
14.2.1888, KGA III,5, No.993. On the importance of the exchange with Dreyfus and 
Rabinow for Foucault, see Foucault’s remarks in e g. Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with 
Michel Foucault (October 1982), in Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, Patrick H. Hutton 
(eds.), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, (London: Tavistock, 
1988), pp.9-15 (12); also The Use of Pleasures. (New York: Vintage, 1990), p.8.
154. Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault. Eribon had worked with Foucault before and had 
conducted interviews with him. For a very American account of Foucault’s life and work 
see now James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault. (New York: Simon&Schuster, 
1993).
155. Eribon, p.156.
156. Die Archaoloqie des Wissens, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 4th ed. 1990), p.29. The 
entire book is a response to the reactions provoked by his earlier books.
157. Eribon, pp.324-327. For more speculations on how Foucault reacted to AIDS in 
general and the possibility of himself being infected see Miller, pp.13-36.
158. I maintain this distinction between Foucault’s project and its end and between 
Nietzsche's projects and its end also after having read James Miller’s book The Passion 
of Michel Foucault.
159. Eribon, p.52, Telos-lnterview, p.23.
160. Eribon, p.70, Telos-lnterview, p.23.
161. Die Riickkehr zur Moral, p. 140-141; Telos-lnterview, p.23.
162. Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault, p.13.
163. Telos-lnterview, p.23,32; Miller, pp.66-72.
164. Telos-lnterview, p.24.
165. Intended preface to The Use of Pleasures, in Foucault-Reader. pp.333-339 (336) 
There are other statements by Foucault which contradict this one. At one point he even 
seemed to imply that the reading of Nietzsche made him join the Communist Party. See 
Eribon, p.52. If one looks at the dates, however, this version appears as unlikely at it 
sounds.
166. Telos-lnterview, p.33.
167. The Minimalist Self (first published in 1983), in Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, 
Culture, pp.3-16 (8).





























































































169. Madness and Civilization. (London: Tavistock, 3rd printing 1985 (first 1971)), 
especially pp.279-289 with explicit references to Nietzsche’s madness as a research 
topic.
170. Eribon, p.62-64.
171. Prison Talk (first published in 1975), in Power/Knowledge, pp.37-54 (53-54).
172. Die Riickkehr zur Moral, p. 141.
173. Folie et Déraison. (Paris: Plon, 1961), preface p.ix. For the second edition, Foucault 
prepared an entirely new preface.
174. Practising Criticism (1981), in Michel Foucault: Politics. Philosophy, Culture, pp.152- 
156 (156).
175. Minimalist Self, p.7.
176. Eribon, p.27.
177. The irony of this is all too obvious: the one who wanted to be the creator of values 
which would guide mankind into a presumably better future had to print some of his books 
at his own expense as his words were sent, at least during much of his lifetime, into a 
frightening void. The one whose efforts were directed mostly towards himself, sold e.g. 
32500 copies of Les Mots et les Choses during the first two years after its publication. For 
the success of Foucault’s book see Eribon, p.156.
178. Archéologie des Wissens. p.30.
179. This is one of the two meanings of the term "subject" he delineated in The Subject 
and Power, published as afterword to Hubert L. Dreyfus, Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. (Brighton: Harvester, 1982), pp.208-226 (212).
180. Minimalist Self, p. 14; The Use of Pleasures. Preface, p.8.
181. Interview with Michel Foucault, Bonniers Literàra Magasin, Stockholm, March 1968, 
p.204, mentioned in Eribon on p.92.
182. Politics and the Study of Discourse (first published in French in 1968), in The 
Foucault-Effect. pp.53-72 (71-72); Archéologie des Wissens. pp.300-301; What is an 
Author? (1971), in Foucault-Reader. pp.101-120.
183. Archéologie des Wissens. p.296.
184. Quoted in Eribon, p.237. On Foucault’s preoccupation with death see Miller, The 
Passion of Michel Foucault, especially pp.54-57 on the suicide attempts around 1948.
185. (Auto-)biography, in History of the Present, Spring 1988, No.4, pp.14-15. This text 
was written in the early 80s; it grew out of Foucault’s attempt to write a preface to the 




























































































186. E.g. Politics and the Study of Discourse, pp.54,62; Archéologie des Wissens, 
pp.292-293; Questions of Method, pp.78,85; Telos-lnterview, p.36; Politics and Ethics, 
pp.375-376; An Aesthetics of Existence (1984), in Michel Foucault: Politics. Philosophy, 
Culture, pp.47-53 (50).
187. See e.g. Questions on Geography, p.74. In his lecture of January 14, 1976, (in the 
following referred to as Lecture Two), Foucault emphasized that even the individual 
cannot be accepted as a pre-given entity. See Lecture Two, in Power/Knowledqe, pp.92- 
108 (98). Related and more general statements also later in The Ethics of Care for the 
Self as a Practice of Freedom (1984), in James Bernauer, David Rasmussen (eds.), The 
Final Foucault, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), pp.1-20 (9-10); The Concern for Truth 
(published in 1984), in Michel Foucault: Politics. Philosophy, Culture, pp.255-267 (257).
188. This formulation in the intended preface to The Use of Pleasures, p.335.
189. In this line is also the non-preface he wrote for the second edition of Folie et 
Déraison, now entitled Histoire de la Folie à l’âge classique. (The former subtitle now 
became the main title.)
190. Questions of Method, p.73-74.
191. Politics and Ethics, p.374.
192. Ordnunq der Dinoe, p.12.
193. Preface to the German edition (1977) of La Volonté de Savoir, p.7.
194. Quoted in Eribon, p.295.
195. This version in The Concern for Truth, p.256.
196. See the preface to the first edition of Folie et Déraison; Politics and the Study of 
Discourse, pp.59-60; Archéologie des Wissens. p.27. One may also try to relate 
Foucault’s problems to "give [himself] and others those middle-range pleasures that make 
up everyday life” to this theme. See The Minimalist Self, pp.12-13.
197. Madness and Civilization, p.xii.
198. This even in an interview of the early 80s: Telos-lnterview, p.30.
199. Histoire de la Folie (Paris: Gallimard, 2nd ed. (of Folie et Déraison) 1972), p.557.
200. Preface to Folie et Déraison, p.ix.
201. Die Ordnunq der Dinqe, p.451.
202. Ordnunq der Dinqe, p.17.




























































































204. See Foucault’s ingenious discussion of the painting in Die Ordnung der Dinqe. 
chapter 1.
205. Die Ordnung der Dinqe, chapter 9,II, pp.372 and following.
206. See also Hinrich Fink-Eitel, Foucault -  Zur Einführung, (Hamburg: Junius/SOAK, 
1989), p.42.
207. Ordnung der Dinqe, preface, pp.26-27; chapter 10,VI, p.462.
208. Introduction to The Use of Pleasures, p.8.
209. Politics and the Study of Discourse, p.61.
210. See for example pp.28-29 in the German translation.
211. Preface to the German edition, pp.10,14.
212. Eribon, pp.209,238.
213. See e.g. Discipline and Punish, (London: Penguin, 1977), Part 4,1., on how the 
prison produces delinquency.
214. See e.g. Body/Power (1975), in Power/Knowledge. pp.55-62 (61); Questions on 
Geography, p.74.
215. For self-critical statements along those lines see e.g. An Aesthetics of Existence, 
pp.47-48; The Concern for Truth, pp.255-256; Die Rückkehr zur Moral, pp.133, 142-143.
216. Der Wille zum Wissen, p.117.
217. Der Wille zum Wissen. pp.59-61.
218. Der Wille zum Wissen. pp.15-16.
219. Der Wille zum Wissen. p.187.
220. For some examples which I marked while reading the book see pp.70,72 (over- 
confidence, bluntness), 81-84 (adjectives), 101 (Foucault is aware of his repetitiveness). 
Apparently, Foucault soon learned that his proposed scheme of analysis could be 
misunderstood as emptiness. See the preface to the German edition (1977) of La Volonté 
de Savoir, p.8.
221. Questions of Method, p.77; Politics and the Study of Discourse, p.58.
222. Interview in La Quinzaine littéraire, April 15, 1966; mentioned in Eribon, p.161.
223. Eribon, p.214.




























































































225. See e.g. Power and Strategies (1977), in Power/Knowledqe. pp. 134-145 (140); The 
Confession of the Flesh, p.201.
226. Power and Strategies, pp.139-140.
227. Truth and Power, pp.118-119.
228. See The History of Sexuality, an interview first published in early 1977, now in 
Power/Knowledge, pp.183-193 (183-184).
229. Power and Strategies, pp.139-140.
230. Lecture Two, pp.95-96,103-108.
231. Truth and Power, p. 119.
232. The Confession of the Flesh, pp. 198-199.
233. The Eye of Power (first published in 1977), in Power/Knowledqe, pp.146-165 (156).
234. Power and Strategies, pp. 141-142.
235. The presentation of the sexuality-project as a study in the theory of power is from 
The History of Sexuality, p.187; 'sexuality' as a positive product of power is mentioned 
in Truth and Power, pp.120-121.
236. Prison Talk, p.52.
237. Lecture Two, 14.1.1976, pp.97-98.
238. Truth and Power, p.119.
239. Lecture Two, p.93; also Truth and Power, p.133.
240. Truth and Power, p. 131.
241. Lecture Two, p.94.
242. Truth and Power, p.133.
243. Power and Strategies, p.142.
244. Truth and Power, p.123.
245. Lecture Two, p.108.
246. The History of Sexuality, p.190.
247. Lecture One, p.81.




























































































249. See also Miller, p.299, on the pain and suffering witnesses noticed in Foucault’s 
struggle with his lectures.
250. "Sécurité, territoire et population" is the title of his course in 1978. An edited version 
of the course exists (translated into German) as "Vorlesungen zur Analyse der Macht- 
Mechanismen 1978: Das Denken des Staates” in Michel Foucault, Der Staub und die 
Wolke, (Bremen: Verlag Impuls, 1982), pp.1-44. Foucault’s résumés des courses, 
summaries of his lectures, were published as Michel Foucault, Résumé des courses 
1970-1982, (Paris: Julliard, 1989).
251. Der Wille zum Wissen, p.167.
252. The course title of 1979 was indeed "Naissance de la biopolitique”. See Résumé, 
pp.107-120. In April 1983, Foucault still thought that a "genealogy of bio-power” could be 
done and that, in fact, he had  to do it. But he acknowledged: "I have no time for that 
now." See On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress (1983), in 
Foucault Reader, pp.340-372 (344).
253. The “governmentality" lecture was published as an Italian transcript already in 1978; 
an English version appeared in 1979. An English translation of the Italian transcript is also 
printed in the Foucault Effect, pp.87-104.
254. This is the note on which the Tanner lectures, held on October 10 and 16, 1979, 
end. See Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, pp.57-85 (84-85).
255. See Questions of Method, p.82. In the 2nd Tanner lecture (p.71), Foucault refers to 
the pastoral as a form of "government of individuals by their own verity”.
256. From Arpad Scakolczai’s seminar at the European University Institute, 1991/92.
257. "Perhaps I’ve insisted too much on the technology of domination and power. I am 
more and more interested in the interaction between oneself and others and in the 
technologies of individual domination, the history of how an individual acts upon himself, 
in the technology of self”, from Technologies of the Self (from a seminar Foucault gave 
at the University of Vermont in the fall of 1982; Foucault died before he could complete 
the revision of his seminar presentations), in Technologies of the Self, pp. 16-49 (19); for 
the new emphasis on the techniques of the self see also Michel Foucault, Richard 
Sennett, Sexuality and Solitude, London Review of Books, 21 May - 3 June 1981, pp.3-7 
(5).
258. See Michel Foucaults Hermeneutik des Subjekts (an abridged presentation of 
Foucault’s lectures at the Collège in 1982), in Helmut Becker, Lothar Wolfstetter (eds.), 
Freiheit und Selbstsorqe. (Frankfurt a.M.: Materialis, 1985), pp.32-60 (55); The Subject 
and Power, p.208; (Auto-) Biography, p.14; Polemics, Politics, and Problematization 
(1984), in Foucault Reader, pp.381 -390 (386-387). The classification of the single works 
also changed here and then. For example, Foucault later indicated that in Folie et 
Déraison, all categories were present "albeit in a somewhat confused fashion." See 
Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress, pp.351-352; and his intended 




























































































259. Polemics, Politics, Problematization, pp.387-388.
260. An Aesthetics of Existence, pp.47-48.
261. Die Ruckkehr zur Moral, pp.142-143; The Concern for Truth, pp.255-256.
262. Die Ruckkehr zur Moral, pp.142; advertising insert distributed with the volumes two 
and three of the History of Sexuality, mentioned in Eribon, p.320.
263. From Arpad Scakolczai’s seminar.
264. An important operator in this time travel was Foucault’s discovery that the Elephant 
metaphor, which presents the life of elephants as ideal models for an adequate family life, 
was in fact not invented by Christians but can be traced back even to Hellenistic literature. 
See Sexuality and Solitude, p.5.
265. Overview of Work in Progress, pp.341,361.
266. Overview of Work in Progress, p.366; An Aesthetics of Existence, p.48.
267. The Concern for Truth, pp.259-260; Die Hermeneutik des Subjekts; also 
Technologies of the Self. From a series of lectures Foucault gave in the fall of 1980 in the 
US, the ones he gave at Dartmouth College have recently been published in About the 
Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth, Political Theory, 
Vol.21, No.2 (May 1993), pp.198-227; they present an early overview of Foucault’s 
arguments.
268. An Overview of Work in Progress, pp.341 -342. Foucault also mentioned that he had 
"more than a draft" of a book about sexual ethics in the 16th century, “in which also the 
problem of the techniques of the self, self-examination, the cure of souls, is very 
important.” (p.342) This draft might have been based on the second book he began to 
write according to his plan of 1976; the other one consisting of material that would evolve 
into Les Aveux de la Chair.
269. Eribon, p.319.
270. Die Hermeneutik des Subjekts, pp.34,47; Die Ruckkehr der Moral, p.144; also 
(Auto)Biography, p.15.
271. Die Ruckkehr zur Moral, p.133.
272. Overview of Work in Progress, p.369.
273. The Concern for Truth, p.256.
274. Use of Pleasures. Modifications and Introduction, p.7.
275. Ethics of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom, p.2.




























































































277. The Subject and Power, pp.222-223.
278. The Subject and Power, p.221.
279. Subject and Power, p.225; words to that extent also in The Ethics of the Care for 
the Self as a Practice of Freedom, pp.12-13.
280. The Ethics of Care for the Self, pp.3-4.
281. Basically, I am claiming here precisely the opposite of Hinrich Fink-Eitel, Foucault - 
- Zur Einfuhrung. pp.79-95.
282. Hermeneutik des Subjekts, p.54.
283. Ethics of the Care for the Self, p.18.
284. Telos-lnterview, pp.38-39.
285. Ethics of the Care for the Self, p.10.
286. Politics and Ethics, p.375; Polemics, Politics, Problematizations, pp.383-384.
287. Overview of Work in Progress, p.348. The quotation may be somewhat misleading 
in that Foucault in his writings usually clearly indicated that he did not consider self­
relations as a sphere that would exist independently of other power-relations or games 
of truth.
288. Foucault must have become aware of the specificity of self-relations at the latest 
while working on the preface of the first version of Les Aveux de la Chair. The text later 
evolved into his short (Auto-)Biography. A first glimpse at the potential theoretical 
implications made a premature publication impossible.
289. Introduction to The Use of Pleasures, p. 11.
290. The Ethics of Care for the Self, p.15. Foucault refers in these remarks to the 
Western world.
291. The Concern for Truth, p.267; The Ethics of Care for the Self, p.17.
292. The masked Philosopher (1980), in Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, 
pp.323-330 (324).
293. The Concern for Truth, pp.263-264.
294. This even in the Subject and Power text of 1982, p.216.
295. See Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault, p.15.
296. The evolution of the various meanings of "parrhesia" was the topic of Foucault's 




























































































transcription of Foucault’s presentation: Discourse and Truth: The Problematization of 
Parrhesia.
297. Discourse and Truth, p.2.
298. Foucault lectured on parrhesia also at the Collège de France. A German translation 
of two of those lectures of 1983/84 was edited by Ulrike Reuter, Lothar Wolfstetter, 
Hermann Kocyba, Bernd Heiter as Michel Foucault: Das Wahrsprechen des Anderen. 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Materialis Verlag, 1988), pp.15-42. On Dion and Plato see pp.21-24.
299. Das Wahrsprechen des Anderen. p.35.
300. Das Wahrsprechen des Anderen. p.19.
301. From Plato, Laches, quoted in Discourse and Truth, p.61.
302. Discourse and Truth, pp. 11,68.
303. Discourse and Truth, p.69.
304. Foucault’s interpretation of Socrates’ last words was inspired by Georges Dumézil. 
See Georges Dumézil, "... Le Moyne noir en gris dedans varennes". Sotie nostradamigue 
suivie d'un Divertissement sur les dernière paroles de Socrate. (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), 
pp. 129-170. James Miller in The Passion of Michel Foucault, p.359, evidently did not 
properly understand this interpretation. Foucault's last lectures dealt with the cynic 
Diogenes, who is said to have considered himself "a Socrates gone mad".
305. See sections 61.-62.
306. Foucault later gave the text to Paul Rabinow for his Foucault-Reader. According to 
Arpad Scakolczai, the text was prepared in 1982. In the text, the universality of thought 
is captured in the "principle of irreducibility of thought", the self-reference in the “principle 
of singularity of the historicity of thought. See Intended Preface, p.335.
307. Hubert L. Dreyfus, Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
308. Die Ordnung der Dinge. pp.22-23.
309. Introduction to The Use of Pleasures, p.11.
310. The concluding remarks of the lectures on parrhesia at Berkeley are perhaps the first 
occasion where Foucault refers to "problematization" as "his" method. They were 
published as On Problematization, in History of the Present, Spring 1988. For self-critical 
comments on his omission to sufficiently isolate this notion see The Concern for Truth, 
p.257.
311. The Concern for Truth, p.257.




























































































313. In his introduction to The Use of Pleasures, p.12, Foucault repeats the by then 
already taken-for-granted categorization of his books now in terms of the different types 
of problematizations they covered.
314. Polemics, Politics, and Problematization, p.388.
315. The Ethics of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom; Overview of Work in 
Progress, p.346,349.
316. Overview of Work in Progress, p.346. Comments along the same line also in Die 
Rückkehr zur Moral, p.135,139.
317. The Ethics of Care for the Self, p.19.
318. Overview of Work in Progress, p.343.
319. The Concern for Truth, p.263; see also An Aesthetics of Existence, p.49.
320. Polemics, Politics, and Problematization, p.384.
321. Die Rückkehr zur Moral, p.141.
322. Die Rückkehr zur Moral, p. 133; The Use of Pleasures: Modifications and 
Introduction, p.11.
323. Foucault’s preoccupation with this text of Kant goes back to at least 1978, when he 
delivered a lecture entitled "Qu’est-ce que la critique?" to the Société française de 
philosophie on May 27. For a transcription see the Bulletin de la Société française de 
philosophie, Vol.84, No.2 (April-June 1990), pp.35-63.
324. Michel Foucault, What is Enlightenment?, in the Foucault-Reader, pp.32-50 (38).
325. Michel Foucault, Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution, a translation by Colin 
Gordon of "Un cours inédit", Magazine littéraire, No.207, May 1984, pp.35-39. The text 
is an excerpt, revised by Foucault, from the first lecture in Foucault’s 1983 course at the 
Collège de France. The English translation was published in Economy and Society, 
Vol.15, No.1 (February 1986), pp.88-96 (89).
326. What is Enlightenment?, pp.39-42.
327. What is Enlightenment?, p.45.
328. What is Enlightenment?, p.43. The words “contemporary limits of the necessary" are 
written in inverted commas also in Foucault’s text.
329. What is Enlightenment?, pp.47,50.
330. What is Enlightenment?, p.46.




























































































332. "Biographie, Attitüden, Zettelkasten”, interview with Niklas Luhmann, conducted by 
Rainer Erd, Andrea Maihofer, in Dirk Baecker, Georg Stanitzek (eds.), Niklas Luhmann - 
- Archimedes und wir. (Berlin: Merve, 1987), pp.125-155 (145-146); a shortened version 
of the interview appeared first in the Frankfurter Rundschau, 27.4.1985, p.ZB3, under the 
title “Der Zettelkasten kostet mich mehr Zeit als das Bücherschreiben".
333. A complete bibliography of Luhmann’s writings until 1987 lists 264 entries. See Dirk 
Baecker, Jurgen Markowitz, Rudolf Stichweh, Hartmann Tyrell, Helmut Willke (eds.), 
Theorie als Passion, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1987), pp.720-737.
334. I will come back to the relationship between Foucault and Luhmann in sections 133.- 
135. in chapter Five.
335. For a discussion of the extent to which Luhmann departed from the theory design 
of Parsons, see also Gabor Kiss, Grundziige und Entwicklunq der Luhmannschen 
Svstemtheorie. (Stuttgart: Enke, 2nd ed. 1990).
336. After the death of Sartre, Foucault revealed that Sartre had been the one he always 
wanted to free himself from. See Eribon, p.280. Perhaps, one might speculate (as it would 
only be: speculation) on the relation between Luhmann and Parsons in similar terms.
337. "Biographie, Attitüden, Zettelkasten", p.132.
338. Luhmann publicly revealed the secrets of his “Zettelkasten" for the first time in Niklas 
Luhmann, Kommunikation mit Zettelkasten -- Ein Erfahrungsbericht, in Horst Baier, Hans 
Mathias Kepplinger, Kurt Reumann (eds.), Ôffentliche Meinunq und sozialer Wandel. 
(Essays in honour of Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann), (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 
1981), pp.222-228.
339. For more information on Luhmann’s "Zettelkasten" see also "Biographie, Attitüden, 
Zettelkasten”, pp.132,142-145.
340. Niklas Luhmann, Funktionen und Folqen formaler Organisation, (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1964). There was an earlier book published in 1963, entitled Verwaltunqsfehler 
und Vertrauensschutz: Moqlichkeiten qesetzlicher Reqelunq der Rücknehmbarkeit von 
Verwaltunqsakten, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963), which he prepared together with 
Franz Becker.
341. "Biographie, Attitüden, Zettelkasten", pp.132-133.
342. “Biographie, Attitüden, Zettelkasten", pp.134-135; also "Die Selbstbeobachtung des 
Systems -  Ein Gespràch mit dem Soziologen Niklas Luhmann”, interview conducted by 
Ingeborg Breuer, in Frankfurter Rundschau, 5.12.1992, p.ZB2.
343. "Biographie, Attitüden, Zettelkasten", p.131.
344. Interview with Niklas Luhmann, conducted by Heidemarie Renk, Margaretha Sudhof 




























































































345. This is how Luhmann later, in 1985, presented the origin of his project in "Vom 
menschlichen Leben", interview with Niklas Luhmann, conducted by Marilena Camarda, 
Alessandro Ferrara, Giuseppe Sciortino, Alberto Tulumello, in Dirk Baecker, Georg 
Stanitzek, Niklas Luhmann -  Archimedes und wir, pp.38-57 (48), first published in Italian 
as “Intervista a Niklas Luhmann", Segno 10, 1985, No.4-5 (48-49), pp.25-33.
346. See e.g. Soziologie als Théorie sozialer Système (1967), in Sozioloqische 
Aufklàrunq 1 : Aufsàtze zur Théorie sozialer Système, (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 
4th ed. 1974), pp.113-136 (113-114); also Moderne Systemtheorien als Form 
gesamtgesellschaftlicher Analyse, Lecture held at the 16. Deutscher Soziologentag, 
Frankfurt 1968, in Jurgen Habermas, Niklas Luhmann, Théorie der Gesellschaft Oder 
Sozialtechnoloqie -  Was leistet die Svstemforschunq?, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 
pp.7-24 (14). Luhmann’s critique of Parsons may be compared to Norbert Elias’ 
assessment of Parsons’ theory and the state of sociology as he describes it in the 
introduction to the second edition of Über den ProzeB der Zivilisation. (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp stw, 16th ed. 1991), pp.VII-LXX.
347. See Niklas Luhmann, Der Funktionsbegriff in der Verwaltungswissenschaft, 
Verwaltungsarchiv, Voi.49, No.2, April 1958, pp.97-105, especially pp.98-100.
348. Funktion und Kausalitât (1962), in Sozioloqische Aufklarung 1. pp.9-30 (13-14).
349. A crucial text for the following is the 1962 article "Funktion und Kausalitât" which 
summarizes how the transformation of functions into problems amounts to an exit from 
causal science. See ib., (e.g.) pp.17-18.
350. See e.g. Funktionale Methode und Systemtheorie (1964), in Sozioloqische 
Aufklarung 1. pp.31-53 (31-34).
351. Funktion und Kausalitât, pp.15,26.
352. This formulation in Niklas Luhmann, Vertrauen (1968), (Stuttgart: Enke, 3rd ed. 
1973), p.2.
353. Funktionale Methode und Systemtheorie, pp.44-45.
354. See also the pregnant formulations in Niklas Luhmann, Funktionen und Folqen 
formaler Organisation, pp.395-397.
355. Funktionale Methode und Systemtheorie, p.47.
356. Funktion und Kausalitât, p.27.
357. Programmatic: Funktionale Methode und Systemtheorie.
358. See Systemtheoretische Argumentationen: Eine Entgegnung auf Jürgen Habermas, 
in Habermas, Luhmann, Théorie der Gesellschaft Oder Sozialtechnoloqie -  Was leistet 
die Svstemforschunq?, pp.291-405 (379-380).
359. On this section see e.g. Funktionen und Folqen formaler Organisation, pp.23-24; 




























































































360. Funktionale Méthode und Systemtheorie, pp.39-40.
361. Die Praxis der Theorie (1969), in Soziologische Aufklàrung 1. pp.253-267 (261).
362. Funktionale Methode und Systemtheorie, pp.33-35.
363. A revised version of the lecture was published in Soziale Welt, Vol.18 (1967), pp.97- 
123, and then later in Soziologische Aufklarunq 1, pp.66-91.
364. A term Luhmann picks up from Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change, (New 
York: New Republic, 1935), pp.95 and following; see Soziologische Aufklàrung, p.68.
365. Soziologische Aufklàrung, p.68.
366. For this move see Reflexive Mechanismen (1966), in Soziologische Aufklàrung 1, 
pp.92-112 (105); Soziologie als Theorie sozialer Système, p.115; Soziologische 
Aufklàrung, pp.71.74,80-81; Zweckbeqriff und Svstemrationalitàt (1968), (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp stw, 2nd ed. 1977), pp.346-349; Vertrauen, p.3; Die Praxis der Theorie, 
pp.253,256,262,264.
367. Vertrauen, p.5.
368. Soziologie als Theorie sozialer Système, p. 116.
369. See e g. Moderne Systemtheorien als Form gesamtgesellschaftlicher Analyse, 
pp. 11,15-16,19.
370. Die Praxis der Theorie, p.261.
371. See Systemtheoretische Argumentationen: Eine Entgegnung auf Jürgen Habermas, 
p.295; see also the self-critical remarks in the preface (1969) to the first edition of 
Soziologische Aufklàrung 1. p.5.
372. See Handlungstheorie und Systemtheorie (1978), in Soziologische Aufklàrung 3: 
Soziales System, Gesellschaft, Organisation. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), 
pp.50-66 (55).
373. Soziologie als Theorie sozialer Système, p. 115.
374. Soziologische Aufklàrung, pp.80,86.
375. Sinn als Grundbegriff der Soziologie, in Habermas, Luhmann, Theorie der 
Gesellschaft Oder Sozialtechnoloqie -  Was leistet die Svstemforschunq?, pp.25-100 (85- 
86) .
376. Soziologische Aufklàrung, pp.82-85.
377. Unverstândliche Wissenschaft -  Problème einer theorieeigenen Sprache (1979), in 




























































































378. Wie ist soziale Ordnung moglich?, in Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik 2. 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1981), pp.195-285 (198-199).
379. Die Differenzierung von Interaktion und Gesellschaft: Problème der sozialen 
Solidaritat, in Robert Kopp (ed.), Soiidaritât in der Welt der 80er Jahre: 
Leistungsgesellschaft und Sozialstaat, (Frankfurt a.M.: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1984), 
pp.79-96 (92).
380. Vorwort, in Soziologische Aufklarung 4: Beitràge zur funktionalen Differenzierung der 
Gesellschaft, (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987), pp.5-7 (6).
381. Vorwort, in Soziologische Aufklarung 5: Konstruktivistische Perspektiven, (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), pp.7-13 (7).
382. Niklas Luhmann, "Ich denke primar historisch" -- Religionssoziologische 
Perspektiven, Ein Gesprâch mit Fragen von Detief Pollack, in Deutsche Zeitschrift für 
Philosophie, Vol.39 (1991), No.9, pp.937-956 (938).
383. Luhmann describes universal theories as a "field of experience" for the oscillation 
between external observation and self-observation. See The Autopoiesis of Social 
Systems, in Felix Geyer, Johannes van der Zouwen (eds.), Sociocvbernetic Paradoxes: 
Observation, Control and Evolution of Self-Steering Systems, (London: Beverly Hills, 
1986). pp. 172-192 (188).
384. See Die Praxis der Theorie.
385. “Biographie, Attitüden, Zettelkasten", p.135.
386. Niklas Luhmann, Die Richtigkeit soziologischer Theorie, in Merkur, Vol.41 (1987), 
pp.36-49 (42).
387. See e.g. Soziologie als Theorie sozialer Système, p. 113; Soziologische Aufklarung, 
p.86; Vorwort, in Vertrauen, p.v; the idea to present value-freedom as a means of 
unburdening, of relieving sociology from complexity is from Die Praxis der Theorie, p.256- 
257; see also the remarks on the de-dogmatization of sociology in Sinn als Grundbegriff 
der Soziologie, pp.85-86; the necessity of an autonomous architecture of concepts is 
emphasized, with reference to Parsons, in Macht, (Stuttgart: Enke, 1975), p.17.
388. Die Praxis der Theorie, pp.260,262; Moderne Systemtheorien als Form 
gesamtgesellschaftlicher Analyse, p. 11.
389. See e g. Niklas Luhmann, Die Weltgesellschaft (1971), in Soziologische Aufklarung 
2: Aufsàtze zur Theorie der Gesellschaft. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2nd ed. 1982), 
pp.51-71; also Selbst-Thematisierungen des Gesellschaftssystems (1973), in 
Soziologische Aufklarung 2. pp.72-102 (82); Macht, p.97; The World Society as a Social 
System, International Journal of General Systems, Vol.8 (1982), pp. 131-138; etc.
390. For a discussion (1968) of why society should be understood as a system and for 




























































































systems theory, see Moderne Systemtheorien als Form gesamtgesellschaftlicher Analyse, 
pp. 15-24.
391. The 1966 article “Reflexive Mechanismen" also introduced the distinction between 
reflexivity and reflexion depending on whether an act refers to another act of similar kind 
or to the system which it is part of respectively. See pp.99-100.
392. Soziologie als Theorie sozialer Systeme, p.126.
393. Soziologische Aufklarung, pp.70-71.
394. Zweckbegriff und Svstemrationalitat, pp.8,157-158. Luhmann refers to Norbert 
Wiener’s classic, which more or less inaugurated the science of cybernetics.
395. Selbst-Thematisierungen des Gesellschaftssystems: Uber die Kategorie der 
Reflexion aus Sicht der Systemtheorie, in Soziologische Aufklarung 2, pp.72-102.
396. Einfuhrende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie symbolisch generalisierter 
Kommunikationsmedien (1974), in Soziologische Aufklarung 2. pp.170-192 (186).
397. Systemtheorie, Evolutionstheorie und Kommunikationstheorie, in Soziologische 
Aufklarung 2. pp. 193-203. The paper is a revised version of a lecture given at the 
Amsterdam Festival of Social Sciences, April 7-18, 1975.
398. Vorwort (May 1975), in Soziologische Aufklarung 2. p.5.
399. Humberto R. Maturana, Francesco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The 
Realization of the Living, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980).
400. This is the way Gunther Teubner illustrated system-environment relations in his 
seminar “Autopoiesis in Law and Politics" (Fall 1991) at the EUI.
401. For non-mathematical overviews see e.g. Ian Stewart, Does God Play Dice?, (New 
York: Basil Blackwell, 1989); for a short introduction James P. Crutchfield, J. Doyne 
Farmer, Norma H. Packard and Robert S. Shaw, Chaos, in Scientific American, Voi.255, 
No.6 (December 1986), pp.38-49.
402. The very fact that the discovery of chaotic, non-linear dynamics struck the natural 
sciences as a shock is quite telling. The shock is usually presented as an advancement 
of knowledge. See e.g. James Gleick, Chaos -  Making a New Science. (New York: 
Penguin, 1988). A more interesting history of Chaos Theory should start from the question 
of how self-reference, subjectivity, circularity was excluded from the realm of admissible 
observations. For it is only on the basis of this traditional exclusion that Chaos Theory 
comes in the clothes of a “revolution"; the "revolution" of Chaos Theory shows, in some 
sense, how the tradition, now as before, is taken for granted. Revealing is also that 
Gleick’s history of Chaos Theory starts with Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) whereas a more 
interesting history of the theory should start with Descartes, if not earlier.
403. See the general remarks in Die Voraussetzung der Kausalitàt, in Niklas Luhmann, 




























































































Pàdaqoqik, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp stw, 1982), pp.41-50. Causality is presented as a 
"kind of organization of self-reference” in Luhmann’s introduction, "Paradigmawechsel in 
der Systemtheorie", to Soziale Système -- GrundriB einer alloemeinen Theorie. (Frankfurt 
a.M.: Suhrkamp stw, 4th ed. 1991), p.26.
404. See his remarks in Reflexive Mechanismen, pp.101-103.
405. See Soziologie als Theorie sozialer Système, p. 128; for the comment on obscurity 
Zweckbeqriff und Svstemrationalitàt. p.349.
406. Systemtheoretische Argumentationen, p.315.
407. Sozioloqische Aufklàrung 1, Vorwort (1969), p.5, Vorwort (1972), p.6.
408. The general reference for the design is, of course, what is considered Luhmann’s 
main work, Soziale Système -  GrundriB einer allqemeinen Theorie (1984). For a brilliant 
summary see his article The Autopoiesis of Social Systems.
409. There is a chapter on "Structure and Time" in Soziale Système, but it conspicuously 
begins with the observation that it is only the eighth chapter and that, in fact, systems 
theory does not have to fall back upon the term "structure" for its self-description. See 
Soziale Système, p.377.
410. See Funktionen und Foloen formaler Organisation, pp.24-26.
411. Even in the inaugural lecture the term did not seem to have caused any problems. 
See Soziologische Aufklàrung, e.g. pp.74,78.
412. Sinn als Grundbegriff der Soziologie, pp.51-52 (especially footnote 25).
413. Identitâtsgebrauch in selbst-substitutiven Ordnungen, besonders Gesellschaften 
(1979), in Sozioloqische Aufklàrung 3, pp.198-227 (219).
414. For a retrospective interpretation of his theoretical decision, see Intersubjektivitat 
Oder Kommunikation: Unterschiedliche Ausgangspunkte soziologischer Theoriebildung, 
in Archivio di Filosofia, Vol.54 (1986), pp.41-60.
415. Plandlungstheorie und Systemtheorie, pp.57-58, suggests that actions are constituted 
by processes of attribution, but still considers actions as the elements of social systems. 
But see also the remarks in Macht. p.5, where Luhmann suggests that only 
communication could constitute social systems.
416. See Vorbemerkungen zu einer Theorie sozialer Système (1981), in Sozioloqische 
Aufklàrung 3. pp.11-24 (15-17); and for 1982 see Autopoiesis, Handlung und 
kommunikative Verstàndigung, in Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Vol.11, No.4 (4 October 1982), 
pp. 366-379 (372).
417. See in addition to Autopoiesis, Handlung und kommunikative Verstàndigung, the 




























































































418. See Sinn als Grundbegriff der Soziologie. An English translation of the text was 
published in Niklas Luhmann, Essays on Self-Reference, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1990). It is telling that Luhmann apparently did not see any problem in publishing 
again a text which was almost 20 years old.
419. Complexity and Meaning, in The Science and Praxis of Complexity. (Tokyo: United 
Nations University, 1985), pp.99-104 (102).
420. Macht, p.56.
421. Soziologie als Théorie sozialer Système, pp. 115-116.
422. See Sinn als Grundbegriff, p.92.
423. Insistence on Systems Theory: Perspectives from Germany -  An Essay, revised 
version of a paper presented at the 1981 meeting of the American Sociological 
Association, published in Social Forces, Vol.61, No.4 (June 1983), pp.987-998 (994).
424. See Wie ist soziale Ordnung môglich?, pp.279-282; see also Niklas Luhmann, Wie 
ist BewuBtsein an Kommunikation beteiligt?, in Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Karl Ludwig 
Pfeiffer (eds.), Materialitàt der Kommunikation. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp stw, 1988), 
pp.884-905 (895).
425. Interpenetration -  Zum Verhàltnis personaler und sozialer Système (1977), in 
Sozioloqische Aufklarung 3. pp. 151-169 (154).
426. Vorbemerkungen zu einer Theorie sozialer Système, p.21.
427. Insistence on Systems Theory, p.995.
428. Vorwort, in Soziale Système, pp.9-10.
429. The Theory of Social Systems and Its Epistemology: Reply to Danilo Zolo's Critical 
Comments, in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol.16 (1986), pp.129-134 (130).
430. Neuere Entwicklungen in der Systemtheorie, in Merkur, Vol.42, No.4 (April 1988), 
pp.292-300 (296-297).
431. Soziale Système, p.31.
432. See e.g. Selbstreferenz und Teleologie in gesellschaftstheoretischer Perspektive, in 
Gesellschaftstruktur und Semantik 2. pp.9-44 (26); The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, 
p.184; Neue Entwicklungen in der Systemtheorie, p.295; Das Moderne der modernen 
Gesellschaft (1990), in Beobachtunqen der Moderne. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 
1992), pp.11-49 (33).
433. See e.g. Vorwort, in Sozioloqische Aufklarung 5. p.10. Later statements which 
present the de-paradoxation of paradoxes as the ultimate reference point for functional 
analysis are just new versions of the proclaimed necessity of the externalisation of self­




























































































Erkenntnistheorien?. (München: Fink, 2nd ed. 1992 (first 1990)), pp,119-137 (129), in 
relation to section 124. below.
434. Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1990), p.538.
435. Die Richtigkeit soziologischer Theorie, pp.44-45.
436. On the denial of an anthropological conception of man, see e g. The Individuality of 
the Individual: Historical Meanings and Contemporary Problems, in Thomas C. Heller, 
Morton Sosna, David E. Wellbery (eds.), Reconstructing Individualism -  Autonomy, 
Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1986), pp.313-325 (322); for related remarks along the same line also Die Soziologie und 
der Mensch, in Neue Sammlung, Vol.25 (1985), pp.33-41 ; Autopoiesis als soziologischer 
Begriff, in Hans Haferkamp, Michael Schmid (eds.), Sinn. Kommunikation und soziale 
Differenzierung -  Beitràoe zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Système. (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp stw, 1987), pp.307-324 (309); also the remarks in Das Erkenntnisprogramm 
des Konstruktivismus und die unbekannt bleibende Realitât, in Soziologische Aufklarung 
5, pp.31-58 (53-54).
437. Sthenographie, p.132.
438. The Individuality of the Individual, p.315.
439. Wie ist soziale Ordnung mbglich?, p.235; Die Richtigkeit soziologischer Theorie, 
p.44.
440. The Individuality of the Individual, pp.317,319.
441. Niklas Luhmann, Individuum und Gesellschaft, Universitas, Vol.39 (1984), pp. 1 -11
( 8 ) .
442. See already Vorbemerkungen zu einer Theorie sozialer Système, p.19; also Die 
Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft. p.360.
443. Niklas Luhmann, Am Ende der kritischen Soziologie, in Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 
Vol.20, No.2 (April 1991), pp.147-152.
444. Systemtheorie, Evolutionstheorie und Kommunikationstheorie, p.202.
445. Handlungstheorie und Systemtheorie, p.50.
446. Unverstândliche Wissenschaft -  Problème einer theorieeigenen Sprache, 
pp. 174,177.
447. In addition to Unverstândliche Wissenschaft, p.174, see also Identitàtsgebrauch in 
selbstsubstitutiven Ordnungen, besonders Gesellschaften, p.198.
448. Niklas Luhmann, Talcott Parsons -- Zur Zukunft eines Theorieprogramms, in 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Vol.9, No.1 (January 1980), pp.5-17. For a more recent re­
assessment of Parsons’ Theory, see also Luhmann, Warum AGIL?, in Kôlner Zeitschrift 




























































































449. See Author’s Preface, in Niklas Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982), pp.ix-xii, written in May 1980.
450. Vorwort, in Sozioloqische Aufklarunq 3. pp.5-7 (7), written in February 1981.
451. Autopoiesis, Handlung und kommunikative Verstândigung, pp.367-368, 376.
452. See Vorwort, in Soziale Système, p.14.
453. "Biographie, Attitüden, Zettelkasten", p.145; Stellungnahme, in Werner Krawietz, 
Michael Welker (eds.), Kritik der Théorie sozialer Système -  Auseinandersetzunq mit 
Luhmanns Hauptwerk. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp stw, 1992), pp.371-386 (377-378).
454. Vorwort, Soziale Système, p.14.
455. "Biographie, Attitüden, Zettelkasten", pp.142,145,155.
456. Die Praxis der Theorie, p.264.
457. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Maturana’s ideas were first taken up by an 
interdisciplinary working group (including Peter M. Hejl, Wolfram K. Kôck, G. Roth) at the 
Forschungs- und Entwicklungszentrum für objektivierte Lehr- und Lernverfahren GmbH. 
The distribution of a German version of Maturana’s Biology of Cognition in 1975 aroused 
some interest on the part of various other disciplines, and in 1977 the University of 
Bremen offered the institutional and financial support for a first exploratory symposium on 
the new model. Conference presentations were published in 1978 as P.M. Hejl, W.K. 
Kock, G. Roth (eds.), Wahrnehmung und Kommunikation, (Frankfurt a.M.: Lang, 1978). 
As interest in the theory grew, a second symposium in 1979 was split: the biological 
aspects of self-organisation were discussed at Bremen, the problems of the social 
sciences at Paderborn. Conference papers of the latter meeting were published in 1980 
as Frank Benseler, Peter M. Hejl, Wolfram K. Kock (eds.), Autopoiesis. Communication, 
and Society -  The Theory of Autopoietic Systems in the Social Sciences, (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Campus, 1980). For this overview see the introduction to the 1980 volume, pp.8-10. In 
his contribution to the volume of 1980, Frank Benseler already refers to “points of contact" 
between Luhmann and Maturana. See his On the History of Systems Thinking in 
Sociology, in Autopoiesis. Communication, and Society, pp.33-43 (38).
458. The Theory of social Systems and its Epistemology: Reply to Danilo Zolo, p.129.
459. Later, Luhmann even considers the close cooperation and personal acquaintance 
among Gotthard Gunther. Humberto Maturana, Heinz von Foerster, Joseph Glanville, and 
Luhmann himself to be “interesting in the context of the sociology of science". Apparently 
this group of researchers is mainly organized by von Foerster. See footnote 7 in Am Ende 
der kritischen Soziologie, p.149.
460. Système verstehen Système, in Niklas Luhmann, Karl-Eberhard Schorr (eds.), 
Zwischen Intransparenz und Verstehen -  Fraqen an die Pàdaoooik. (Frankfurt a.M.: 




























































































461. The Self-Description of Society: Crisis Fashion and Sociological Theory, in 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol.25, No.1-2 (1984), pp.59-72 (65,68).
462. Vorwort, in Soziologische Aufklarunq 4, p.7.
463. Autopoiesis als soziologischer Begriff, pp.307-308.
464. Stellungnahme, p.386.
465. See the remarks in Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft, pp.388 (footnote 43),652.
466. The Individuality of the Individual, p.322.
467. See e.g. Die Autopoiesis des BewuBtseins, in Soziale Welt, Vol.36 (1985), pp.402- 
446 (405,414); The Autopoiesis of Social Systems, pp. 179-180.
468. See e.g. Intersubjektivitat Oder Kommunikation, p.56; very clear also in Niklas 
Luhmann, Ôkologische Kommunikation: Kann die moderne Gesellschaft sich auf 
ôkoloqische Gefâhrdungen einstellen? (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1986), p.59; see 
also Tautologie und Paradoxie in den Selbstbeschreibungen der modernen Gesellschaft, 
in Zeitschrift fur Soziologie, Vol.16, No.3 (June 1987), pp.161-174 (172).
469. Talcott Parsons -  Zur Zukunft eines Theorieprogramms, p.13.
470. George Spencer Brown, Laws of Form, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969; 2nd ed. New 
York: Julian Press, 1972).
471. See e.g. Neuere Entwicklungen in der Systemtheorie, p.296.
472. This interpretation of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida was evidently inspired by 
Hilary Lawson. Reflexivitv -  The post-modern Predicament, (London: Hutchinson, 1985). 
See Die Richtigkeit soziologischer Theorie, p.47, footnote 17; explicitly also in 
Sthenographie, p.120.
473. Die Richtigkeit soziologischer Theorie, p.46; Sthenographie, p.120.
474. Autopoiesis als soziologischer Begriff, p.315.
475. Die Richtigkeit der Theorie, p.39.
476. Soziale Système, pp.647-661; the description of self-reference as an "explosive" is 
on p.656.
477. Tautologie und Paradoxie in den Selbstbeschreibungen der modernen Gesellschaft, 
p.171.
478. Heinz von Foerster, Objects: Tokens for (Eigen-)Behaviours, and On Constructing 
a Reality, both in Observing Systems, (Seaside, CA: Intersystems Publications, 2nd ed. 
1984), pp.274-285 and pp.288-309 respectively.




























































































480. Das Erkenntnisprogramm des Konstruktivismus und die unbekannt bleibende 
Realitàt, p.45.
481. Die Richtigkeit der Theorie, p.39.
482. Autopoiesis als soziologischer Begriff, pp.311,314; Neuere Entwicklungen in der 
Systemtheorie, p.295.
483. Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft. p.306-307; Vorwort, in Sozioloqische Aufklarung 
5, p.9; Das Erkenntnisprogramm des Konstruktivismus und die unbekannt bleibende 
Realitàt, p.41.
484. Niklas Luhmann, Ôkologie des Nichtwissens, in Beobachtunqen der Moderne, 
pp. 149-220 (170).
485. Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft. p.15; Vorwort, in Sozioloqische Aufklarung 5, 
P-11-
486. Die Richtigkeit soziologischer Theorie, p.38; Das Erkenntnisprogramm des 
Konstruktivismus und die unbekannt bleibende Realitât, p.49; Die Wissenschaft der 
Gesellschaft. pp.690-691.
487. Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft. p.87.
488. See Kontingenz als Eigenwert der modernen Gesellschaft, in Beobachtunqen der 
Moderne, pp.93-128.
489. See Author’s Preface, in Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society, p.ix.
490. These handy definitions are given in The Self-Description of Society: Crisis Fashion 
and Sociological Theory, p.64.
491. In Soziologie als Theorie sozialer Système, p.124, Luhmann only introduces two 
stages: segmentary and functional differentiation. To my knowledge, this is Luhmann’s 
first text (published in 1967) where society’s evolution is depicted in these terms. The 
three-stages-picture is given, at the latest, in Systemtheorie, Evolutionstheorie und 
Kommunikationstheorie, pp.197-198, in 1975.
492. See Gesellschaftliche Struktur und semantische Tradition, in Gesellschaftsstruktur 
und Semantik 1. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1980), pp.9-71, on the relation between 
structure and semantics. The characterization of modern European society as functionally 
differentiated is given on p.27.
493. A good discussion, almost a case study, of the consequences of functional 
differentiation is Ôkoloqische Kommunikation: Kann sich die moderne Gesellschaft auf 
okoloqische Gefahrdunqen einstellen?. See p.87 on interdependence, p.210 on 
redundancy, pp.211-212 on contingency.





























































































495. N iklas Luhmann, Erleben und Handeln, in Sozio log ische Aufklàrunq 3 . pp.67-80 (76).
496. Identitatsgebrauch in selbstsubslitutiven Ordnungen, besonders Gesellschaften, 
p.209.
497. On the relation between functional differentiation and increasing demands on 
individuality see e.g. Interpenetration -- Zum Verhâltnis personaler und sozialer Système, 
p.158; Identitatsgebrauch in selbstsubstitutiven Ordnungen, besonders Gesellschaften, 
p.217. On an increasing "distance" between social and psychic systems see e.g. Liebe 
als Passion. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 6th ed. 1992), p.16; Die Autopoiesis des 
BewuBtseins, p.436.
498. Ôkologie des Nichtwissens, p. 181.
499. The relation between the (new) conceptualization of action and the possibility of 
empirical research in semantics is made explicit in Handlungstheorie und Systemtheorie, 
pp.58-59.
500. Gesellschaftstruktur und Semantik 1-3. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1980,81,89); 
Liebe als Passion: Zur Codierunq von Intimitât. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1982 (6th ed. 
1992)).
501. See the prefaces of Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik 1. p.8, and 
Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik 2. p.8.
502. See the crucial remarks in Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft, pp.616-619.
503. Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft. p,634.
504. See e.g. Vorwort, in Soziologische Aufklàrunq 4, p.6; Die Wissenschaft der 
Gesellschaft. p.710; Das Erkenntnisprogramm des Konstruktivismus und die unbekannt 
bleibende Realitàt, pp.57-58.
505. See e.g. Das Moderne der modernen Gesellschaft, p.47; Kontingenz als Eigenwert 
der modernen Gesellschaft, pp.93-128.
506. See Die Beschreibung der Zukunft, in Beobachtunqen der Moderne, pp.129-147; 
and especially Niklas Luhmann, Sozioloqie des Risikos, (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 
1991).
507. Tautologie und Paradoxie in den Selbstbeschreibungen der modernen Gesellschaft,
p.168.
508. Georges Dumézil, Entretiens avec Didier Eribon, (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), p.217; 
quoted in Arpad Scakolczai, Nietzsche’s Genealogical Method: Presentation and 
Application, forthcoming as EUI Working Paper in Social and Political Sciences, p.48, 
endnote no.77.
509. See in the preface to Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik 3, p. 10, his remarks on the 
concepts of the “author" (with self-referential implications!). For a recent contribution 




























































































Eine Anmerkung zum Problem der Emergenz sozialer Système, in Kôlner Zeitschrift fur 
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Vol.44, 1992, pp.139-142.
510. Luhmann once remarked that the proper alternative to his systems theory was a 
"relatively theory-less empirical research which works with ad-hoc hypotheses". He 
emphasized the important merits of this type of work. See Neuere Entwicklungen in der 
Systemtheorie, p.298.
511. Interesting (but also ambiguous) passages on this point in Also sprach Zarathustra 
can be found e.g. in the second part, Von den berühmten Weisen, and in Von der Selbst- 
Überwindung.
512. Zur Genealogie der Moral. Zweite Abhandlung, No. 16.
513. This expression is from the preface to the second edition of Die Frohliche 
Wissenschaft. No.4.
514. M. Clark, Michel Foucault: An annotated Bibliography. Tool kit for a New Age, (New 
York: Garland, 1983).
515.1 already alluded, in previous chapters, to the silence encountered by Nietzsche and 
Foucault. Similarly, Luhmann complains about a "peculiar disproportion" between the 
attention paid to the theory of autopoiesis and the lack of appropriate theoretical 
redispositions which this very theory, taken seriously, demands. See Autopoiesis als 
soziologischer Begriff, p.309.
516. For this distinction between the two approaches and this example, see Niklas 
Luhmann, Vorbemerkungen zu einer Theorie sozialer Système, p. 11.
517. Vorbemerkungen zu einer Theorie sozialer Système, p.20.
518. In addition to everything I said in chapters Two and Three on Nietzsche and 
Foucault, I should add that Niklas Luhmann, too, understands ethics as a limitation of and 
a reflection on what counts as morally self-evident. For example, in the lecture he gave 
when he was awarded the Hegel-Prize in 1989, Niklas Luhmann interprets ethics as a 
"Reflexionstheorie der Moral". See Niklas Luhmann, Paradiam lost: Liber die ethische 
Reflexion der Moral. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp stw, 1990).
519. For a full account of the argument (and an application) see Stefan Rossbach, The 
Dynamics of Truthfulness and the Cold War, forthcoming; and for an overview Stefan 
Rossbach, The Autopoiesis of the Cold War: An Evolutionary Approach to International 
Relations?, (Florence: EU I Working Papers in Political and Social Sciences SPS 
No.92/23, 1992).
520. Hence, this essay, in all possible respects, goes much beyond Hilary Lawson's 
introductory discussion of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida. See Hilary Lawson, 
Reflexivitv -  The post-modern predicament. (London: Hutchinson, 1985).
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